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3. ABSTRACT 
This study has examined two epochs of reform and resistance to the government in 
Afghanistan’s modern history. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the internal and 
external factors that terminated the government’s efforts in consolidating the central 
authority and modernizing the country in failure which consequently resulted in the long 
lasting civil war and anti-western tendencies in Afghanistan. The first selected regime is 
the monarchy of King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) and the second one is the communist 
regime of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (the PDPA), under the Soviet 
hegemony (1978-1989). 
This study has provided a conceptual model, which hypothesizes the functions of different 
social, political, and religious factors in the process of consolidating the central power and 
conducting the reform programme. In this regard, the Afghan governments’ inappropriate 
social, political, and economic policies, which provoked several reactions from tribal and 
religious forces, are identified as the internal factors. Furthermore, the colonial 
competitions between Russians and the British, the Great Game, and the tension between 
the Soviet Union and the West, the Cold War, are indicated as external elements. 
The study demonstrates how King Amanullah initially was able to attain legitimacy from 
religious elites, and attract the public support to attain Afghanistan’s complete 
independence from Britain and successfully implement initial stage of his reform 
programme while the PDPA in consequence of its military coup from the beginning was 
involved in the legitimacy crisis. 
According to comparative analysis of two selected regimes, this study has concluded 
several significant findings regarding the factors that were supposed to be under the 
Afghan government’s special consideration and also the characters of the several 
resistances that occurred throughout the two regimes. 
Keywords: Afghanistan, modern history, government, reform, resistance, King Amanullah, 
the PDPA. 
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4. RIASSUNTO 
Questo studio ha esaminato, nella storia moderna dell'Afghanistan, due epoche di riforma e 
resistenza al governo, di fornire un'analisi completa dei fattori interni ed esterni, che si è 
conclusa con gli sforzi di quest’ultimo di consolidare il proprio potere centrale e 
modernizzare il paese. Come causa del fallimento è scaturita una guerra civile che si è 
protratta per un lungo periodo di tempo con tendenze anti-occidentali. Il primo regime 
selezionato è stata la monarchia di re Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) e il secondo è stato il 
regime comunista del Partito popolare democratico dell'Afghanistan (il PDPA), sotto 
l'egemonia Sovietica (1978-1989). 
Questo studio ha fornito un modello concettuale che ipotizza le funzioni dei diversi fattori 
sociali, politici e religiosi nel processo di consolidamento del potere centrale e nella 
realizzazione del programma di riforme. A questo proposito i governi Afghani, 
inappropriati sotto il punto di vista sociale, politico ed economico, hanno causato 
numerose reazioni da parte delle forze tribali e religiose. Questi fattori sono identificati 
come “fattori interni”. Inoltre, la competizione coloniale tra Russi e Inglesi, chiamata come 
il Grande gioco e la tensione tra l'Unione Sovietica e l'Occidente, definita come la Guerra 
fredda, sono elencati come “elementi esterni”. 
Lo studio dimostra come il re Amanullah è stato inizialmente in grado di raggiungere la 
legittimità delle élite religiose e di attrarre il sostegno del pubblico per accedere alla 
completa indipendenza dell'Afghanistan dalla Gran Bretagna, impostando con successo la 
fase iniziale di attuazione del suo programma di riforme; contrariamente il PDPA ha avuto 
sin dall’inizio, come risultato del suo Colpo di Stato militare, una crisi di legittimità. 
Secondo l'analisi comparativa dei due regimi selezionati, questo studio ha trovato diverse 
importanti e significative conclusioni: una su i fattori pricipali essenziali ma non 
considerati dal governo Afgano, l’altra su i caratteri delle diverse resistenze che si sono 
svolte durante i due regimi. 
Parole chiave: Afghanistan, storia moderna, il governo, la riforma, la resistenza, il re 
Amanullah, il PDPA.  
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 Background and Context to the Study 1.1.
In the recent century, Afghanistan was one of the most undeveloped, unstable and insecure 
countries of the world, although several Afghan reformist regimes endeavoured to improve 
Afghanistan’s condition. Since 1880, Afghanistan has seen many processes of 
modernisation such as instituting administrative, political, and social structures, which 
were implemented by several Afghan reformist regimes. Besides, owing to some internal 
factors such as public resistance and external factors such as the Great Game and the Cold 
War the reformist regimes failed to achieve their desired results. 
Afghanistan’s modern history has witnessed permanent tension among the liberal and 
progressive forces and the conservative and regressive ones. Definitely, ethnic and tribal 
struggles, frontier wars, desiring to preserve traditions and resistance to reforms and finally 
dysfunctional government could be regarded as the main character of Afghanistan.  
The first Afghan reformist regime was Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901), who 
was given titles such as “Iron Amir” or “internal imperialism” due to his brutal operation 
to manage the tribal and ethnic communities and subdue them. He conducted some 
policies to develop the government structure, receiving financial aids from the British and 
increasing internal taxation. The king’s cabinet members, governors, and Supreme council 
were selected from non-royal people. He codified laws, systemized the economic 
structures, and established his government based on new administration. His policies were 
based on centralizing control and decentralizing authority to control the power of tribal and 
feudal leaders and to exert a strong influence on the religious scholars. The king’s policies 
against tribal community resulted in uprising the tribal community against his government. 
For instance, Hazara tribe arose against his government and consequently in 1982 faced 
with the king’s successful reaction. However, it is noteworthy that Abdur Rahman Khan’s 
policies in the villages and areas far from the capital to control the power of local 
solidarity groups were not so successful. 
Abdur Rahman Khan’s son, Habibullah Khan (r.1901-1919), whose assumption of power 
was peaceful, was a secular and the reformist King and conducted some policies to 
modernize Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that he wanted to take advantage of western 
science and technology to develop Afghanistan. In 1904, he established the Habibia 
School and also a military school. Siraj-ul-Akhbar, which during King Amanullah became 
an organization for independence and modernization, was published during his reign. It is 
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particularly significant that he endeavoured to alleviate the harsh rules of his father and 
establish a series of more moderate legislation, which resulted in the popular support for 
his regime. Nonetheless, his regime still was not able to gain the consent of all the tribes; 
hence, the tribal opposition was an obstacle to the process of his reforms. During 
Habibullah Khan’s reign, the people who were exiled by his father were allowed to return 
to the country. They brought modernizing ideas and implemented significant role in 
highlighting the significant of independence and launching the reform policies during the 
Amani era. Although there were acute anti-British feelings in the Afghan Society, 
Habibullah Khan was strikingly attracted to British scientific and technical progresses 
especially in India, and he believed that Westernization would result in the modernization 
of the country. 
From 1919 to 1929, which is the first case study of this dissertation, King Amanullah 
Khan, the third son of Habibullah Khan, was the sovereign of Afghanistan. He conducted 
the country to gain independence and cut British hands from Afghanistan, as well as he 
implemented dramatic political and social reform and also as the first Afghan ruler 
conducted some policies to modernize the country based on Western designs. 
As a matter of fact, Afghanistan, subsequent to the attainment its independence and 
achievement the right to manage its own foreign affairs in 1919 commenced a decade of 
modernization. Accordingly, the country’s first constitution was established in 1923 (See 
Appendix A). Furthermore, King Amanullah Khan adjusted a substantial number of Abdul 
Rahman Khan’s inward looking development policies by seriously improving the 
communication substructure and relying on national resources. His reforms threatened the 
interests of his internal and external opponents and in consequence, the reform process was 
faced with several challenges. Following the king’s famous trip to Europe and launching 
the policies to modernize Afghanistan based on Ataturk’s modernizing, he implemented 
hastily and also radically his reform projects. It is worth pointing out that his fundamental 
change in the social and cultural field angered traditional and religious elements in the 
Afghan society, and consequently it emerged popular uprisings led by religious and 
traditional leaders against his government, which resulted in cessation of the king’s 
reforms and ultimately collapse of his regime.  
Although the king’s advisers suggested him to implement the reforms more prudently in 
the rural and tribal areas, his inattention to this advice and making harsh and hasty reforms, 
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which were grave threat for conservative religious and tribal interests, resulted in failure of 
reforms. It is worth pointing out that none of the subsequent reformist governments paid 
attention to reform experience of the Amani era; as a consequence, they repeated the same 
mistakes as Amanullah’s.  
During the reign of King Nadir Shah (r.1929-1933), the turbulence was subsided and the 
development process resumed prudently. He had been the Secretary of War in 
Amanullah’s government and played a major role in the Afghan war against Great Britain 
in 1919, which eventually led to the complete independence of the country in 1922. 
Shortly thereafter, he fell into disgrace and went into exile in France. As descendants of a 
branch line of King Amanullah, Nadir Shah and three of his brothers (including Sardar 
Mohammad Hashim Khan, Sardar Mohammed Aziz Khan and Sardar Shah Mahmud 
Khan) revolted in 1929 and overthrew the short-reigning of Amir Habibullah Kalakani. In 
fact, Kalakani with the British support and in collaboration with Ulema and tribal leaders 
had forced King Amanullah to abdicate and establish non-Pashtun domination. Mohammed 
Nadir Shah appointed himself the king of Afghanistan and immediately initiated hasty 
programs for economic and social modernization of the country, which as during the 
Amani era resulted in conflict with the conservative Ulema. It goes without saying that he 
did not consider at all the experience of Amanullah to deal prosperously with the religious 
forces.  
After the assassination of Nadir Shah in 1933, his son Zahir Shah became his successor 
and led the regency until 1953. The dynasty that was established by father and son called 
Musahiban Dynasty, based on their branch of the family of Mohammedzai
1
 that was a sub-
clan of the Barakzai. In 1964, the Loya Jirga (Grand Council) in the introduction of a 
constitutional monarchy proposed a new constitution. During this time, Zahir Shah 
proposed to implement further reforms; women were given the right to vote and were 
allowed to attend schools, as well as the medieval infrastructure of the country, was 
modified and the country was opened to the outside world. It is noteworthy that for many 
Afghans this era symbolized the last positive memory and reform experience throughout 
the recent decades.  
                                                          
1
 Also known as Mohammadzai or Mohamedsai. 
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On July 17, 1973, Zahir Shah was overthrown while he was in Italy by a military coup that 
was conducted by his cousin and long-time Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud Khan and 
abdicated on 24 August 1973. 
Daoud Khan called the country the Republic of Afghanistan, introduced himself as 
president and supported the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (the 
PDPA). In addition, in 1976, he with the National Revolutionary Party, which was his own 
party redirected their policies and ideologically and politically became away from the 
leaders of the PDPA, Nur Muhammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin.  
Daoud Khan implemented some reforms such as the suppression of Islamic radicalization 
and the emancipation of women, which ultimately forced Islamists to immigrate to 
Pakistan. Islamists made some attempts to perform uprising, however, none of them was 
successful and the government utilized them as a pretext for intensifying pressure on them.  
In 1977, Daoud Khan convened the Loya Jirga with the intention of convincing the 
assembly to recognize the influence of Constitution in Afghanistan and turn the state into a 
one-party state. It does not seem unreasonable to consider that this led to the ban of the 
PDPA. On April 19, 1978, at the funeral of assassinated Akbar Khyber, a Pashtun 
ideologue emerged an uprising against Daoud Khan’s government. Thousands of people 
responded to the summons of Taraki, Amin, and Karmal to demonstrate against the 
government. The PDPA’s leaders seized the power in a military coup on April 27, thus the 
Afghan army that was influenced by the PDPA openly turned against Daoud and finally 
overthrew his regime. 
It is particularly significant that throughout 1933-1978 a substantial number of the 
country’s establishments and also its financial substructure were constructed. Further, the 
government founded the national bank, the first trained army, Kabul College and the state 
airline, not counting streets, airfields, telephones, institutes, production of energy. Thus, 
the country took several significant steps toward the development throughout the 
mentioned years. It is worth pointing out that numerous of the social reforms introduced, 
however, anti-religious reforms such as unveiling of women in 1959, did not face with the 
similar response as in the 1920s. Additionally, since then Prime Minister Daoud to some 
extent took advantage of the mechanism of the government to put them into effect and did 
not run them forcibly. It is likely that apart from the coup in July 1973, some public 
commotions, or local rebellions, Afghanistan generally experienced a nonviolent epoch of 
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approximately 50 years from the interruptions of 1929 up to the Communist coup in 1978. 
Nonetheless, some tensions occurred between the traditionalists and the modernists 
leaders. By virtue of incompatibility of political and cultural progress with Afghan 
traditionalists’ ambitions, the country entered in a challenge with the Saur coup, the Soviet 
invasion, and public opposition. 
The PDPA was able to take power in the country’s political scene and formed the 
government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (the DRA) (1978-1992), which is 
the second case study of this dissertation. The PDPA was established in 1965 and its 
members principally arrived from the urban petty-bourgeois intellectual milieu and 
possessed of Marxist theory at best vague ideas. In May 1967, the party split by virtue of 
some grounds such as disagreements concerning the nature of a future revolution and the 
issue of alliance.  
After 27 April 1978, the PDPA’s leadership took over the management of public affairs. 
The party’s Secretary General Mohammad Taraki became Chairman of the Revolutionary 
Council, Babrak Karmal was Prime Minister, and his deputy foreign minister was 
Hafizullah Amin. They immediately initiated reform measures such as land reforms, 
regulation of marriage and divorce matters, literacy programs and annihilating feudal and 
semi-feudal structures. It is remarkable that they were performed such reforms without 
consideration of social conditions of the country. For instance, there were literacy courses 
in which girls and women had to participate along with men, which was not applicable in 
the religious society of Afghanistan.  
Even with the land reforms, the government underwent serious blunders. In fact, neither 
the farmers nor the government were politically and materially prepared for it. Further, the 
tribal structures and the role of the clergy were simply disregarded; most of the landowners 
were likewise tribal and religious leaders whose interests were under threat by the land 
division.  
In addition, all government responsibilities were given to party members, regardless of 
their qualifications and experiences. Thus, many professionals lost their position in the 
government structure and consequently emigrated. It goes without saying that contrary to 
the principles of the party programme no attempts implemented to reach a broad national-
democratic alliance.  
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All mentioned issues and the de facto division of the PDPA led to a strengthening of the 
government’s opponents. In late 1979, the position of the government was so desperate 
that Soviet military aid appeared inevitable. Since March 1979, Kabul government several 
times requested the Soviet Union for military aid and army deployment.  
There is a school of thoughts that the Soviet military intervention was a huge political 
mistake of the Soviet leadership and documented the inability of the Kabul government to 
seek a political solution to the internal disagreements. It is quite clear that the Soviet 
provided opportunity for the PDPA’s government to compensate for preceding mistakes, 
fulfil a moderate reform policy, and defuse the controversy. The Soviet assured the PDPA 
that all supports could be provided for a period of six months. After this time, the Afghan 
government was supposed to be able to defend itself, and subsequently disposition of 
Soviet forces would have been unnecessary.  
The geostrategic importance of Afghanistan on the southern flank of the Soviet Union 
prompted the Politburo of the CPSU to send units to Kabul. In other words, with the Soviet 
intervention in the intra-Afghan conflict it gained an international character. Most Western 
countries, especially the United States and its regional allies, initially in a secret manner 
and later openly supported opponents of Karmal while the Soviet forces were assisting 
Karmal to handle his opponents. Thus, one could draw the conclusion that Afghanistan 
became the scene of international battlefield. 
 Aims of the Study 1.2.
The primary aim of this study is to clarify why several attempts, implemented in 
Afghanistan’s modern history, to modernize Afghanistan and also develop the influence of 
the central government on the rural and tribal areas faced with public resistance.  
One clarification is the permanent role of religious, tribal, and local groups in resisting to 
modernist government’s attempts at the local level. This study demonstrates that previous 
Afghan modernist regimes have challenged with this particular issue and also it examines 
their adopted policies to expand their control and authority over the rural and tribal areas.  
This study scrutinizes the backgrounds and functions of Afghanistan’s tribal and rural 
systems and religious groups in restraining government’s modernizing efforts spanning 
two Afghan modernist regimes. Besides, the disturbing role of superpowers especially 
Russia and Britain in this regard are verified. Main research questions this study purposes 
8 
 
to respond are how did each modernist regime endeavour to implement its reform 
programme, modernize the country and handle the tribal, rural and religious group that 
have permanently resisted to central governments’ policies? This study hypothesizes that 
resistances of traditional forces such as tribal and religious groups to the central 
government could be regarded as the primary factors, and rivalries and interventions of the 
superpowers such as Russia and Britain could be regarded as the secondary factors in 
disrupting the modernizing process and failure of the reformist regimes throughout 
Afghanistan’s modern history. 
Despite the fact that the preceding studies have correspondingly sought to demonstrate the 
permanent resistance of traditional and religious classes of Afghan society to the central 
rule, none has taken a methodology to delineate characteristics of resistance to the 
modernist government. Likewise, none of them scrutinized characteristics of functional 
Afghan government that were supposed to consider by the authorities throughout 
Afghanistan’s modern history. For instance, Senzil K. Nawid (Nawid, Amanullah and the 
Afghan Ulama: Reaction to reforms, 1919- 29 1987), Roshan Noorzai (Noorzai 1987), and 
M. Waseem Raja (Raja 2011) sought to describe the role of public resistance in disrupting 
Afghan regimes’ reform projects, regardless of scrutinizing the inefficiency in Afghan 
governments in identifying the characteristics and backgrounds of the resistances in order 
to conduct them prosperously.  
It is worth pointing out that this dissertation embarks on this historical analysis with the 
intention of drawing lessons of resistance to the Afghan governments’ modernizing efforts 
to the ongoing reform processes in Afghanistan. 
 Significance of the Study 1.3.
This study provides momentous historical experiments for the current Afghan government 
and international reform determination, for how to best handle the largely rural, tribal, and 
religious community and also conducting them devoid of provoking further internal 
challenge and chaos. 
Recently implemented policies in Afghanistan have hunted to develop the central 
government’s control beyond Kabul and improve the country’s social, cultural and 
political conditions. Although the international community has assisted the Afghan 
government in centralizing its control and regionalize its authority by founding the new 
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administration, owing to internal disunity, challenge, and terrorism operations these 
measures have resulted in failure. Accordingly, there is not a shadow of doubt that the 
current reform efforts have not realized the desired results; consequently, the central 
government has been ineffective to decentralize its authority in the tribal and rural areas.  
There is a school of thoughts that the substructures of the international community’s 
strategy have been inappropriate, as well as it could not be effectively functional in the 
process of reform and strengthening the Afghan government’s control in all over the 
country. (Bradsher 1999, 130, Misdaq 2006, 100). Likewise, there are those who maintain 
that internal challenge and disunity in Afghanistan could be regarded as a significant point 
in this regard (Tanner 2009, 117). 
Re-experiencing these historical blunders would lead Afghanistan to involve in further 
civil war, and also would debilitate the government in handling resurgent forces. In 
addition, consolidating the government’s control and reforming the country regarding 
political, social, and cultural aspects are likewise essential for the campaign against 
resistance groups and ameliorating Afghanistan’s condition. This is because such 
government would be capable of handling prosperously resistance groups and conduct 
consequential political, social and cultural reforms, which would realize national 
reconciliation and develop the country.  
This study, therefore, selected two types of regime in Afghanistan modern history that 
totalitarian regime of King Amanullah Khan (r.1919-1929) and democratic regime of the 
PDPA (1978-1992), with the purpose of analysing the obstacle to consolidate Afghan 
government’s control in the rural and tribal areas and also scrutinizing the factors of 
resistances to the governments’ reform projects. 
 Research Methodology 1.4.
The central methodology to examine aims this of study is a methodical case study of two 
Afghan regimes. The study hunts for providing methodological visions and detailed 
analyse by scrutinizing the historical context of two selected cases. The conceptual model 
for state-making and reform-making (See Figure  1-2) hypothesizes the functions of 
different political, social and religious factors on state-making and reform-making.  
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The model puts forward the constructive and destructive effects that different internal and 
external factors had on the process of state-making and reform-making in Afghanistan’s 
modern history. As the figure shows, external powers are hypothesized as having the 
positive effect on the state-making, but nevertheless their roles regarding reform-making 
are hypothesized negative. Additionally, a legitimate and indigenous authority is assumed 
to be functional, particularly if it is independent and has widespread control in the local 
and tribal areas.  
Furthermore, identification and scrutiny of solidarity groups and their destructive role in 
consolidating the power of central government and also in conducting its modernization 
plans are provided. It is worth pointing out that the conceptual model offers a means, 
through which the study can subjectively analyse the functions of two types of regimes, 
including a totalitarian and a democratic regime, in handling solidarity groups and 
irregular forces that steadfastly resisted the governments’ modernizing policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
           Figure ‎1-2: Conceptual Model for State Making and Reform Making in Afghanistan’s  
Modern History 
 
(+): Positive effect,  (-): Negative effect 
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Ultimately, the study offers a comparative analysis of two studied regimes with the 
intention of evaluating each regime’s prosperity in consolidating its rule and also in 
conducting consequential reforms. 
 Case Selection 1.5.
As above mentioned the two selected cases for study are the semi-totalitarian regime of 
King Amanullah Khan (r.1919-1929), the years of the communist regime of the PDPA 
under the Soviet hegemony (1978-1989). 
These two cases are selected first and foremost for their difference in regime type, 
spanning a monarchist and a democratic rule. Consequently, determining these cases offers 
a prospect of comparing the efforts of two different types of Afghan regimes in 
consolidating their powers and their prosperity in implementing consequential reforms and 
development of Afghanistan.  
An additional noteworthy aspect regarding case selection was the independence. 
Amanullah’s regime was the first independent Afghan regime while the PDPA was a 
puppet regime and completely dependent on the Soviet Union. 
1.5.1. Case One: the Monarchy of King Amanullah Khan: 1919-1929 
Despite the fact that there are many interpretations of King Amanullah Khan’s initial 
success regarding establishing a semi-consolidated central rule to manage several 
resistance factors and also conducting some successful reforms, there has been no scrutiny 
concerning this momentous historical experience to take advantage of them for the 
ongoing reform attempts and eventual resistance to them. Taking into consideration 
Amanullah’s prosperity in attracting the support of tribal and religious elements at least in 
his first stage of reforms might make obtainable traces about how to manage the 
incompetence of the Afghan government to implement consequential reforms and handle 
tribal and religious elements. 
1.5.2. Case Two: People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, under the Soviet 
Hegemony: 1978-1989 
A large number of assays have striven to scrutinize Soviet hegemony in Afghanistan, but, 
nonetheless, a limited number of them have inspected the hindrances of the state-making 
after the Saur coup and the role of different factors in the failure of the PDPA’s reform 
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attempts. There is not a shadow of doubt that scrutinizing the PDPA’s political blunders 
will provide a consequential historical experience for the ongoing reform efforts in 
Afghanistan. 
There is not a shadow of doubt that the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan provided 
the conditions for the final clash between the USA and the USSR, which as a matter of 
course led to fall of USSR. One of the remarkable effects of the Soviet-Afghan war was 
the failure of spreading Marxist-Leninist ideas and accordingly the termination of any anti-
Islam ideologies. It goes without saying that the communist government of the PDPA was 
incapable of controlling the rural and tribal areas and making a consequential agreement 
with the solidarity groups. It is likely that the fundamental mismatch and contrast between 
the apparatuses of the PDPA’s government and ethnic and tribal structure of Afghan 
society was the main obstacle in the process of state-making in the era. Besides, public 
resistances and oppositions to external domination and also to the government’s 
interference in their local affairs and privet life hindered the PDPA from the course of the 
reform-making and modernizing the country.  
 Structure of Thesis 1.6.
The rest of this thesis is organized into five chapters and each chapter is divided into 
several sections and sub-sections. Chapter two provides a prefatory literature review and 
presents the importance of internal and external factors in state-making and reform-making 
spanning two selected epochs.  
Chapter three discusses how King Amanullah was able to gather various elements in 
Afghanistan, consolidated his power and consequentially attained Afghanistan’s 
independence from the Great Britain. Furthermore, this chapter scrutinizes how the king 
was prosperous in his first stage of reforms and which obstacles hindered him from 
decentralizing his authority and also following his reform programme in the subsequent 
stages.  
Chapter four scrutinizes the process of the Saur coup and the PDPA’s adopted solution to 
implement political, Social and educational reforms. The Soviet Union role in the PDPA’s 
policies and the public reaction to them is meticulously depicted. Besides, internal dispute 
in the PDPA, effects of Soviet invasion and resistance to their occupation, and ultimately 
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failure of Najibullah’s national reconciliation policy are the other matters that are regarded 
by this chapter. 
Having presented and discussed two cases of reform and resistance to the government in 
Afghanistan modern history, chapter five presents and analyses separately each case and 
also it provides a comparative analysis of the cases. Furthermore, according to the analysis 
of one monarchical and one democratic government’s function and internal and external 
resistance to their policies, this chapter offers exhibition of findings. 
Finally, conclusion with a number of implications, recommendations, and scope for further 
research are presented in chapter six. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎1-3: Interplay of Thesis Components 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Reforms 
Resistance 
Internal 
Factors 
External 
Factors 
Thesis 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Figure ‎2-1: Structure of Chapter Two 
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 Introduction 2.1.
This chapter arranges based on the aims of the study and the conceptual model for state-
making and reform-making in Afghanistan’s modern history presented in chapter one. It 
goes without saying that there is a substantial number of a literature regarding process of 
state-making and the governments’ reform projects throughout Afghanistan’s modern 
history. Accordingly, a main intention of this chapter is to categorize them through 
incorporating them and provide those sources that follow the most relevance to the aims of 
the study and its conceptual model in order to offer an effective, meticulous, and 
characteristic literature review. Further, the chapter accomplishes a scrutiny of importance 
of internal and external factors in the process of conducting the government’s reform 
projects in Afghanistan’s modern history, in order to offer an overall primer for the further 
presentation of different factors presented in the chapter five. 
 Literature Review 2.2.
A substantial number of literatures are in Persian (Farsi) and Pashto authored by important 
Afghan authors such as Ghobar, Mojaddedi, Farhang, Keshtmand. These authors provide 
an overall stance and provide plenty of perception in the political changes in Afghanistan’s 
history until the twentieth century. It should also be stated that the bulk of this research is 
based on such primary sources because their authors were direct observer of many 
measures, thus their books are the most reliable in this regard. Mir Gholam Mohammad 
Ghobar who was a politician, historian, and journalist in Afghanistan’s modern history 
wrote many books in regard to Afghanistan’s history such as Afghanestan Dar Masire 
Tarikh (Afghanistan in the Course of History Vol 1-2). He scrutinized Amanullah’s 
unprosperous policies and investigated British elements role in this regard. Fazl Ghani 
Mojaddedi was Afghan historian graduated from Cairo University in 1983. He is the 
author of more than 75 articles, books. One of them is “Afghanistan during the kingdom of 
Amanullah Khan”, which is one of the important sources of this study. Mir Mohammad 
Sediq Farhang was another Afghan scholar that was the advisor of the Prime Minister 
during Babrak Karmal, wrote Afghanistan Dar Panj Gharne Akhir (Afghanistan in the 
past five centuries). Sultan Ali Keshtmand was an Afghan politician that was prime 
minister of the PDPA during 1980s. His book Yaddashthaye Siasi va Roydadhaye Tarikhi: 
Khaterat-e Shakhsi ba Borhaee az Tarikhe Siasi Moaser-e Afghanistan, (Political Notes 
and Historical Events Vol 1) is one of the main sources of scrutinising political 
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development in Afghanistan during PDPA’s rule. It goes without saying that there are a 
substantial number of primary sources scrutinized by this study that it is problematic to 
mention the name of all of them in this part. 
Furthermore, this study took advantage of a substantial number of the books written by 
Western scholars. Tytler, Gregorian, Roy, Poullada, Dupree, Olesen are the authors that 
their books are included in the most important sources of this study. William Kerr Fraser-
Tytler was a British soldier and diplomat in Afghanistan from 1935 to 1941. His book 
“Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia” is a 
significant source of this research.  
There are those who maintain that King Amanullah was incapable of attaining public 
support to manage the local solidarity groups. Vartan Gregorian in his book “The 
Emergence of Modern Afghanistan” addresses tribalism, nationalism, Islam, and 
modernization during contemporary history of Afghanistan and strategies of the 
superpowers in Afghanistan during the Cold War. He believed that Amanullah’s failure of 
reform-making was due to his incapability in getting support from urban class to handle 
tribal-feudal-religious-traditionalist coalition (Gregorian 1969, 269). Gregorian surveying 
the opinions of different researchers, who have scrutinized the roots of the independence 
war, is of the opinion that there are different judgements in this regard (Gregorian 1969, 
228). “Afghanistan” is the title of a book written by Louis Dupree who spent several years 
in Afghanistan. He gathered detailed information regarding Afghanistan political 
development from 1962 to 1978. 
Olivier Roy, the well-known French scholar of Islam believes that announcing the policy 
of modernize Afghan society by the king disturbed his relations with influential Muslim 
clerics. It is remarkable that this point was the termination of the Pan-Islamism alliance, 
which had been established in tribes, society, and reformist government. The main reason 
for this dispute was disagreement regarding the relationship between Islam and the 
westernization. Roy highlighted that according to standpoint of fundamentalist clergies, 
defence of Islam was defined as guiding the society toward Islam and Shariah while based 
on King Amanullah’s standpoint defence of Islam was the political issue of anti-
imperialism, and the society could lead to modernity by tendency towards the West (Roy 
1992, 100-101).  
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There is a school of thoughts that have blamed King Amanullah for inefficiency in 
considering the traditional basis of the Afghan government. “Reform and rebellion in 
Afghanistan, 1919-1929; Amanullah’s Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society” written by 
Leon Poullada in 1973 is a remarkable source regarding the first case of this research. The 
author examined the dramatic conflict between a traditional society, whose rules was 
established based on religious and tribal codes, and a modernist group, whose thoughts 
was influenced by the Turkish modernist leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. He disregarded 
the significant role of Islam as an ideological tool directed by religious forces to launch 
traditional tribal uprising against government’s reform programme. He believed that 
King’s incapability to consider traditional basis of his government resulted in uprising 
against his policies.  
There are those who highlighted the functional role of the Islam regarding political 
development in Afghanistan. “Islam and politics in Afghanistan” written by Asta Olesen is 
a comprehensive study regarding the role of Islam in the political development, from the 
realization of the modern Afghan state in the nineteenth century to the present day. He 
emphasized the cultural incoherence of traditional Islamic structure of the Afghan society 
with the king’s thoughts, the rule of prohibition of traditional clothing in cities that was 
enforced by the government and also Queen Soraya’s non-Islamic clothing. According to 
Olesen gender mores that established upon Islamic values effectuated one of the most 
crucial subjects for those who provided a number of requirements to the monarch, and also 
became persistent obstacle to the subsequent modernization processes (Olesen 1999, 117). 
Senzil Nawid, in her PhD thesis titled “Religious Response to Social Change in 
Afghanistan, 1919-1929: King Aman-Allah and the Afghan Ulama”, scrutinizes the 
significant role of Islam during the Amani era considering the connection between British 
spies and Afghan tribes. He believes that in Afghanistan’s modern history Islam developed 
along with anti-imperial campaign. Accordingly, it had a consolidated position and well-
established militants when King Amanullah conducted his reforms regarding 
Afghanistan’s tribal system. He likewise mentioned that influential religious families such 
as Mojaddedi always were not in the contrast with the king’s policies and they likewise 
supported the government in peaceful times. 
Nazif Shahrani reviewed the considerable point of insurgencies during the Amani era. He 
believes that Nawid’s stance presents a statement of facts that were already identified 
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regarding the social and political aspects of Afghan tribes (Shahrani 2005, 665). As an 
illustration, he remarks Nawid's stance regarding anti-imperial activities provided an 
opportunity for religious class. Furthermore, a substantial connection among common-law 
principles, Pashtunwali, and the Shariah might contribute in the process of resistance to 
Amanullah’s reforms. This is because the tribal system regarded government’s new 
constitution as a potential menace to their tribal principles. Accordingly, as Shahrani 
stated from Nawid’s research tribal society regarded Islam as beneficial instrumental to 
expand and increase its demands (Shahrani 2005, 673). 
It is worth pointing out that apart from the indicated sources some others such as Rhea 
Talley Stewart 1973, Heathcote 1980, Fred Halliday 1978, Alexander Lyakhovsky 1995, 
Robert Johnson 2012 are meticulously scrutinized by this study as well. 
It is remarkable that there is a school of thoughts regarding the historical ties between the 
king’s regime and the PDPA are highlighted by some interpretations. Iranica traces the 
historical origin of the PDPA to the nationalistic and anti-colonial (Young Afghans) 
movement of 1920, which led by Amanullah Khan (Iranica 2010). Britannica mentions 
that in 1921 “[King Amanullah] concluded a treaty of friendship with the new Bolshevik 
regime in the Soviet Union. Afghanistan, therefore, became one of the first states to 
recognize the Soviet government, and a “special relationship” evolved between the two 
governments that lasted until December 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan” (Weinbaum 2010). 
Both regimes’ reform policies were faced with many resistances from the traditional and 
religious forces. A substantial number of scholars scrutinized the challenge among 
modernity and tradition during Afghanistan’s modern history. Muhammad Iqbal believed 
that “the religious order of is organically related to the social order which it has created. 
The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other” (Sharma 2008, 
110). 
Indeed, the mentioned sources are a limited number of a long list of sources that is offered 
in the bibliography. In order to provide the literature several archives, libraries and media 
centre were visited library of New York University (Afghanistan Digital Library), the 
National Library of Afghanistan (Kabul), the National Library and Archives of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (NLAI), Interlibrary Services of University of Ferrara, centres such as 
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“Dickinson Bologna Centre” which is a Centre for Global Study and Engagement and 
University Library of Bologna and National Central Library of Rome. 
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3. CASE STUDY 1-THE MONARCHY OF KING 
AMANULLAH KHAN: 1919-1929 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3-1: Structure of Chapter Three 
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 Introduction  3.1.
The previous chapter addressed the overview of the study. This chapter painstakingly 
examines King Amanullah’s reforms, their scopes, and objectives and also pinpoints roots 
of their failure in the views of different scholars and researchers. The method applied in 
this chapter is descriptive and analytical, which is directed using historical texts and also 
macro models of reform programme. 
Afghanistan undergoing more than two decades of despotic and tyrannical rule of Amir 
Abdur Rahman Khan, eighteen-year rule of Amir Habibullah Khan,
 1
 and suffering from 
the British colonialism for decades, eventually in 1919 saw a period of enlightenment and 
freedom devoid of any tyranny and colonialism. Amir Amanullah Khan came to the throne 
in 1919 and plunged into a new strategy, which was based on the independence and a 
decent relationship with the neighbouring countries and western word. Regarding domestic 
issues, he concentrated upon social equanimity, national identity, and egalitarianism. 
Additionally, his domestic policies were vigorously in contrast with the interests of the 
feudal lords, nobles, and clergies. (L. Dupree 1980)  
The previous regimes under the banner of the British colonialism and achieving financial 
and political supports from colonialists autocratically governed. Nonetheless, King 
Amanullah was decisive to release Afghanistan from the British colonialism. He leaned 
upon the Afghan people, terminated the British hegemony, and ceased the British from 
directing and controlling Afghanistan’s domestic and foreign policies. Freedom and 
autonomy need indisputably essential rearrangement and changes regarding the political, 
social, and economic matters. Accordingly, the king conducted these significant principles. 
He sought to shrink the influence of the nobles, feudal lords and Mullahs, and with the 
intention of establishing social equanimity, embarked on some strategies to adjust the 
situation of lower social class and intellectuals. From another point of view, he hunted to 
release state apparatus and administration from influence of irrational and senseless 
traditional principles (See Figure  3-3). The king summoned the collaboration and 
contribution of all Afghans in the process of the reform and modernization. The People 
impressively responded his demand and collaborated with him in the course of pulling out 
the British from Afghanistan and attaining the independence. Additionally, when the 
reform programme involved in the Afghans’ social and cultural norms and the king 
                                                          
1
 For further information see: Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3
rd
 Ed, 
1980), pp.450-462.  
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endeavoured to eliminate the influenced superstition in the Afghan society, the people 
resisted to him, and unfortunately, the resistance became an armed insurgency, which 
eventually resulted in the failure of the reform attempts and collapse of the government. 
Failure of the reforms proposes the question that which factors could be regarded as the 
main reason for failure of the reforms? Moreover, how could be regarded the function of 
the international elements in encouraging the grass root people and solidarity groups 
against the central government. Finally, why the king was not able to centralize his control, 
and decentralize his authority and have successful control in the local and tribal areas? 
There are those who provided so many theories and examinations based on these questions 
in this regard. This study examines all of them with the intention of offering scrupulous 
responses for the mentioned questions;  
 What could be regarded as the essential causes of the failure of Amanullah’s 
government’s policies? 
 What was the role of the Great Game in the state-making and reform-making? 
 What was the role of domestic elements in this regard? 
The British plots and subversive role of the British spies, characteristic inconsistency of 
the modern state with traditions, treason and sabotage of feudal lords, tribal heads, Islamic 
scholars and officials, could be regarded as the roots of the failure of the king’s reform 
programme and resistance to his government. There is no doubt that a successful and 
effective reform programme is supposed to implement in an organized scheme; however, 
in the king’s reform programme lack of such scheme is obvious. From the other point of 
view, the British colonialism, sought to annihilate the principles that assist the country to 
release from colonialism and foreign hegemony. In this regard, the colonialists taking 
advantage of the political and cultural reactionary aspects were able to miscarry of the 
king’s reform programme.  
This chapter offers a conceptual model for the roots of the failure of Amanullah’s policies 
and his inefficiency to consolidate his power.  
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Figure ‎3-2: Conceptual Model for the Roots of the Failure of King Amanullah 
 
The chapter takes advantage of a methodical overview of Amanullah’s government based 
on primary and secondary sources. The chapter determines all methodological theories by 
providing the suitable historical background in every event. In addition, the chapter 
scrutinizes the state’s function in handling dissidents, irregular forces, and rebels. Finally, 
after these examinations, it provides an inclusive analytic summary regarding the first case 
study.  
The chapter at the outset examines Amanullah’s assumption of power and attainment of 
independence for the country. The elements that played consequential role in the process 
of intellectual development of the king and his reformist comrades are presented. 
Afterwards, the chapter provides the stances of reformists and their objectives, scopes of 
reforms and resistance to them. Besides, the chapter emphasises on the elements that 
bothered the king to centralize his control and decentralized his authority.  
Subsequent to the king’s unsuccessful reform programme and downfall his government, 
the country faced with a huge crisis. Habibullah Kalakani who was a leader of religious 
forces getting support from the British elements provided a huge resistance to the king’s 
policies and collapsed his government. The British utilized Kalakani as the predominant 
religious factor to stimulate all the Afghan solidarity groups against the king’s policies. 
Kalakani provided his remarkable declarations for the Afghan people, in which addressing 
to the grass roots of the people declared that he saw cruelty, atheism and irreligious beliefs 
of the government, thus he arose to declare Jihad to protect the religion of Prophet 
Muhammad and release the Afghan people from cruelty and offence. He added that he 
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would never exploit the public treasury for constructing schools and would grant this it to 
his militaries and to Mullahs (Ataee 2004, 270). 
Nevertheless, some intellectual people comprehended the significance and principles of the 
king’s government, comparing it with Kalakani’s strategies and his religious and 
traditional system of the governance. Consequently, several researchers directed their 
studies in the manner of scrutinizing the factors of the failure of King’s reform programme 
and his inability to control the local and tribal areas and practically handle the different 
resistance groups.  
Ghobar regarded the British intervention and government’s inefficiency as the motives of 
uprising and consequently the failure of reform attempts. He assumed that the British 
elements by providing propaganda in contradiction of the king and Queen Soraya excited 
the public. From the other point of view, misgovernment, and lack of powerful authority, 
officials’ plots resulted in the failure of the reforms. He likewise criticized the king by 
virtue of his selfish and arrogant behaviour, radical policies, and hasty reforms following 
his dramatic trip to Europe and neighbouring countries (Ghobar 1981, 7).  
Ataee approves Ghobar’s idea taking into account the mentioned factors as the grounds of 
the failing in the reform programme. Furthermore, he assumes that, the king’s immoderate 
confidence in his mother and following her idea in conducting his policies was a 
remarkable blunder of him. He charges Barakzai to bother the king in conducting 
successfully his policies (Ataee 2004, 249). 
Indeed, the majority of researchers are approved Ghobar’s point of view that the British 
conspiracy, the king’s radical westernization and secularization, disregarding traditional 
rules, Islamic instructions and social beliefs, antagonism of religious scholars could be 
regarded as principal roots of the failing in his policies and toppling his government 
(Ghobar 1981, 7). 
 Assumption of Power 3.2.
King Amanullah’s rise to power was a struggle between two different ideological groups, 
which were reformists leading by Amanullah Kahn and orthodoxies leading by Sardar 
Nasrullah Khan. Both parties were opposite to Amir Habibullah Khan’s pro-British policy 
throughout the first World War and they were of the opinion that the country was supposed 
to continue Angolo Afghan war to attain independence. Additionally, each party had 
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different comprehension regarding religious matters. The reformists were motivated to 
develop the country and implement modernization efforts in the social and political 
aspects, nevertheless the orthodoxies were completely opposite to any kind of 
modernization, and supported traditional rules and Islamic values institutions as the best 
manner of the guiding the country. Each party sought to bring its own leader to power and 
direct the country based on its on ideologies.  
The Ulema and the Ghalzais declared their support of Nasrullah Kan, who advocated their 
interests and traditional and religious beliefs, and intellectuals and reformists supported 
Amanullah Khan. Finally, he defeated Nasrullah Khan’s limited army in Jalalabad and 
took the control of the country. Subsequently the British recognized Amanullah Khan as 
the Sovereign of Afghanistan (Johnson 2012, 177). 
Amanullah’s assumption of power could be regarded as the outset of a new era of dramatic 
modification in Afghanistan regarding foreign and domestic policies. The king in a decade 
of his rule made an effort to achieve and preserve Afghanistan’s independence. He sought 
to make improvement and adjust his new relations with other countries. Furthermore, he 
altered domestic politics with his social, political, and economic reform programme. His 
efforts faced with backlash from the local solidarity groups, which caused a crisis between 
these groups and the central government and bothered the government to have a 
decentralized authority in all over the country.  
 The Young Afghans 3.3.
To have a meticulous outlook regarding Amanullah’s social reform and the nationalist-
reformists phenomenon in Afghanistan modern history, is indispensable the scrutiny of the 
development of the nationalist and modernist movements of the modern history of Islamic 
countries.  
The phenomenon of the modern nation-state and independence initially sparked in the 
Western world and afterwards it was generalized to the other nations. Additionally, pro-
independence doctrine developed in the Middle East and as a reaction to Western 
hegemony and its cultural and political influence. The primary intention of the first of 
Islamist modernist movement was to review of Islamic principles to adapt them to the 
modernization ideology and preserve Islam from any disappointing damages (Ghazal 
1997). Accordingly,
 
nationalist-reformist movement in the Middle Eastern countries like 
THE CONTRADICTION 
BETWEEN TRADITION 
AND REFORMS  
BRITISH CONSPIRACY  
TREASON AND 
SABOTAGE OF NOBLES, 
FEUDAL LORDS, 
GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS  
FAILURE OF THE 
REFORMS AND FALL 
OF THE 
GOVERNMENT 
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Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan initiated to examine prudently the Western methods and 
procedures of political and social reforms to make adaptable reforms in the Islamic society 
and its administrative system.  
Emerging nationalism in Afghanistan was simultaneous with social and political alteration. 
In the beginning of twentieth century, Afghan intellectuals established the secret national 
movement known as constitutionalists’ movement, which requested restrictions on the 
control of the king, attainment of national independence, improvement of domestic 
economy and scientific progress. Constitutionalists’ movement by virtue of unfolding their 
secret plot against Amir Habibullah Khan was suppressed by the government, whereas in 
fact it did not collapse. It is worth pointing out that after the first decade of the twentieth 
century, constitutionalists’ movement became united with Jawanan-i Afghan movement 
(Young Afghan movement). 
This nationalist group was chiefly composed of intellectuals, scholars, and journalists. It 
likewise attracted several important political leaders comprising of high-ranking officials 
and the royal family. The originator of the Young Afghan movement was Mahmud Tarzi
1
, 
the most important ideologist of Afghanistan’s modern history. He assumed that 
Afghanistan had all the conditions to fulfil nationalism; however, the remarkable issue in 
this regard is lack of the knowledge to demonstrate obviously that Afghanistan, as other 
countries, could be independent regardless any protection from the British or any other 
superpowers. (TARZİ 2003, Schinasi 1974, Farhadi 1977) 
Amir Habibullah Khan granted safe-conduct to all the intellectuals and scholars who were 
exiled by the previous regimes. This policy resulted in bringing back knowledgeable 
individuals to Afghanistan. These individuals under the leadership of Tarzi implemented a 
fundamental function in directing the country towards independence and fulfilling 
nationalism. In fact, Tarzi affected many intellectuals comprising the two sons of Amir 
Habibullah Khan; Enayatulla and Amanullah. It is worth pointing out that when he 
became the Minister of Education in Kabul requested some modern education and also in 
1914 Habibia School experienced some educational reforms (Tarzi 1913). 
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However, the Young Afghan movement managed to remove Amir Habibullah Kahn from 
the political scene and thus by putting an end to an totalitarian regime provided the 
conditions for raising a constitutional one, which would emphasis on civil rights, liberties 
and administrational system (See Figure  3-3). In other words, in 1919, the young Afghan 
movement directed by King Amanullah struggled against the British colonialism and 
implemented a series of reforms throughout the Amani era, which were faced with local 
solidarity groups and finally were doomed to failure.  
As reported by Dr. Misdaq, the Young Afghan movement was a model of the Young Turk 
movement and the doctrine of Sayed Jamaludin Al-Afghani
1
 with pan-Islamic 
programmes. The Young Afghan believed that to defence of Islam Afghanistan was 
supposed to be adapted to modern ways or views like Turkey and Iran; thereby 
Afghanistan could provide a strong fortified defensive system for defence of Islam 
(Misdaq 2006, 98). 
 Siraj-ul-Akhbar and Mahmud Tarzi  3.4.
Siraj-ul-Akhbar (Lamp of the News of Afghanistan) was first Afghan newspaper published 
in Kabul, which was an organization for Afghan intellectuals such as Tarzi to spread their 
modernist ideas regarding political, educational, social issues. From the other point of 
view, it was regarded the best approach by Afghan intellectuals to spread out their 
constitutional outlook and highlight the necessity of implementing the fundamental 
changes and modifications in the administrative system.  
Mahmud Tarzi during his present in Turkey sought to discover the roots of the 
backwardness of Afghanistan and the factors that played as barrier in this regard. He 
strongly believed lack of attention to educational issues in Afghanistan was supposed to be 
one of the most consequential factors of Afghan backwardness. These conditions provided 
a context for superpowers to dominate Afghanistan and direct it based on their own 
interests and desires, which with no shadow of doubt was in the conflict with the Afghan 
people beliefs and desires. 
Indeed, these issues determined Tarzi to launch some policies to increase the level of 
knowledge of the people with the intention of developing the revolutionary concept in the 
country. He believed that in the first step religious educations were supposed to be 
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replaced with advanced progressive educations. It is worth pointing out that based on 
religious education the king had divine authority and nobody had the right of criticizing 
him. From another point of view, religious leaders are strongly supposed to be respected 
owing to the fact that through them people could be convinced. Accordingly, religious 
leaders guide people based on their own idea and provided for people no opportunity to 
consider different issue and as a result, there was no possibility of making any progress in 
the country (Sakhawarz 1997, 25). 
Tarzi wrote several articles in Siraj al Akhbar and criticized the British policies in 
Afghanistan, and addressing the British authorities declared that the period of their mastery 
in Afghanistan was over. Amir Habibullah Khan never prevented him from criticizing 
them and also encouraged him to continue his anti-British activities. Tarzi went a step 
further and constantly criticized European imperialism and their policies in Afghanistan. 
He likewise blamed religious leaders for promoting outdated beliefs in the Afghan society 
providing the context of backwardness of the country (L. Dupree 1980, 439). 
It is remarkable that apart from Tarzi’s articles several intellectuals published their anti-
colonial article in the Siraj al Akhbar, which gradually became an important organization 
of anti-colonial movement. Thus, intellectuals, taking advantage of the important factor of 
national identity, promoted the revolutionary concept among local solidarity gropes. They 
endeavoured to provide the conditions to arise against the British among all local solidarity 
groups especially those whose interests depended on the British.   
Mahmud Tarzi knew attainment of independence without a strong coalition among all the 
solidarity groups would not be practical. He likewise believed the country required to be 
united with all the countries, which were suffering from the colonial powers. Based on this 
idea he decided to convey the messages of pan-Islamism to Turkey and anti-colonial 
movement of Muslims in India. Further, he conducted some policies establish good 
relationships with tribal chiefs and religious leaders with the intention of getting their 
approval and support in this regard. Furthermore, he assumed that international support 
was likewise very consequential and would bring a definite victory for Afghans. In this 
respect, he published many articles supporting Islamic or non-Islamic countries, which 
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were under colonial pressure of Russia and Britain.
1
 (Siraj al-Akhbar, (Mizan, 8th, 1292) 
1913) 
In addition to the actions of Tarzi and his comrades, which played a significant function in 
stirring up the Afghan people, the role of international events should not be disregarded. 
Indeed, some international events such as the Iranian Constitutional Movement, 
convention between Great Britain and Russia in 1907, pan-Islamism in India after the 
trauma of the Balkan in May 1913, had considerable consequences regarding the Afghan 
nationalism movement. These events could be regarded as a remarkable lesson learned and 
convenient models for inexpert Afghans and prevent them from repeating their political 
mistakes. Furthermore, Tarzi and the other intellectuals translated several books such as 
International Law from Turkish to inform Afghan people regarding their country’s 
international right and The History of the Russo-Japanese war to demonstrate that Asian 
countries attained their rights from imperialism and colonialism.  
Moreover, Afghan intellectuals emphasized the emancipation of women. They believed 
that the government to hold women in high respect as men should launch some policies. 
Based on their idea the women were supposed to involve in all public affairs and they 
could have the same rights as men. Further, they wanted the government to allow the 
women to learn foreign languages and later they were able to inaugurate a school for 
women in this regard. 
It is worth pointing out that Afghan intellectual class believed that the country is backward 
and undeveloped as a result of the consecutive errors throughout Afghanistan’s history. 
Accordingly, the mentioned errors were supposed as lesson learned in the process of the 
modification of different aspects of the Afghan society.  
They likewise repeated Tarzi’s idea regarding the necessity of establishing convenient 
educational institutions to increase the level of the knowledge of the Afghan people. They 
argued that taking special consideration in this regard was very consequential to cut the 
roots of development in the country. Tarzi likewise argued that in consequence of lack of 
knowledge in the country the Afghan people were not aware of their fundamental rights in 
the internal and international arena. The intellectuals were strongly against religious and 
traditional educations and argued that in consequence of lack of qualified educators and 
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recourses in such educations, they were not adequate to improve public knowledge. Tarzi 
emphasized that development in the progressive countries was not just in consequence of 
their military capacity, it was on account of their scientific progress as well (Sakhawarz 
1997, 34). 
Tarzi’s opinions resulted in appearing a huge encouragement in the court regarding the 
necessity of conducting social, cultural, and political modifications in the country. At that 
time, prince Amanullah was one of the important adherents of Tarzi and promoted Tarzi’s 
opinions in the ruling system. Furthermore, Tarzi’s special attention to Afghan lower class 
led to obtaining a very popular position in the society (A. M. Ghani 1980, 92).
 
Thereby, he 
was able to make a consequential connection between local solidarity groups and the 
central government. In other words, Tarzi’s popularity among tribal and local groups later 
assisted the central government to implement successfully some part of its policies. Tarzi 
was able to make a semi-unity in the country and handle the opposition groups and 
associated them with the central government. 
Amanullah Khan enjoyed particular popularity by the beginning of 1919 as a result of 
Tarzi’s arrangement (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan, 1914-1929; faith, hope, and the British 
Empire 1973, 24).
 
Indeed, he became a political figure that attracted the attention of all 
Afghan nationalist-reformists.  
 Achievement of Independence   3.5.
One of the most important political successes achieved by King Amanullah was attainment 
of Afghanistan independence in the first year of his rule. Ghani criticized him by virtue of 
some of his policies in this regard, and argued that he disregarded several Afghan local 
solidarity groups and in his policies did not consider their interests; moreover, he blamed 
the king for his senseless manners and strange policies regarding the public (A. A. Ghani 
1989, 733). 
Indeed, some of the Afghan solidarity groups were pro-British and some others were anti-
British. For instance, Shir Ahmad Khan and Ali Ahmad Khan’s solidarity groups were 
oriented to the British and were against government’s anti-British policies. They 
comprehended that the termination of the British influence in the country would threaten 
their interest in the country. The king by virtue of having adequate support never 
endeavoured to make any alliance with these opposition groups throughout the third 
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Angolo Afghan war. Although he was the winner of the war, these groups later played an 
important role to bother him in making his policies.  
It is noteworthy that the king’s assumption of power was along with some significant 
international events after the first World War, which persuaded him to consider the foreign 
policy as the first and foremost issue. In addition, the especial international situation and 
social and political instability among the British territory encouraged him to take 
advantage of these conditions as an opportunity to attain independence of his country. It 
could be argued that the termination of the British influence and intervention in 
Afghanistan’s affairs for the first time in its history was yield of the third Anglo-Afghan 
War
1
 in 1919. (Fremont-Barnes 2009) 
Vartan Gregorian surveying the opinions of different researchers, who have scrutinized 
the roots of the independence war, believes that there are different judgements in this 
regard (Gregorian 1969, 228). For instance, some of them those who supported the British 
in this war did not consider Afghanistan as the winner and argued that the British due to 
expediently relinquished the war. 
Indeed, King Amanullah conducted some policies to obtain further support from the local 
solidarity groups. He promised to provide full freedom and respect all beliefs. He likewise 
ensured them obtaining the independence of the country and argued that the influence of 
the British was a threat to Afghan people’s rights and he was going to regain their rights 
(Popalzai, Summary: a glance at history of independence, Third Anglo-Afghan War with 
Britain, 1919 1989, 19).
 
Thus, the king on 24 February announced independence of 
Afghanistan and personal freedom in the country.
2
 
On 28 February 1919, the king addressing the Afghan people promised them to provide for 
them complete freedom and ensure them to be immune from any aggression and 
oppression. He added that the people were supposed to be obedient to the law and the 
government would consider the principle of consultation in conducting the affairs and 
running the country (Ghobar 1981, 752). Furthermore, on 3 March he emphasized that the 
right of Afghanistan like other independent countries were supposed to be respected 
                                                          
1
 For further information see: Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919, (Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, 2009), pp.76-90. 
2
 For further information see: Mir Gholam Mohammad Ghobar, Afghanistan dar masire tarikh, [Afghanistan 
in the Course of History], vol. 2, p.753. 
32 
 
(Ghobar 1981, 753).
 
Indeed, this action indicated declaration of war against the British and 
also meant that he was sure from the support of tribal and local groups. 
On 3 March, Amanullah wrote a letter to British India and declared Afghanistan 
independence.
1
 Hafiz Saifullah Khan, the British representative in Kabul informed the 
British India that the king declared that he would allow neither the British nor any other 
country to intervene in Afghanistan’s affairs. 2 Furthermore, he implemented a series of 
political measures, sent political missions to other country, and established some 
commercial treatment with the other countries in order to demonstrate his country’s 
independence. (Adamec, The History of political relations in Afghanistan from Amir 
Abdul Rahman till independence 1970) 
It could be argued that due to having adequate backing from local solidarity groups he was 
determined to enter a war with the British. He knew that the one most important factor that 
could support him in the battle with the British was the tribal and ethnic forces. In other 
words, in consequence of lack of strong military forces
3
 in the country the king was forced 
to be sure of having support from these groups. Furthermore, he made an attempt to have 
Ulema’s support as well. He was aware of their spiritual power, which could provide for 
him the popular support in this regard. Accordingly, he slowly equipped the Afghan 
military forces and sent them to East and South side (Ghobar 1981, 753). 
On 3 May 1919, the king’s forces through Khyber attacked Peshawar (Adamec, 
Afghanistan, 1900-1923; a diplomatic history 1967, 104-105), which was the starting point 
of the war. In this region, the functional position of the Pashtun tribe and their supporting 
role were very important for his troops. Fraser Tytler provided meticulous examination of 
the situation in the Pashtun
4
 tribal belt throughout the war. He argued in consequence of 
supporting role of the Pashtun the British could not manage the battle and the Pashtun 
dominance in the region bothered the British to have the upper hand throughout the 
battlefield, thus the British control of the border got poor within a few days (W.K 1967, 
191).
 
The mentioned situation provided encouragement among the Afghan forces, which 
motivated them to invade the British India’s borders. Furthermore, seizing Peshawar was 
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the most important victories for Afghans, which was only obtained by Afghan tribal forces 
in the border and brought serious impact on the British Army (Heathcote 1980, 177). 
Indeed, the Afghan forces with the collaboration of tribal forces in several regions, 
Jalalabad, Paktia, Waziristan, Tel, Pivar defeated the British forces. Such successive 
failures forced the British to relinquish and call for a permanent ceasefire.  
The British authorities comprehended that the domination of the Afghan tribes especially 
the Pashtun tribal belt would never provide possibility to their forces to make any 
progress. They knew that the present of the tribal forces in the battle in favour of the king 
would be very disappointing for them. They, therefore, regarded ceasefire as the only and 
the best option for them in this regard. It should also be stated that the liberation 
movements in the British India territory indirectly assisted Amanullah to be the winner of 
the battle. In consequence of these movements, the British authorities involved in the 
internal problems and spent a substantial part of their forces to handle them. Accordingly, 
they knew that the continuation of the war would cost a substantial sum for them and 
making peace with the king was more reasonable. 
 Pan-Islamism  3.6.
As it was mentioned earlier King Amanullah at the beginning of his reign followed pan-
Islamism policies. As a result, he managed his foreign policy based on this policy and thus 
regarded a priority for Islamic countries. For insistence, in the first year of his reign he 
made an attempt to establish the relationship with the neighbouring country, Bukhara. 
Amanullah wrote a letter to Amir Alam Khan, Amir of Bukhara, and highlighted the 
necessity of making unity between Bukhara and Afghanistan and also in the Muslim 
world. It should also be stated that he added that Bukhara’s independence would be 
recognized by Afghanistan in its agreement with Russia.  
The king managed his domestic policy on the foundation of pan-Islamism policies and as a 
result he made an attempt to unify different Muslim groups in the country. He was against 
the racial and ethnic prejudice and comprehended that such disunity could absolutely 
create problem for his government. He declared that Hindu, Hazara, Shiite, Sunni, 
Popalzai and Ahmadzai were equal and same nations. 
Amanullah perceived that that his government was required to receive legitimacy from 
religious elites. Accordingly, with the purpose of attainment legitimacy from religious 
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elites founded his governments based on pan-Islamism policies. Besides, he sought to 
attract religious elites’ trust and consider their idea in launching his policies at least in the 
beginning of his reign.  
The common view among the king religious elites, and Mashrooteh Khahan 
(constitutionalists) was their anti-British and also anti-colonialism, which resulted in 
making a substantial alliance among them and definitely assisted Amanullah in conducting 
his policies peacefully. It goes without saying that considering pan-Islamism and 
respecting religious elites likewise brought for Amanullah popularity among Afghan tribal 
solidarity groups.  
It is worth pointing out that pan-Islamism policies provided international reputation for the 
king and he found many sympathizers throughout the Muslim world in consequence of his 
anti-colonialism ideas, as well as he became known as Islamic leaders. For instance, 
Egyptians believed that a democratic and nationalist sovereign like King Amanullah could 
be a key to be released from colonialism for the Egyptians and other eastern nations. In 
other words, Amanullah became a great model an oriental King in the twentieth century 
and countries that were under colonial domination requested him to assist them to cut the 
hand of colonialism from their country (Mojaddedi 1977, 330). Furthermore, following the 
collapse of the Ottoman caliphate King Amanullah became the last hope of the Muslim 
world and the only salvation of Islam (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 2005, 32).
 
There is not 
a shadow of doubt that the underlying cause that his regime, at least in the early years of 
his reign, appeared to be more successful comparing other Afghan regimes was his 
political astuteness in treatment the different critical factors in Afghan society. 
Subsequent to attainment the independence of Afghanistan, Indian Muslims argued that 
they were likewise supposed to release themselves from domination of infidels (the 
British). Accordingly, as they did not have adequate ability to withdraw the British from 
their country, the only option for them was immigrations moving toward Afghanistan. As 
a result, the Indian religious leaders issued fatwa, which ordered the Indian Muslims to 
immigrate to Afghanistan. Consequently, a large number of Indian Muslims moved to 
Afghanistan and the Afghan king accepted them warmly. As a result, the British 
authorities felt a grave threat from Afghanistan and deduced that if the situation continued 
like this their situation would be so critical in the region. 
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Afghanistan did not have adequate financial support for Indian immigrants, the Britain 
authorities, therefore, did not cease the Indian Muslims to immigrate to Afghanistan. They 
believed that the present of Indian immigrants in Afghanistan could be a considerable 
trouble for Amanullah’s government. Their prediction was accurate and the king soon after 
ordered to cease the immigration to Afghanistan (Olesen 1999, 114). The number of Indian 
immigrants in Afghanistan reached eighteen thousand and the Afghan government was not 
able to support all of these immigrants. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that this 
event demonstrates Amanullah’s political inexperience and the British authorities’ efforts 
to weaken the position of the Afghan king.  
As a result of Amanullah’s pan-Islamism policies, in addition to the Indian Muslims, the 
Hindus supported his anti-colonialism policies and believed that the king’s policies could 
assist them to release their country from the British hegemony. On the other hand, he 
sought to respect their Hindu sentiments and regarded their ideology in his policies.
 1
 It 
could be argued that he formed a multilateral coalition against the British in his 
neighbouring country in the early years of his reign, which determined the British 
authorities to remove the Afghan king from the political scene as soon as possible. (Paksoy 
2005) 
Amanullah’s independence campaign presented him as the anti-imperialist figure in the 
Muslim world. In the early years of his reign, he conducted the militant pan-Islamic 
policies and as a result, on the one hand he supported the caliphate against threat of the 
British and the Bolsheviks, on the other hand, he encouraged Amir of Bukhara and 
Turkestan Basmachis
2
 to stand against the Bolsheviks. Eventually, in September 1920, the 
Bolsheviks seized Bukhara and Khiva and requested to use Kabul as their campaign 
against the British, which was absolutely rejected by the king. He believed that giving such 
opportunity to the Bolsheviks could bring a serious treat for Afghanistan’s independence 
and increasing the British hostility.  
Amanullah’s policies were affected by the Great Game, which forced him to direct his 
foreign policy based on this event. He comprehended that neither the British nor the Russia 
were trustable, but nevertheless in order to implement his policies he was forced to handle 
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one of them and Russia was obviously better option comparing it with the British. It 
should be highlighted that Amanullah did not have sufficient financial sources and in 
consequence of immigration of Indian Muslims to Afghanistan, he was more in trouble. 
From another point of view, he recognized a grave threat from the British territory and 
comprehended that without getting support from tribal solidarity groups could not handle 
the British forces. However, these forces were not reliable for the king and they were 
under the command of the tribal chiefs, followed their tribal interests, and always could 
not be available. Accordingly, Amanullah regarded Russia as the only option that could 
provide military support for Afghanistan against the British. Although On November 28, 
1921 he concluded a treaty with the Bolsheviks for the first time, the Bolsheviks respected 
none of their obligations. The king’s estimate was indisputably true in this regard and he 
said that there was not a shadow of doubt that the Bolsheviks were not reliable (Stewart, 
Fire in Afghanistan 2005, 32). Additionally, he argued that Afghanistan was a free and 
independent country and had its own right to have relationships with its neighbouring 
countries like Russia, Bukhara. Although third Angolo Afghan war could be considered as 
the underlying cause that the British hated the king, the British authority also recognized 
that his measures provoked the Indian Muslims to arise against the British colonialism and 
encouraged them to abdicate from British rule.  
Amanullah took advantage from Pan-Islamist movement to centralize the central 
government control, decentralize his authority, and also provide the suitable backgrounds 
for his modernization efforts. He adopted this policy based on Mahmud Tarzi’s advises. 
Tarzi believed that the only solution to unify the Muslim world was Pan-Islamist 
movement, which likewise could bring popular support for the king to implement 
successfully his modernizations policies. Tarzi believed that Amanullah’s reform 
programme could be difficult and critical to the Afghan society to understand. It, therefore, 
was essential to provide a suitable background for the reform programme. Furthermore, 
Tarzi’s invited all Muslims in the Middle East from Egypt to Turkey, Iran to arise against 
the imperialist oppression, which caused a unified movement against colonialism. Nawid 
Senzil argued that Islam was a consequential ideological factor for the anti-colonialism 
activities element to unify the Afghan people in opposition to the British hegemony in the 
country throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Nawid, The State, the 
Clergy, and British Imperial Policy in Afghanistan during the 19th and Early 20th 
Centuries 1997, 581-82).  
37 
 
Mahmud Tarzi’s advices were remarkable in the king’s state-making and reform-making 
processes. The king sought to make a unity within the court and among the noble class in 
order to consolidate the central government and centralize his control. Tazi’s patriotic 
ideas were very consequential to guide the king in this regard. It should also be stated that 
Amanullah’s constitutional movement was one of his principal objectives, based on which 
the constitutionalists were required to remove all internal barriers to fulfilling the rule of 
law in the country (Ghobar 1981, 726).  
 Reform Programmes and Resistances  3.7.
The reform programme initially accomplished in the court and the royal family, with the 
purpose of attracting the trust of the local solidarity groups and getting religious elites 
endorsement of the reforms. Pamir argued that the king comprehended that his reform 
programme was supposed to be fundamental to attain the public trust. Consequently, he 
conducted some popular measures, which could provide a suitable background for his 
critical reforms. For instance, he dismissed the women and girls who were forced to work 
as labour in his father’s and grandfather’s court. Furthermore, he conducted some policies 
to prevent any kind of buying and selling humans, and in fact, he prohibited slavery. From 
another point of view, luxury and lavishness were strongly forbidden and urged the 
courtiers to adhere to this new procedure. The king argued that all the people were equal 
and nobody had superiority to the other people (Pamir 2002, 107). 
It could be argued that Amanullah by launching such policies could attract the trust of the 
tribal and rural groups within Afghan society; on the other hand, he made many opponents 
within the court and among the government officials, who used to have a luxury life and 
wanted to have their former privileges.  
Before King Amanullah, his father and grandfather implemented some measures to 
modernize the Afghan state and society. The efforts of his grandfather, Amir Abdul 
Rahman Khan, led to make modern Afghan state; however, his policies were based on 
feudalism and autocracy, which disappointingly disregarded tribal cultural values of the 
Afghan society. Although, Amanullah’s father, Amir Habibullah Khan, initially appeared 
to be very encouraged to consider and develop the public Affairs and conducted some 
political and cultural innovations in this regard. For instance, he founded some educational 
institutions like Habibia School and endeavoured to modernize the society in this regard. 
Additionally, in consequence of his oppressive policies and political inexperience, at the 
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end of his rule the reform process was aborted. Such backgrounds resulted the king faced 
with many critical problems throughout the process of state-making and reform-making. In 
other words, Amanullah’s predecessors provided a huge cleavage between state and 
society and he was aware of the reality that the people hated the Afghan authority. All the 
mentioned activities, conducted by the king, were with the intention of providing a popular 
trust for the Afghan authority. It should also be stated that regarding the foreign policy the 
country was dependent on London and was not self-governing. Accordingly, when the 
king came to power was supposed to make a revolution regarding internal and external 
policies and in fact, the constitutionalists like Tarzi were supposed to provide a 
programme, which could change everything immediately.  
Totalitarian and monarchist authorities in Afghanistan and inter-tribal rivalry between 
Pashtunisim could be regarded as two remarkable characters of this country throughout its 
history. Results of the mentioned characters were growing discrimination, injustice, and 
subjection for the Afghan people. On the other hand, in consequence of being under 
hegemony of the British, Afghans were allowed to establish no political relationship with 
the other nations. It is likely that internal despotism of rulers, inter-tribal rivalry and lack 
of communication with the outside caused backwardness and development in all aspects 
for the Afghan people. 
Indeed, making modifications and changes in the political and social structure of the 
country appeared to be the first required step in developing and modernizing the country. 
The king believed that first and foremost the governance structure was supposed to be 
changed to rid the country of its dramatic conditions. He requested from his political 
advisers to provide the best reform programme in this regard. Thus, he followed the idea of 
constitutionalists to establish a new form of political structure. In addition, the member of 
Afghan young movement, who implemented a significant function in attainment the 
independence of the country, provided a reform programme to make fundamental changes 
in administration system of the country and creation a constitutional government. Based on 
this type of the government the king was not an absolute power and the people had right in 
decision-making for the country.  
Indeed, Amanullah established a constitutional monarchy system in Afghanistan, based on 
which he was not absolute and constitution had an outstanding function in his rule. It 
should be remarked that this type of the government system assisted the king to retain the 
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derived legitimacy and gain the approval of the religious elites regarding his governing 
system. It is noteworthy that the constitutional movement in Afghanistan conducted no 
political party in the country; however, their measures caused the spirit of free criticism 
and judgment for the first time in Afghanistan’s history. 
The main objectives of the reforms throughout the Amani era
1
were taking into a special 
consideration the issue of national identity and making consequential changes and 
modification of different factors in the country. In this regard, the factor, which appeared 
to be so critical, was the king’s orientation to establish an independent state and his 
avoidance of tribalism. However, it was some signs of his anti-tribal activities, which later 
forced him to settle high price for this policy. 
Amanullah’s principal objective of preparing a new constitutional code was establishment 
of a central administration system. It goes without saying that fulfilling a centralized 
control and decentralized authority primarily required a central administration system, 
based on which the central government could be consolidated and dispersed its dominance 
in all over the country. Accordingly, he sought to spread out central administration system 
in national, provincial, rural, and tribal levels, which could be critical to the Afghan 
society that was established based on traditional administration. Furthermore, in 
consequence of the central government financial problems the new constitutional codes 
with the intention of increasing the government’s revenue modified tax collection system 
and the earnings of Ulema and landowners, which put his government at stake of losing 
religious elites support.  
It could be argued that there were some obvious signs of the king’s initial blunders and 
consequently the dissatisfaction of the traditional and religious elements in the Afghan 
society, whose functions were very consequential in establishment of the first independent 
Afghan state and putting an end to the British hegemony in the country.  
By launching the first stage of Amanullah’s reforms, some critical factors created obstacles 
in this regard. First of all it should be mentioned the destructive role of the British spies, 
whose mission was providing the conditions in Afghanistan to bring back the British 
influence on the country. In other words, they sought to persuade the local solidarity 
groups, not only to support the government but also they tended to exaggerate the king’s 
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blunders. It should also be stated that Mullahs discovered that the central government 
interfered in the religious rules and endeavoured to modify and change the majority of 
them, and also they had no influence in this regard. It is noteworthy that the role of the 
British elements to provoke Mullahs should not be disregarded. Besides, the tribal chiefs 
were another opposite factor to the Afghan state. Although they receive further rights 
during Amanullah’s rule comparing the previous Afghan regimes, they could not 
collaborate with the king in decentralizing the state authority and increasing the control of 
Amanullah’s government in the tribal and rural area.  
It is remarkable that reviewing the analyses of the different researchers regarding the 
reforms and resistances throughout the Amanullah’s reign demonstrates that they have just 
argued that the king’s reform programme caused resistances in all over the country 
especially in the tribal and rural areas. It is likely that in consequence of their lack of 
attention to the processes of the Amanullah’s reform programme and the function of the 
different factors in this regard, their analyses, especially regarding the third phase of 
reforms, are not so consequential to demonstrate exactly the king’s political blunder and 
the role of the local solidarity in this regard.  
As was mentioned earlier, King Amanullah with the intention of removing the roots of the 
backwardness of the society and providing development and progress conducted a series of 
cultural, social, and political changes in the country. Additionally, he implemented his 
reform programme in three stages, and every stage tribal, rural and local forces offered 
resistance to the government. First stage accomplished from 1919 to 1923, during which 
the government implemented a series of administrational, legislative, and judicial reform 
programme and it brought about fundamental development in the government apparatus. 
Although the nature of the reforms appeared to be so crucial for the Afghan society, this 
stage was the most successful stage of reforms and comparing the subsequent stages, the 
resistance were not so serious for the government.  
From1924 to 1928, Afghanistan saw the second stage of the king’s reform programme. 
Mangal rebellion that occurred during the first stage of reforms caused the reformists 
implemented the reforms slightly more prudently. This stage implemented a limited 
number of the reforms comparing the previous stage. The last stage of the reforms exactly 
initiated after Amanullah’s dramatic trip the European countries.  
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From July 1928, until January 1929 a series of radical and hasty reforms were 
implemented in the Afghan society, which were completely against the people’s values, 
religious elites’ beliefs and local solidarity groups’ interests. The king was faced with 
Shinwar
1
 rebellion and Habibullah Kalakani’s2 attacks, and consequently, Amanullah’s 
government and his reforms were doomed to failure.  
 The First Stage of Reform  3.8.
From 1919 to 1923, Afghanistan experienced the first stage of the reforms, which could be 
regarded as the most consequential part of the king’s modernization efforts. In other 
words, in this stage the tribal and religious factors’ dissatisfaction did not grow as it could 
put the government in trouble the reform-making process. National unity, the state 
apparatus, the emancipation of women, culture and education development were the issues 
that were regarded by King Amanullah.  
3.8.1. Drafting of the Constitution 
At the outset of the reform-making, the government regarded strengthening national unity 
and providing equality for all Afghan people before the low. The ruling system of 
Afghanistan hitherto had been based on absolute authorities, who had been the owner of 
the people’s life and property. King Amanullah was decisive to abrogate this procedure 
and with the intention of attracting the trust of the tribal solidarity groups and the public 
trust proclaimed that all the people regardless their ethnic, language and religion were 
equal, and nobody had priority to the others. He initiated to execute this reform in the court 
and the royal family and ordered the court members and their families should not have any 
priority in using the possibilities of the country than the other people.  
The relationship in the Afghan society was based on the tribal-patriarchal rules and the 
people were unfamiliar with the law and its advantage in their life. It should also be stated 
that the relationship between the state and the people was never characterized the 
principles of justice or social equality. The authorities introduced themselves as the 
representative of God (Farhang 1995, 425) and they introduced their rules as the rule of the 
God and thereby imposed them on the people. Resistance to the authorities and their 
approved rules recognized as resistance to God and the divine laws (Majmoeye maghalate 
                                                          
1
 For further information about Shinwar see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shinwar_District 
2
 For further information about Habibullah Kalakani see: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habibull%C4%81h_Kalak%C4%81ni 
42 
 
seminare ayandeh Afghanistan va ghanoon asasi, [Proceedings of the seminar on the future 
of Afghanistan and the constitution] 2003, 19).
 
 
Indeed, King Amanullah sought to strengthen the rule of law in the society and revoke 
dominate tribal-patriarchal rules. He believed that governors and people were equal in 
front of the law and based on the national unity wanted to provide the principles of 
freedom and democracy and equality in the society. In order to fulfil this programme, he 
ordered the Afghan intellectuals to codify the constitution as the first time, which could be 
regarded as a legislative evolution in Afghanistan’s history.  
The heads of the tribal solidarity groups was so concern regarding recognizing their 
interests in the new constitution. Thus, a substantial number of them attended in the Loya 
Jirga,
1
 which occurred in Jalalabad in 1922, to approve the primary constitution. 
Additionally, Afghan state constitution including 73 articles was signed by military 
officers, religious elites, and tribal chiefs in Paghman Loya Jirga in 1923 (See Appendix 
A). This new constitution defined state power based on legislative, executive, and judiciary 
powers, which happened for the first time in Afghanistan’s history. 
The approved constitution had some prominent and progressive principles. The principle 
of the rule of law obligated the king to rule based on law (Afghanistan’s Constitution 1922, 
Article 4) and determined certain rules and regulations for officers and government 
officials (Afghanistan’s Constitution 1922, Article 5). It should also be stated that this 
principle the council of ministers had responsibility regarding their collective and 
individual decisions (Afghanistan’s Constitution 1922, Articles 6 and 33). The principle 
added that the violation of the law would be prosecuted by the Supreme Court 
(Afghanistan’s Constitution 1922, Article 33). 
Furthermore, human rights and freedom were strongly esteemed by the authority and also 
detention and punishment people without being sentenced by the court became absolutely 
forbidden (Afghanistan’s Constitution 1922, Article 10). The government prohibited 
torture (Afghanistan’s Constitution 1922, Article 24), forced labour (Afghanistan’s 
Constitution 1922, Articles 22 and 23), slavery (Afghanistan’s Constitution 1922, Article 
10), and respected personal property (Afghanistan’s Constitution 1922, 17), the right to 
have education (Afghanistan’s Constitution 1922, 14) and freedom of the press.  
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All the local and tribal ethnic groups in Afghanistan, regardless of their religious, ethnic 
and class were regarded the citizens of the country (Afghanistan’s Constitution 1922, 
Article 8). Ethnic religious minorities were offered the freedom to execute their religious 
rites (Afghanistan’s Constitution 1922, Article 2) and became free to instruct their 
religious beliefs (Afghanistan’s Constitution 1922, Article 15). Furthermore, all citizens 
were offered the equal value before the law without taking into account race, religion, and 
language (Afghanistan’s Constitution 1922, Article 16). 
Approval of the constitution in the Loya Jirga was a significant step in abrogating the rule 
of personal interests in the Afghan society. At this point, the king decided to adopt various 
statutes to fulfil the general principles of the new Constitution. Besides, around fifty 
statutes were ratified and each had its own significant function various sectors of the 
Afghan social life (Ghobar 1981, 1250, Farhang 1995, 454).  
One of the most remarkable matters regarding the new constitution is that the Afghan 
people were offered the same rights as the western liberal laws. Providing the equal rights 
for all Afghan people realized national identity in the country. In other words, this 
constitution could be regarded as a revolution in the Afghan society owing to the fact that 
for the first the civil rights were respected in the country; as well as the government duties 
and restrictions, and the cabinet responsibility were determined accurately. It should also 
be stated that the authority of the king became limited and was subjected to the law, based 
on which this was the termination of the dictatorial role in Afghanistan (Afghanistan’s 
Constitution 1922, Article 7, Olesen 1999, 124).
 
 
It is noteworthy that the new constitution was not in favour of all the people. In other 
words, based on the new constitution the people those who their interests were in peril 
became opposite to the new system of law. The king was against any kind of bias system 
and demonstrated his opposition to favouritism towards some families and influential 
people. It should also be stated that he interrupted incomes of some dynasties like 
Mohammadzai
1
 and some Khans and influential religious scholars. It is particularly 
significant that he imprisoned some member of the royal family to demonstrate to the 
people that everybody is equal in front of law, as well as the royal family, like the other 
people, could be punished according to law. From one point of view, such policies were 
consequential and led to fulfil the spirit of the law in the society, from another point of 
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 For further information see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammadzai 
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view, they strictly scratched the dignity of the influential people within local solidarity 
groups and also disappointed some part of the religious scholars.  
3.8.2. The State Structure 
The Afghan state was relationship was based on the Association based on kinship, tribal, 
regional, or ethnic solidarity (See Figure  3-3).  
Conducting the policy of centralizing the control and decentralizing the authority required 
regulated the state structure. Accordingly, King Amanullah endeavoured to adjust state 
affairs in order to release from tribal and ethnic system that dominated the government 
(See Figure  3-3). He re-established the structure of the state based on legislative, judicial 
and executive and founded a modern administrative state with the collaboration of some 
Turkish and Indian experts.  
Indeed, the new system had its own characteristics and qualities, and in fact, except for the 
judiciary sector, there was no fundamental difference in comparison with the foundations 
of the preceding systems. Additionally, in the legislative sector, the king adjusted the old 
house of lords which called “Dar al Shora”, and formed “Shora e Khas” (the special 
council), which later called “Shora e Dowlat” (the council). The council was comprised of 
elected members and those who were appointed by the king. It had a duty to examine the 
legal projects, and also dispatched them to the king through the council of ministers for 
endorsement and authentication. It is remarkable that, the council regarded the government 
budget, and also its international conventions and treaties (Ghobar 1981, 1248-49). 
Figure  3-3 depicts Afghanistan’s tribal structure and relationship to the state. King 
Amanullah sought to fill the gap between state and tribal. Due to several tribal revolts 
against the government “two types of intermediaries were employed at the tribal level, a 
Malik and khan. Maliks are tribal leaders politically appointed by the state while khans are 
socially recognized by the tribe to speak with the state on their behalf, although not 
recognized (within the tribe) as a chieftain per se. The key political and socio-cultural 
finding is that the central government had structural institutions to conduct relations and 
relay policy between the state and the local level, but it left local government to the tribe. 
The individual Afghan, therefore, never developed any sense of political relationship or 
loyalty toward the state. Instead, individual solidarity was owed to the qawm or tribe, a 
relationship perpetuated from antiquity. Moreover, traditional group loyalty was paid to 
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the watan (tribal, ancestral or cultural homeland), and not the state, which never figured 
prominently in local socio-political affairs” (Mullins 2011, 21). 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3-3: Afghanistan’s Tribal Structure and Relationship to the State 
(Mullins 2011, 21) 
 
Previous to King Amanullah, the judiciary system was apparently independent, whereas in 
fact it was practically regarded a part of the servant of the king. Although the judges were 
under subjugation of the king, they had wide discretion. In the new constitutional law, 
judicial independence was still held in high regard, but nevertheless the wide discretion of 
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the judges became narrow. Tazir
1
 was previously as a sharp instrument in the hands of the 
judge, whereas in fact the king compiled two volume books, which called “Tamasok al 
Ghozat Amanieh” and changed Tazir into Taghrir. Thus, “Tamasok al Ghozat Amanieh” 
became an independent law and codified criminal codes (Ghobar 1981, 1248-49). 
Thus, a fundamental transformation was implemented in the judicial system following a 
long period of inefficiency. In 1922, the ministry of justice was established and all matters 
related to the judiciary were supervised by the new system. Besides, in order to improve 
the conditions and increase the efficiency of the judiciary, two other changes accomplished 
in the system:  
 Specialization of courts: For the first time in Afghanistan, the field of jurisdiction 
according to general topics was limited. Different types of claims, based on their 
nature were divided into several categories and for each category, a special 
branch was considered. In this regard, four kind of court were established in the 
country and each of them had different branches: criminal court, military court, 
rights court, bail court. Shrinking sphere of competence provided the background 
of increasing scientific expertise and practical skills for judges (Popalzai, Edalat 
dar Afghanistan: az awayele doran islami ta doreh jomhoriyat, [Justice in 
Afghanistan: the early Islamic era to era Republicanism] 1990, 677). 
 Multiple stages of investigation: Systematic scheme of multiple stages of 
investigation was another fundamental change, based on which the justice process 
and the investigation into different claims were set in three stages. According to 
this scheme, the triple courts of primary courts, lawsuit courts and supreme court 
were formed. It is noteworthy that the three stages of investigation were not 
performed in all claims (Popalzai, Edalat dar Afghanistan: az awayele doran 
islami ta doreh jomhoriyat, [Justice in Afghanistan: the early Islamic era to era 
Republicanism] 1990, 677). 
Furthermore, executive or ministerial committee picked up some persons for the charge of 
the chancellery, the ministry of the interior, the foreign ministry, and the ministry of war. 
In addition, the chancellery had just a superficial aspect and in fact, the king was the chief 
of ministers (Farhang 1995, 542-43, Ghobar 1981, 1249-50). 
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3.8.3. Culture and Educational Reforms 
According to the Afghan scholar, Peykar Pamir, owing to the fraud and cruelty, lack of 
reformative and educational programmes, aggravating superstitions, oppressive policies of 
the previous Kings, underdevelopment and social obstacles King Amanullah and his new 
founded government were supposed to handle many problems. Amanullah was desirous of 
reforming society and removing the roots of social backwardness. Additionally, his charity 
nature and good intentions did not allow him to sit on the throne of power in the royal 
castle regardless of all of the backwardness of the Afghan society. Accordingly, he knew it 
is inevitable making some efforts in the social affairs in parallel with economic measures 
and plans.
1
 Naturally, his social reforms would interfere in the customs, habits, personal 
interests and the deep traditions of the society (Pamir 2002, 113). 
Indeed, the most important part of the king’s reform was regarding educational cultural 
structures of the country. Notwithstanding having expert and technical human resources in 
various fields, this field was one of the fundamental principles of development of the 
country, and education was the first phase of progress of human resources planning. 
Besides, it could be said that the basis of social and economic trends of any country is 
related to expert and professional human sources. Consequently, educational system with 
training expert human resources provided the necessary background to accept 
government’s modernisation and innovation efforts as well as smoothed the path of 
development.  
In addition, King Amanullah determined to enlarge the public education system by 
founding new schools and training of expert human resources. Accordingly, he arranged 
the infrastructure of a modern and civil society. He approved article sixty-eighth of the 
constitution obliged having primary school education, moreover, he regarded many 
facilities for higher education (Afghanistan’s Constitution 1922, Article 68). It is 
noteworthy that the budget of the ministry of education after the ministry of finance and 
ministry of war were placed on third grade (Ghobar 1981, 1245). Further, the king for 
expansion of public education took advantage of two factors of force and encouragement. 
Based on this purpose, he distributed some leaflets in public places and ordered all 
government employees to send their children to school in order to be a model for others. 
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 These plans were based on the ideas of constitutionalism and his commitment towards human values of his 
movement. 
48 
 
As well as it was emphasized that in case of disobedience, the offenders would be 
punished. 
The king employed Egyptian and Turkish teachers for organizing and strengthening the 
system of training and education. In 1922, a French delegation of archaeologists directed 
by Alfred Foucher, professor at Sorbonne University, arrived in Afghanistan. They had the 
mission to organize a new system for higher education in Afghanistan. Three high schools 
were established in Kabul, which had the same function as “Habibiah School”, moreover, 
several foreign languages were taught and utilized by teachers for teaching. The first 
school was “Amanieh”, which was founded in 1922 and after the French schools, was very 
popular. In “Amanieh”, all courses were taught in French and five French teachers that one 
of them was female and twelve Afghan teachers were teaching, later in 1923, the German 
teachers taught at “Amanieh”. In the next years were built some other schools like 
“Nejat”, a German language school, “Ghazi”, an English language school, “Esmat”, a 
School for Girls, which was under the supervision of Queen Soraya (Tanin 2005, 42). 
Furthermore, technical-professional schools in the fields of art, music, weaving, painting, 
telegraph, carpentry, glass, agriculture, building construction, accounting, police, 
architecture, women’s health, women’s proper management home were established in 
Kabul. Similar schools were established in the other provinces of Jalalabad, Kandahar, 
Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif (Ghobar 1981, 1245). 
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that it might be said, the most stable of 
Amanullah’s reforms was in the field of education. From 1924 to 1928, more than three 
hundred twenty-two primary schools in each province were established, and four thousand 
eight hundred thirty-two students finished primary school. In addition, one hundred fifty-
one male and female students were sent to France, Germany, Russia, and Turkey for 
higher education with the costs of the ministry of education (Anousheh 2002, 120). It is 
worth pointing out that the king organized some educational projects for nomad tribes 
(Dopri 2000, 151). 
The main goals of educational reforms during his reign could be pointed as follows: 
 Development of young intellectuals in the country.  
 Training the technical staff in different fields of science and technology, in order to 
adapt new programmes. 
 Training efficient and skilled labour (Fayyaz 2010, 101). 
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An educational policy, which was conducted in order to modernize Afghanistan and was 
likewise an infrastructure development in various fields, was the necessity of learning the 
new science. In addition, the reformers desired that along with the development of the 
modern style schools, modern science would be taught as well. Intellectuals believed one 
of the main reasons for Afghanistan’s backwardness was forgetting education and 
knowledge. 
In 1918, the number of Indian educated in Punjab was more than all Afghans. Several 
generations of Afghans were deprived of education and competent teachers. Additionally, 
in Afghan society, where traditions and superstitions dominated, the people, like other 
Muslims population, did not have the right of taking advantage of their human and natural 
resources.  
Young Afghans argued that the domination of Europe had not involved only in the military 
issues, however in the industrial, economic and cultural issues they had interfered as well. 
In this regard, there were two prominent ideas at that time in Afghanistan. One of them 
believed that renovation was compatible with Islam, and the other one, which was 
followed by clergies and bigoted traditionalists, was opposite of any modernity and 
rejected new knowledge as a product of the infidels. 
Indeed, for teaching new technologies and sciences, which the western world was the 
leader of them, some attempts were made. For instance, some schools for teaching foreign 
languages were established and students initiated learning foreign languages. As was 
mentioned in the previous pages, even in “Amanieh School” and “Ghazi school”, the 
courses were taught in French and English languages (Tanin 2005, 42).
 
 
In the struggle between traditionalists and modernists, initially modernists overcame, even 
some of the students were sent to abroad for studying with the costs of the ministry of 
education. Nonetheless, ultimately traditionalists overcame the struggle, and reformists 
faced with the deadlock. 
One of the obvious characteristics of this epoch was spreading the idea of freedom, 
liberalism, and modernity. In this era, owing to coming foreign experts and scholars in 
Afghanistan and establishing cultural contact with the outside world people got familiar 
with the manners of life in developing countries. Further, by virtue of Amanullah’s support 
and attention to young writers and reformists that attempted for the development and 
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progress of Afghanistan was removed the previous harsh and oppressive political and 
social system and the reformists provided the background for creating an open and 
developed social system. 
Freedom of the press and the freedom of writing supplied by King Amanullah provided 
suitable conditions for connection of intellectual circles and people through publishing 
papers. In the previous epochs, liberalism and intellectualism were regarded incompatible 
with the purposes of the sovereignty and intellectuals and oppositions were severely 
punished. In the open society, nationalist intellectuals that had been arrested by the 
previous regime were released from prison. Among them, Abdul Rahman Lodin known as 
“Kebrit” and Abd al Hadi Davoudi known as “Parishan” had a significant role in the 
establishment and development of the press and cultural promotions and liberalism. They 
issued political and social topic in the form of both poetry and prose, and contributed to the 
growth of the awareness of the society and the development of modern ideas (Habibi 1984, 
181-187). 
Mahmud Tarzi provided numerous articles regarding legal, political, social, and cultural 
issues, and discussed topics such as Islamic alliance, necessity and benefits of 
independence, necessity of learning science and technology and backwardness of Muslims. 
He was regarded as a “leading innovator” and “Father of Journalism” on the scenes of 
political issues, literature and publication (Davoudi, Zamine va pishinehe eslah talabi dar 
Afghanistan, [Background and History of the Reform Movement of Afghanistan] 2000, 
162, Habibi 1984, 151-152). 
In addition to Kabul, in the other cities like Herat, Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, and Mazar 
Sharif, the number of publications considerably increased. Magazines such as “Ershad 
Nasvanin” in Kabul (1922), “Ettehad Mashreghi” in Jalalabad (1922), “Ettehad Islam” in 
Herat (1921), “Bidar” in Mazar Sharif (1923) and approximately 23 publications with 
government’s spending were conducted. Likewise, there were some nongovernmental 
(NGO) magazines such as, “Anis”, “Norooz”, “Afghan” and “Payandeh” that were 
conducted with personal cost (Ghobar 1981, 1246-47, Anousheh 2002, 121). 
In the Amani era, in both terms of language titivation and diversity in literary genres and 
the press became more widespread and this increased the impact of the press on human 
growth. It should also be stated that personal publication resulted in increasing journalists 
in Kabul, and the press provided further information to the people in the fields of 
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economic and social life (Naderi 2007). In fact, expanding the press in this period was 
based on a social, economic and political necessity. Amanullah’s government was 
interested in modernizing the country in all fields, and this issue required the responsible 
press for explaining to the people the necessity of foundations such issues. Particularly, the 
governmental press permanently retained their influence and freedom from this period and 
never returned under control or censorship of the subsequent dictatorship regimes (Naderi 
2007). In addition to the spread of reformist publications, many books were translated 
from other languages into Persian that were introduced the infrastructure of the 
development and progress in the country, people awareness and learning new sciences. 
Another attempt that was made based on the modernist approach was freedom of doing 
religious practices. Previously, religious minorities had not had this possibility and some 
of their rituals were held secretly. In order to illustrate the importance of this action and 
determine the point of deprivation and limitation of doing religious practices, it is 
necessary to consider the past of Afghanistan. The majority of the Afghan people were 
Muslim and in terms of religious attitudes they were initially divided into two sects, Sunni 
and Shia.
1
 The majority of the Afghan population were Sunni and the majority of the Sunni 
flowers were Sunni Hanafi,
2
 as well as Hazara people
3
 were majority followers of the Shia 
in Afghanistan (Sajjadi 2001, 91). 
Shiite communities in Afghanistan had always been under pressure and deprived of human 
rights, however, Pashtuns were always ruler and political leader. Furthermore, throughout 
history, the Sunnite people had always occupied the authority position, and thus Sunni 
always had been regarded superior to Shia, and Shiite always had been regarded as second-
class citizens and even lower. Furthermore, Sunnis’ fanatic behaviour and their challenging 
with Shiite underlined the social solidarity, thus it resulted in social deprivation and 
religious limitation for Shiite. Afghan autocrats, whose rule was based on force and 
compulsion, always had been utilized religious conflict of Afghan people to preserve their 
sovereignty. Although they had no devotion to religion, they supported Hanafi, who were 
the majority and always were in rivalry with Shiite in order to satisfy the Sunnite.  
                                                          
1
 For further information about Sunni and Shia see: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shi’a%E2%80%93Sunni_relations.  
2
 For further information about Sunni Hanafi see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanafi 
3
 For further information about Hazara see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hazara_people 
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It is worth pointing out that the role of the British colonialists in fomenting religious 
disagreement should not be disregarded (Sajjadi 2001, 94-95). The Afghan rulers were 
loyal to British colonialism and always endeavoured to impose religion of the majority on 
the minority. Amir Abdul Rahman Khan conducted a specific policy for removing Shia 
and Ja’fari jurisprudence 1 and replacing it with the Hanafi jurisprudence. He declared 
Shia as an illegal religion and received from Sunnite clergies the sentence of 
excommunication and heretic of the Shia. Sunnite clergies associated with the royal court 
and encouraged Sunni to struggle against Shiites. Thus, Amir Abdul Rahman announced 
that who would participate in this holy struggle against Hazara Shia, would obtain their 
assets as prize and their women and children as servant and slave. As well as performing 
publicly the rituals of the Shia was forbidden and the religious right of Ja’fari 
jurisprudence were not recognized by the government (Davoudi, Majmoeye maghalat 
seminar-e Afghanistan va ayandeh nezam-e siasi, [Proceedings of the seminar on 
Afghanistan and the future of the political system] 2002, 355). Amir Abdul al Rahman 
Khan sent Sunnite religious scholars to Shiite populated area to train people according to 
the Hanafi jurisprudence and promote the Hanafi teachings. He forced Shiite to perform 
their legal claims according to the Hanafi jurisprudence (Sajjadi 2001, 71). Additionally, 
Sunnite religious scholars issued a fatwa
2
 that introduced Shia illegal and excommunicated 
them. Subsequently Amir Abdur Rahman banned the Shiite rituals. These conditions 
resulted the Afghan society became unsuccessful in having collective life. Besides, 
governmental announcement and religious fatwa put Sunnite common people in serious 
conflict with the Shiite.  
Amanullah after assumption of power, in order to modify Afghanistan’s internal policies 
gave a special consideration to the national unity and attempted to remove the religious 
fanaticism. He granted to all citizens of Afghanistan religious and intellectual freedom 
regardless ethnic and racial affiliations. Furthermore, he emphasized on social equality and 
fraternity and regarded equal right for all citizens. In his constitution, he stated in eight 
articles that all people of Afghanistan without religious supremacy were regarded the 
Afghan citizens. He mentioned in the ninth article of new the constitution that the Afghan 
citizens were free to commit their religious affairs and their personal rights and freedoms 
would be respected by the government (Ghobar 1981, 1274). Subsequently, Shiite 
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 For further information about Ja’fari jurisprudence see: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ja%27fari_jurisprudence 
2
 Authoritative religious decree of Islamic law. For further information about Fatwa see: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatw%C4%81 
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religious ceremonies and their religious places practically were esteemed as well as 
Hazara slaves, who were heritage of Amir Abdur Rahman, were released from slavery 
(Ghobar 1981, 1274).  
The king, in order to confirm his sincerity and seriousness in the manner of social unity, 
was present personally on Day of Ashura 
1
 in Shiite ritual in Chandawa (Kabuli 2009).
2
 In 
order to prevent discriminative and divisive intervention of British colonialism, he ordered 
to mention Islam as the official religion of Afghanistan and avoided mentioning the name 
of any sect of Islam. Nonetheless, in the second Loya Jirga meeting, King Amanullah by 
intense pressure from some Sunnite scholars acquiesced in approval and recognition of the 
Hanafi sect in the new constitution. Even he demonstrated his willingness to recognize 
Shia, which proposed by Faiz Mohammad Katib Hazara,
3
 but nevertheless Sunnite 
scholars’ hard opposition deterred him to recognize Shia (Davoudi 2000, 181-182). 
3.8.4. Changes in Family Life 
As it was mentioned previously King Amanullah initiated a series of educational and social 
reforms, including new statutes called Nizamnama.
4
 Loya Jirga in 1921, and Loya Jirga 
Paghman in July 1924, enacted some articles, for women’s social freedom (Olesen 1999, 
138-140), as follows:  
 The child marriage was prevented which was a violation of human rights 
particularly affected all aspects of the girls’ rights. Accordingly, Nikah5 in 
childhood was forbidden unless reaching the age of maturity. Thirteen-year-old 
defined as the minimum age of maturity for male and female.  
 The act of polygamy became limited and it was an obligatory permission from the 
court for a man that wanted to marry more than one wife at one time; therefore 
having four wives was limited to one woman.  
                                                          
1
 For further information about Day of Ashura see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Day_of_Ashura 
2
 Chandawal is one of the oldest districts of Kabul that were inhabited for a long time by the Shia 
community. During AmirAbd al Rahman Khan, the people of this region like most Afghans felt a heavy 
shadow of repression. However, with the opening up of political and religious freedom of the country, during 
reign of AmirAmanullah Khan- were able to establish their important religious centers there; http://database-
aryana-encyclopaedia.blogspot.it/2009/06/blog-post_85.html (accessed, October 18, 2012). 
3
 For further information about Faiz Mohammad Katib Hazara see: 
http://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faiz_Mohammad_Katib_Hazara  
4
 Regulations or statutes of an organization; constitution. 
5
 The legal contract between a bride and groom as part of an Islamic marriage; the contract of Islamic 
marriage; Islamic marriage in general. 
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Amanullah paid a particular attention to the role of women in social development. He 
initiated the process of rescuing women by recognizing them as citizens with equal rights. 
He established some schools for girls and conducted an association for the protection of 
women’s rights. As it was mentioned earlier, he sent a number of girls in Turkey to learn 
higher education in the fields of medicine and nursing.  
The king concerning bride price and the high cost of a wedding ceremony adopted some 
rules to reduce the cost of the wedding for the groom’s family, moreover, he determined 
the legal age for marriage. Nonetheless, in the second Loya Jirga that was established in 
1924, were made some modifications in the programme of reforms by virtue of pressure 
and opposition of landowners, khans, and fanatical priests. They issued a resolution 
according to which the marriage of minors was permitted, women’s education was limited 
to the home, and a man was allowed to marry four women (Hoseinzadeh 2008). Although 
there was freedom of religion or belief, a new article was added to the constitution, which 
forced Hindus and Jews to settle ransom by virtue of being infidel. Additionally, when 
Sunni clergies suggested supporting of Hanafi sect the king declared his opposition. He 
believed that such issue could destroy national unity and would ne grave menace to the 
Shia community but, nonetheless, the protest clergies prevailed and could convince him in 
this regard. It is likely that these modifications were the result of opposition to the spirit of 
the new constitution, the king’s policies, and his advisor, Mahmud Tarzi. 
Despite all the troubles that his reform programme confronted, a special chapter for 
women’s rights was regarded in the government’s reform programme. In 1920, queen 
Soraya and some of the open-minded women took charge of the administration of the 
Maktab Masturat
1
 (Masturat School). In 1921, the queen along with her mother founded 
the first magazine for women that called Ershad-I-Niswan (Guidance for Women). Then 
Maktab Tadbir Manzel (school of management house) in which German and Turkish 
women taught, was founded (Hoseinzadeh 2008). In a part of a royal proclamation that 
was signed by queen Soraya, was stated that the purpose of establishing these schools was 
liberation of women from economical dependent on their husbands and to contribute to the 
family economy (Kazem 2005, 144). In the summer of 1928, queen Soraya established an 
association for the protection of women’s rights (Anjoman-i Hemayat-i Neswan) and 
                                                          
1
 The first primary school for girls, Masturat School, was founded in 1921 in Kabul, under the patronage of 
queen Soraya. 
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twelve of knowing women in Kabul took its management. Thus, for the first time women 
like men were involved in the country’s management and bureaucratic system.  
3.8.5. Other Reforms  
King Amanullah made some reforms in the economic and financial fields. He initiated land 
reforms for the first time in Afghanistan’s history and gave governmental land to people. 
He likewise paid a preferable attention to the export; thus, from 1920 to 1925 
Afghanistan’s exports increased from 50 million Francs to one billion Francs. The king did 
not like importation and he always encouraged people to use domestic production in order 
to prevent from importing (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 2005, 213). This policy was by 
virtue of his anti-imperialism ideas and he was concerned that importation could threaten 
Afghanistan’s independence.  
King Amanullah in the first step in the progress of reform was successful and all his 
colleagues and reformist comrades were concurred with him. In addition, he modified the 
tax system and thereby released the majority of the people such as farmers, livestock, and 
artisan from heavy taxes. Monetary tax was considered for lands, and all people could 
settle direct tax. They linked to financial offices of the government without interfering of 
chieftains and Khans.  
 Backlash against the Reforms 3.9.
As it was mentioned earlier, following the first stage of the successful implementation of 
reforms, the first armed rebellion against Amanullah’s government occurred in the south of 
Afghanistan. This section briefly discusses backgrounds and causes of the realization the 
reactions, as well as it remarks the process of public backlash and the government function 
to handle them. 
3.9.1. The Background of Mangal Rebellion  
The Khost rebellion arose from Afghan tribal community and religious leaders. It was 
motivated by many causes, such as increasing tax and changing in penal codes and family 
law. After third Afghan war, Britain cut the financial aid to Afghanistan. Furthermore, 
third Afghan war imposed too high costs on the Afghan government. Accordingly, the 
government had no choice except increasing taxes and in the new constitution changed the 
tax law, thus it levied taxes on the landowners, traders. 
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These taxes increased the government revenue and assisted to implement reforms. In 
addition, the government abolished some non-mandatory taxes, and in Kandahar it forgave 
some belated taxes (Summary of events in Afghanistan, from 1st June 1920 to 1st July 
1922 1922). Amanullah largely reduced military spending and instead imposed taxes to 
support educational affairs, which resulted in dissatisfaction of military commanders. They 
were opposite to government policies owing to losing their former incomes they, therefore, 
were ready for insurrection. 
Furthermore, a head tax or capitation tax was levied, which was a fixed amount and 
imposed on every male citizen (Summary of events in Afghanistan, from 1st July 1922 to 
22nd May 1923 1923, 2023). Landowners that must settle the largest share of taxes were 
very discontent of increasing taxes, moreover, in Kandahar there was a general 
dissatisfaction with increasing taxes. It is worth pointing out that in July 1924 in Loya 
Jirga Paghman Kandahar’s delegates refused to increase taxes and declared their 
opposition in this regard (Kateb 1923, 236). 
The tax increase led to the corruption in the government, which means the new system of 
collecting tax despite inspiring from the western taxation system and eliminating any 
possibility of bribery and corruption, resulted in further corruption among the government 
officials. According to Ghobar, King Amanullah arranged an inspection team to inspect the 
taxation (Ghobar 1981, 691). 
It should be remarked that reform measures in Afghanistan had no rapid results, especially 
for the peasants, who could not tolerate the problems that arose from government’s reform 
programme. Additionally, in order to compensate these problems the government initiated 
to make land reforms for the peasants. Based on this policy, the government sold the state 
land to the peasants at a low cost (Poullada 1973, 135). Nevertheless, instead of the 
peasants, just the large landowners took advantage of the land reforms (Ghobar 1981, 
791). 
As a matter of fact, King Amanullah with his social reforms intervened in the most 
personal aspects of the people’s life such as marriage, funeral, and banning to wear some 
costumes. Thus, the people felt more aggrieved at the reforms, as well as the government 
forced the Afghans to perform obligatory military service and make individual identity 
card for all Afghans. In fact, the government weakened the military authority of the 
Afghan tribes by obligatory military service; and controlled child marriage and polygamy 
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by making individual identity card, which led to a deep sense of resentment of reforms 
among the people. 
Habibullah Khan and Nasrullah Khan had granted an allowance to tribal leaders and 
religious scholars in order to attract their support. Nonetheless, King Amanullah refused to 
grant any allowance to them because he wanted to spend this money on implementation 
his policies. Tribal leaders and religious scholars became very furious with him and 
opposite to his policies. In consequence, the Afghan society slowly became ready for a 
popular uprising.  
3.9.2. The Mangal Rebellion  
The Khost rebellion or the Mangal rebellion lasted fourteen months. It is known as 
Mullah-i-Lang rebellion as well. Besides the casualties and financial losses, Amanullah’s 
efforts of the nation building and national unity, faced with obstacles and significantly 
slowed the process of implementation of reforms. 
This rebellion initiated in March 1924, in the Mangal district, in Paktia province,
1
 and led 
by Mullah Abdullah, known as Mullah-i-Lang and his son in law Mullah Abdul Rashid. 
The background of this rebellion since long time earlier had been arranged in Paktia, 
however, it initiated under the pretext of the trial of one of the Mangal tribe people. This 
person had claimed that in childhood with a girl had been engaged and his opponents of 
this person, complained to Amir Uddin Khan, the supreme ruler and judge. The judge after 
obtaining the consent of the girl, according to the new constitutional code in which minor 
marriage (child marriage) was banned, rejected the claim of the man. Mullah Abdullah that 
was supposed to solve the dispute argued that the judge disobeyed Sharia
2
 decree (Hazara 
1999, 13-14). Mullah Abdullah in cooperation with Mullah Abdul Rashid convinced tribes 
that in this regard instead of penal code Quran should be considered; hereby he invited 
them to uprising against the government. 
Rhea Talley Stewart, the author of the famous book “Fire in Afghanistan” wrote about 
rebel leader, Mullah Abdullah wore green cassock that was in the colour of the cassock of 
prophet. He became a significant character among the Afghan masses. The people talk 
about him as if he inspired from heaven (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan1914-1929: The First 
Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000, 259-260). 
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 Paktia is one of the Province of Afghanistan that is located in the South East of Afghanistan. 
2
 Islamic code of law based on the Koran; holy laws of the Islam which cover aspects of day-to-day life 
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Thus, a number of the Mullahs in Paktia were stimulated and rebelled against the 
government. In opposition to the statute and codes that were proposed by King Amanullah, 
they argued that he was away from the Quran and Shariah, and he enacted the new 
legislation based on his interests and predilections (Tanin 2005, 45).  
The rebellion continued for more than one year; gradually other tribes joined it, thus it 
spread to Logar 
1
 province. Both Mullahs with the support of the people of Mangal and 
Jodran
2
 requested the king to moderate some of the penal codes, which according to their 
idea were against Shariah.
3
 The king wanted to negotiate with those who had approved the 
law, nonetheless, the Mullahs did not accept his reasons and revolted in Paktia in the name 
of preserving Islam and Shariah. Farmers of Paktia, who were upset of the government 
officials’ method and particularly supreme ruler, came to support them. Besides, a number 
of mercenaries joined the uprising (Ghobar 1981, 807). 
The king sought to solve the problem by sending influence and intellectual scholars to the 
opposite group. These scholars met with rebellious Mullahs in Bidak Logar, however, 
Mullah-i-Lang had no willingness about discussing the problems. They had a hostile 
attitude towards the king and their explicit demand was his resignation, as well as they 
announced that they already selected the new Amir. Nonetheless, according to the 
mentioned meeting the government concluded that a compromise was not possible and 
turbulence could just cease with collapsing the rebel forces. Besides, the board of scholars 
realized that Mullah-i-Lang’s requests were political issues and they were not related to 
religious issues. The king’s religious counsellors advised him to establish Loya Jirga to 
investigate the religious complaint. However, Loya Jirga generally accepted his proposals 
and they just made a few modifications regarding penal codes (Poullada 1973, 122). 
Loya Jirga modified some part of the reform agenda and sent a board headed by Shams al-
Mashayekh, Hazrat-e Noor al-Mashayekh, minister of Justice and chief justice, Sardar 
Mohammad Osman Khan and some other people to negotiate with insurgents. The purpose 
of negotiation was adjusting all articles of the constitution with Shariah and removing any 
article, which was in contradiction with Islam. Nonetheless, there was no result in the 
negotiation with insurgents. Professor Fazl Ghani Mojaddedi quoted from daughter of 
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 Logar is one of the Province of Afghanistan that is located in the East of Afghanistan. The centre of this 
province Pul-i-Alam. 
2
 It is one of the Afghan tribal communities. 
3
 (Islam) code of law based on the Koran; holy laws of the Islam which cover aspects of day-to-day life. 
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Sardar Mohammad Osman Khan (Hazrat-e Sebghatallah Mojaddedi’s mother) that some 
private negotiations between Hazrat-e Noor al-Mashayekh and Mullah Abdullah were 
conducted. Although Hazrat-e Noor al-Mashayekh initially accepted a substantial number 
of his ideas, but nevertheless he ultimately refused Mullah Abdullah’s suggestion 
(Mojaddedi 1977, 239). 
During occurring unrest and conflict in Paktia, many casualties happened to the 
government forces and insurgents. Most of the battles were in benefit of the insurgents. 
According to Ghobar, in one of these battles, when war minister Mohammad Wali Khan, in 
Gardez
1
 was beleaguered by insurgents, 700 people were sent as assistance force named 
“Askar Jan Fada” from Kabul toward Gardez. Nonetheless, the insurgents ambushed the 
assistance force in Bidak Logar and killed all of them (Ghobar 1981, 808). Ali Ahmad 
Khan the governor of Nangarhar province came to aid the war minister. If Ali Mohammad 
Khan with militias of Khogyani and Momand districts had not arrived on time, there was 
not a shadow of doubt that the war minister would have failed and the insurgents seriously 
would have threatened the capital. In addition, the governor Ali Mohammad Khan arrived 
on time and besieged Gardez broke through the rebel siege and ultimately forced the 
insurgents to retreat and escape. 
During the turbulence intensity, the military camp of Khost province
2
 was under siege, as 
well as the insurgents attacked the national treasury that was on the way of Ghazni
3
 to 
Gardez. They occupied Tanghi Agha Jan city by a sudden attack and the capital was 
directly under threat. Additionally, after a while, the insurgents besieged Ghazni city, 
Ahmadzai and Khayal tribes cut connection between Kabul and Paktia, even the insurgents 
could arrive up to Sheikh Abad and wardak Provinces, and in Sheikh Abad they took the 
government treasury as booty. 
At this time, Abd al-Karim from Indian British entered the scene to make some 
intercessions in the civil war. This news rapidly was spread throughout the country and as 
a result of a foreign intervention the people despite their inconvenience of the country’s 
administration maintained their neutrality in the Paktia war. Indeed, when they realized the 
Paktia rebellion and involving British spies, in addition to having religious neutrality, they 
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 Gardez is a city in southern Afghanistan in Paktia province. 
2
 Khost is a city in eastern Afghanistan. It is the capital of Khost Province that is adjacent to Afghanistan’s 
border with Pakistan. 
3
 Ghazni is a city in east central Afghanistan. Its historical name is Ghaznin.  
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retained their political neutrality. Thus, all people rose to support the government and were 
united against foreign intrusion (Ghobar 1981, 808). It is noteworthy that the young 
Afghan movement had a significant role in creating the spirit of independence and 
xenophobia among Afghan people.  
After preparing and supporting the people from the north, the east, Kandahar, Kabul, and 
Hazara the government forces on the battlefields were out of defensive state and initiated 
attacking. Additionally, General Mohammad Omar Khan
1
 penetrated in Ghazni that was 
under siege by the uprisings and defeated insurgents of Paktia, he, therefore, terminated 
Kabul threat. Furthermore, Mohammad Amin Khan defended fort of Logar and defeated a 
group of insurgents in Paktia. Furthermore, Ghulam Nabi Khan Charkhi defeated the 
insurgents in Tangi Agho Jan Logar, and Sardar Shah Wali Khan initiated to negotiate 
with the insurgents in Logar. 
Indeed, removing insurgents from Kowtal-e Tireh, defeating rebels in Zurmat District 
2
 
and Mangal, and smiting the last force of rebellion in Paktia effectuated the termination of 
the Paktia war. Officers and the government officials arrived in Paktia and controlled the 
re-established the connection between Kabul and Paktia.  
Abd al-Karim Khan fled to India and the government forces arrested the elements of 
uprising. In addition, the government conducted a military operation, which resulted in 
execution of rebel leaders such as Mullah Abdullah, Mullah Abdul Rashid, twenty-five 
other leaders of the rebellion, and other Mullahs, who motivated the people against the 
central government (Ghobar 1981, 809-811). 
As it was stated previously, this rebellion lasted more than one year and during this time, 
the intensity of dealing with insurgents had different stages. It is noteworthy that the final 
defeat of rebels and the arrest of leaders of Mangal rebellion was not the termination of the 
internal conflict. Owing to the casualties and financial losses that arose from the war, the 
southern opponents and local solidarity groups continued their resistance to the 
government. Additionally, fear of the government and the idea of revenge as a matter of 
principles of Pashtunisim had a remarkable function in this regard. For concluding this 
problem, tribal Jirga appeared to be the best option. Although in the tribal Jirga there were 
some disagreements, which even appeared to be able to promote restarting the conflict, 
                                                          
1
 He is known as Sur Jrnil, as well. 
2
 Also spelled as Zormat, is a district in Paktia Province in the East of Afghanistan. 
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with arrival of Ghazi Mir Zaman Khan Kanri, who was a tribal leader, and subsequently 
establishing a tribal Jirga, the conflict almost terminated.  
King Amanullah on 25 May 1925, in the court before the implementation of the execution 
of the rebel leaders, which issued by the military court in a speech addressing the rebel 
leaders outlined the reasons for the execution. The King mentioned that the rebels had 
accused him of heresy and being against the Koran. He added that he requested them to 
discuss about the problems, but nevertheless they did not want to negotiate and instead 
sought to support Abdul Karim, who according to the King’s idea, was an adventurous and 
terrorist person. 
1
 (Andishmand 2010, 30) 
 Impact of the Grand Tour 3.10.
On 10 December 1927, he left Afghanistan for Asian, European, and African countries, 
and started the so-called Grand Tour. According to Rhea Talley Stewart, King Amanullah 
in his farewell in the palace of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressing to the staff and 
students and education officers in Afghanistan expressed the reasons for his trip.
2
 Then, in 
order to represent the different class of the people of Afghanistan accompanied him four 
different classes of society, including one soldier, one student of school, one government 
official and one citizen of Kabul. (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan1914-1929: The First 
Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000, 51-52).  
On December 15, 1927 King Amanullah through Kandahar along with thirty-one people as 
a board, entered British India. In India, he participated in the Friday prayers and preached 
a sermon based on Hindu Muslim unity. This statement brought the Indian public 
sentiment into passion for their freedom. Then, he departed to Egypt, where he was 
welcomed in Port Said. Queen Soraya and Noor al Saraj - the king’s sister - appeared with 
non-Islamic dresses. Some photos were taken photo of them, which published in 
newspapers in Europe and demonstrated the queen and the king’s sister with non-Islamic 
dress. These photos arrive soon in Afghanistan and were distributed among the tribe. It 
should be mentioned that the British elements in order to destroy the king’s position in 
Afghanistan and stimulate the people against him distributed these photos in the country.  
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 For further information about the king’s speech see: Mohammad Akram Andishmand, Amozesh va 
parvaresh modern dar Afghanistan, [Modern Education in Afghanistan], (Kabul: Maiwand Publication, 
1389/2010), P.30. 
2
 For further informantion about King’s speech see: Rhea Talley Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan1914-1929: The 
First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban, pp.51-52. 
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Italy was the first European country that invited King Amanullah. In Italy, he was 
welcomed by Mussolini and two magnificent banquets were arranged in his honour as well 
as he visited Rome, Milan and some other cities and met with the pope. Amanullah was the 
first King that was accepted by the pope. 
The king quoted, “Italians demonstrated me a desirable kindness; especially their attentive 
and aware the king and the royal family of Italy expressed their friendship very much. 
What I did in Italy are as follows: […] Italian government admitted a number of our 
children. They accepted twenty-five people for teaching and I am sure this is the most 
useful support and love” (Popalzai, Safarhaye shah Amanullah dar davazdah keshvar -e 
Asia va oropa 1306-1307, [King Amanullah’s Visits of 12 Asian and European Countries 
in 1927] 1985, 100-101). 
The king after visiting Italy travelled to France and Belgium, Switzerland, Britain, 
Germany, Poland and Soviet Union. George V the king of Great Britain said it would 
never address Amanullah as “His Majesty”, however when he met with Amanullah, 
greeted promptly and addressed as “His Majesty” (Popalzai, Summary: a glance at history 
of independence, Third Anglo-Afghan War with Britain, 1919 1989, 55). It goes without 
saying that this deed confirmed the significant position of the king and recognizing 
Afghanistan’s independence by Great Britain. Further, the British endeavoured to prevent 
him from travelling to Moscow (Popalzai, Summary: a glance at history of independence, 
Third Anglo-Afghan War with Britain, 1919 1989, 55). The Great Game between Great 
Britain and Russia caused each of two colonialism countries endeavoured to attract the 
king’s accordance with their own policies and interests in Afghanistan. 
In Turkey, General Mustafa Ataturk arranged a magnificent banquet for King Amanullah. 
It is worth pointing out that programmes of General Mustafa Ataturk for progress and 
prosperity of his country had a dramatic effect on the mind of Amanullah. He wished he 
could walk in the footsteps of Mustafa Ataturk. It is worth pointing out that the Turkish 
society and Afghan society in terms of the conditions and characteristics were quite 
different from each other, thus it was not easy to develop the Afghan society with the same 
manners and reform programmes, which were implemented by Ataturk. 
On 20 June 1928, King Amanullah returned to Afghanistan. In Kandahar, he addressing 
the Afghan people declared that he went to Europe to find the manner of progress and 
improvement for the country. He added that he would sacrifice everything for the 
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progressive and improvement of the country. He hoped that the development and progress 
of the country would initiate from Kandahar. He added in Europe that women worked like 
men had equal rights, and attended in all social, political, economic, and commercial 
aspects. (Popalzai, Summary: a glance at history of independence, Third Anglo-Afghan 
War with Britain, 1919 1989, 56-57). Nevertheless, the Mullahs in Kandahar believed that 
the king became infidel and he would make them infidel as well. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, regarding the king’s long trip to Europe, 
and its consequences believed that, the king long trip attracted a preferable attention to 
him, provided for him a higher credibility and prestige, and increased the importance of 
Afghanistan in the world. Nonetheless, he criticized Amanullah for his trip and believed 
that the situation in Afghanistan was not stable and in this regard, his trip was a critical act. 
He left his country to travel during the change process, which was a very blameful action. 
Nehru also indicates that he sought to change the old manner of life and Mustafa Kemal 
never implemented such critical measure (Nehru 2007, 1665-66). 
It is worth pointing out that conspiracy and adverse publicity against King Amanullah 
during his trip to Europe were severe. Especially the British were particularly interested 
and involved in running propaganda. In addition, they wanted to revenge for their defeat in 
third Afghan war. According to Jawaharlal Nehru, in the absence of the king all persons 
and reactionary elements, who were disagreed with his policies, undermined his position. 
Various plots and conspiracies were raised and many rumours spread against him. 
Furthermore, so much money was spent for propaganda against the king. Mullahs were 
given large sums of money and they introduced Amanullah as infidels and enemy of 
religion in all over the country. Inappropriate pictures of Queen Soraya in European 
evening dress were printed thousands of copies and were distributed in villages and remote 
areas in order to demonstrate people her non-Islamic clothing. The basic question is this 
who organized this widespread and expensive propaganda? Afghans had no money, as 
well as they did not know how to perform these measures. There is a strong likelihood that 
the British secret police organization was beyond all these measures. Furthermore, it was 
apparent that Britain was interested in weakening the king position in Afghanistan. Thus, 
during Amanullah’s European trip the British sought to undermine his influence and 
foundations of his power by intense propaganda. He returned to the country and 
immediately reinitiated his reform programme based on new ideas and encouragements 
that he received in the meeting with Kemal Pasha in Ankara, (Nehru 2007, 1665-66). 
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As it was mentioned previously queen Soraya’s non-Islamic photographs were distributed 
among the tribes. It is worth pointing out that printing such picture required technical 
skills, which demonstrated that Britain was involved in preparing and distributing the 
photos. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that this is an important evidence to 
demonstrate the British involvement in the conspiracy against the king. (Stewart, Fire in 
Afghanistan1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years 
before the Taliban 2000, 84). It is likely that the Britain’s purpose of these measures was 
destruction of the reputation of position of the king and the queen and their popularity 
among the people. 
According to Asta Olesen business representative of Afghanistan in Quetta, in opposition 
to King Amanullah, bought all newspapers, which contained the unveiled photographs of 
the Queen and sent them to Kabul, in order to provoke the public sentiments against the 
King, which was another indication regarding the British conspiracy. (Olesen 1999, 84). 
Rhea Talley Stewart believed the British published the news regarding the king’s 
programmes in France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Russia and distributed rumours in 
their newspaper about him. On 19 October 1929, in Daily Mail the fanatics revolted 
against the Queen, killed Islamic elites, and jailed the king’s brother. However, there is no 
dispute that all the mentioned measures could be regarded as conspiracy against 
Amanullah. (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan1914-1929: The First Opening to the West 
Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000, 226). 
Mir Mohammad Sediq Farhang belived that “the most remarkable issue was the 
disapproval of Mojaddidi family, especially Hazrat-e-Fazl Omar, who in Dera Ismail 
Khan - adjacent to the Afghanistan border with Pakistan - penetrated the Afghan nomads 
and promoted propaganda against King Amanullah. According to the report of Indian 
officials, he assured his followers that he had supporters within the government. 
Furthermore, he mentioned the name of Minister of war, Mohammad Wali Khan, and the 
previous lieutenant governor of eastern of Afghanistan, Ali Ahmad Khan those who were 
closed to the King” (Farhang 1995, 522-528). 
Three days after the king’s arrival in British India, the British allowed Hazrat-e-Fazl Omar 
(Noor al Mashayekh) to enter to Dera Ismail Khan (Center for his traditional followers). 
On 18, December Omar entered Dera Ismail Khan and reinitiated promoting propaganda 
against the king and his reforms among the Afghan nomads. Noor al Mashayekh had two 
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houses in Dera Ismail Khan, one of them was the British agents’ donation, and due to the 
British order, he returned to Dera Ismail Khan to provoke local solidarity groups against 
the central government. The apposition, especially Mullahs him at this home and he 
suggested them the plan to dethrone of the king. He thereby prepared Mullahs and 
especially the people of Khost for uprising against Amanullah. (Stewart, Fire in 
Afghanistan1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years 
before the Taliban 2000, 65). 
In Kabul, Mashayekh’s brother and nephew (Mohammad Sadiq Mojaddidi and Mohammad 
Masoom Mojaddidi) made some plans to overthrow the king Amanullah. Two Mullahs that 
were called Mullah Mohammad Hasan and Mullah Elyas ordered to Abd al Rahim and 
Mohammad Jan to leave immediately for Khost in order to stimulate the People of Jdran 
and Mangal to revolt. In this regard, for Jdran tribe Malek Boland Khan was assigned, and 
Malek Gholam Khan was appointed for the people of Gardez
1
. (Stewart, Fire in 
Afghanistan1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years 
before the Taliban 2000, 54). In fact, the British elements could convince different local 
solidarity groups to arise against Amanullah. At this moment, the King along with 
conducting the final stage of reforms should handle the internal instability, which was 
occurred by the British expense. 
 Secularization 3.11.
The final stage of Amanullah’s social reforms that were very secular initiated after his 
return from his long trip to European and Asian countries. In fact, he became strongly 
dynamic and encouraged after meeting the powerful individuals of Europe, observing the 
western technique and culture, and especially after visiting the reforms of Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Shah in Iran. Besides, he accelerated implementation of his 
experience and reform programme in Afghanistan. 
In October 1928, he established Loya Jirga with thousands of people, exposed to 
discussion his intentions, and hoped to accelerate the process of social change. First, the 
king reported on his trip and then proposed the plan of reforms and rapid changes in the 
economic and social conditions in Afghanistan. It should be noted before his trip some 
parts of his reforms, which were relatively basic and fundamental, were successful and 
pretty well received by the people. Indeed, approving the new constitution, organizing the 
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 Gardez is located in south of Afghanistan and It is the capital of the Paktia Province. 
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education system, changing the structure of the government all were conducted in 
consultation with other reformers. Nonetheless, his reforms after his trip were imitation of 
western culture and completely superficial, and even some reformers were disagreed with 
some of his new reforms and his haste in the implementation of them. In this regard 
Ghobar mentioned, “[The king after his trip] was not the previous King and became very 
arrogant and selfish. Afghanistan soon became susceptible to a negative repercussion due 
to King’s hasty measures” (Ghobar 1981, 530-531). His close associates such as Mahmud 
Tarzi and Mohammad Wali Khan neither participated in his plans nor were concurred with 
the content of reforms and the manner of their implementation. Notwithstanding, they 
expressed the reasons for their opposition and the king disregarded their ideas (Ghobar 
1981, 530-531). 
However, King Amanullah in Loya Jirga, which arranged in Paghman in 1928, approved 
the following programmes: 
 Child marriage was banned; 
 Marriage age was determined from 18 to 22-year-old; 
 Testimony was provided to the Mullahs; 
 Land tax was increased; 
 The national flag was marked with mountains, sun and wheat; 
 The veil (Hijab1) was free;  
 Compulsory military service was determined for three years without any change 
and forgiveness; 
 General Audit Office was established under the direct supervision of the king and 
also were established the National Council Selective including 150 literate lawyers 
of the country instead of the state council; 
 Finally, the freedom of the press and criticism was approved (Ghobar 1981, 1278). 
Furthermore, he changed the official holiday from Friday, which was an Islamic holiday 
and the day of Friday prayer, to Sunday, which is the day of Christians’ Pray. Enactment 
of these legislations angered Mullahs and provoked their dissatisfaction, and finally 
representatives of Loya Jirga left the meeting while they were very upset and confused 
(Ghobar 1981, 1278). In addition, intellectuals were completely disappointed with King 
Amanullah by virtue of his obstinacy in handling some affairs such as having Chancellery 
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 Headscarf worn by Muslim women to cover their hair; custom in Muslim societies of women to dress 
decently outdoors. 
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Ministers and the lack of responsibility for the government ministers in the national 
assembly. Besides, it could be argued that from this moment a severe political abstraction 
performed in Afghanistan, and the government had no legitimacy in the view of the 
intellectual elites. 
Unveiling women and making uniform dress for the men were the critical reform 
programmes conducted by Amanullah for modernizing the society in the final stage of 
reforms. The King in consequence of being influenced by western culture, civilization, 
industry, and technology conducted these reforms after his trip to European countries. 
Additionally, he objected severely to Afghanistan’s backward social conditions and 
believed that to reach European countries’ social conditions should be westernized each 
aspect of traditional system of the Afghan society. Accordingly, he precipitately initiated 
to imitate the superficial trappings of western culture and civilization; moreover, he 
decided to make a preferable amount of changes in the minimum time. The king by taking 
some measures undermined the previous symbols of Afghan value, which he previously 
promoted and encouraged them (such as the use of homemade products especially clothes 
and homespun fabric) (Ghobar 1981, 554). At this moment, King Amanullah instead of 
wearing a homemade, simple, and closed collar shirt wore western suit and necktie. 
In the beginning, the king proposed women’s liberation and stood up to defend their rights. 
In July 1928, his wife Queen Soraya, in an article in the Aman-e-Afghan gazette explained 
the necessity of removing the veil. Then, the king invited the senior officers in the 
education system to the royal palace and expressed them regarding the progress and 
freedom of women in other countries. He emphasized on respecting the women’s rights 
and remarked that he would personally help the women in this regard (S. M. Farrokh 1993, 
465, Ghobar 1981, 531). 
The king ordered to put in the special road in Kabul signs with this phrase: "No woman 
with a Burqa can pass through here". The king enforced this programme by putting the 
police force in the intersections. Nonetheless, by virtue of various reason many women 
could not follow this programme and they, therefore, were forced to stay at home (Ghobar 
1981, 1276).  
Furthermore, men were ordered to wear uniform and hat chapeau instead of the traditional 
clothes and it was declared that in case of violation of law they would be fined. On the 
other hand, uniform clothes were made for the men and especially representatives of Loya 
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Jirga Paghman were forced to wear a suit, tie, and chapeau hat, which caused to 
dissatisfaction of Loya Jirga’s representatives with such secular and anti-tradition policies. 
(S. M. Farrokh 1993, 481). 
It could be argued that the mandatory implementation of these programmes provoked 
dissatisfaction regarding the reforms among the people (Ghobar 1981, 1277, Farhang 
1995, 531). The worst of all was that shaking hands became forbidden and the people had 
to remove their hat from head and waved it like European. Further, Sikhism
1
 people that 
based on their religious orders wrapped their long hair in a turban were forced to cover 
their turbans and heads together with an elastic woollen hat. These issues led the Afghan 
society to a very complicated situation. (Ghobar 1981, 1277). 
It should be mentioned that similar to these kinds of reforms were implemented a little 
earlier by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and later by Reza Shah in Iran (Kashf -e- 
Hijab az Soye Reza Khan, [The unveiling by Reza Khan] 1997, 14).
 
It is worth pointing 
out that unveiling policy, which even implemented by Reza Shah in Iran always was 
regarded as a struggle with Islamic clothing and promoting western culture in the Eastern 
countries. It should be remarked that implementation of these issues would require two 
conditions:  
 First, providing the cultural and social context for acceptation such culture; 
 Second, a powerful agent and organized programme for implementation the 
reforms (Haddad-Adel 1987, 46-47). 
Regarding the first condition should be remark that despite the fact that some efforts were 
made to provide this context, but nevertheless they were not sufficient. Thus, in order to 
achieve this purpose, in the summer of 1927, he created the association for the protection 
of women and twelve women lawyers of Kabul took management of the mentioned 
association, and thus they initiated to promote the unveiling in the society (Taghire-lebas 
va kashf-e- hijab be ravayat-e asnad, [Change clothes and unveiling according to 
documents] 1998, 80). Regarding the second condition, it should be said that a centralized 
control and decentralized authority is needed to implement successfully the government 
policies, Amanullah’s government due to internal conflict and external sabotage did not 
have such ability at that time. 
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 Monotheistic religion that combines elements of Hinduism and Islam and was founded in northern India in 
the sixteenth century. 
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In October 1928, King Amanullah established an assembly composed of officers, senior 
government officials, and capital’s outstanding personalities. It occurred in the garden of 
the Foreign Ministry and was held for five days. In this assembly, Queen Soraya 
participated unveiled and the king offered his long statement regarding backwardness of 
the country. Furthermore, he displayed a video regarding his trip to Europe and requested 
the people to emancipate women. He indicated to the Queen in front of the audience to 
remove her veil (Azimi 1998, 13, Habibi 1984, 191). 
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the king recognized correctly the problem 
and found the exact solution, which was training of technical and qualified forces as the 
political, economic, and cultural foundations of the country. Accordingly, he established 
and developed the new style schools and conducted some educational policies in order to 
provide these forces. Nonetheless, in the manner of implementation of these policies he 
could not find an appropriate manner for Afghan society, moreover, he could not proposal 
any manner in this regard.  
In his view, all the western developed countries at that time could be model for progress in 
Afghanistan. Accordingly, he employed some forces from different countries such as 
Egypt, Turkey, Italy, Germany, and France. Additionally, as it was previously stated, each 
of the three schools that he established in Kabul was a copy of a particular country. For 
instance, Amanieh School (Esteghlal) was not only a copy from French schools, but also 
the teachers from French taught there. Nejat School was modelled on the German school 
and the Germen teachers taught there, and in Ghazi school the lessons were taught in 
English (Nancy Peabody Newel, Richard S. Newell 1981, 37). Later, a number of male 
and female graduates of these schools were sent abroad for higher education in developing 
countries.  
Likewise, the successful implementation of the king’s first stage of reform until 1924, 
made him arrogant, thus after his trip to Europe, he exaggerated and kept away a 
substantial number of his close associates and advisors, who had co-operated on the first 
and second stages of his reforms. In this issue should not be disregarded Britain’s 
mysterious interference. He selfishly implemented some programmes, which neither were 
pursuant to the Afghan traditions nor were very considerable factors in development and 
progress. Regardless of blindly imitating the western culture, the king’s new programmes 
flouted the rules of life and attacked values and religious beliefs of Afghans. Additionally, 
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People realized that implementation of his reforms not only would not lead to progress, but 
also it was regarded as an insult to the national culture. Likewise, it was an excuse for a 
number of opportunistic to misuse the critical situation and completely changed the 
process of reforms in order to achieve their own interests. 
His critical position in front of a number of influential people in the Afghan society such 
as Mullahs was the most important issue that demonstrated the king’s inexperience. The 
hidden hand of colonialism, in order to benefit from such elements, spread the general 
tendency for Mullahs and Molavis
1
 in the closed and tribal community of Afghanistan. For 
instance, they were utilized in the excommunication the followers of other religions, which 
apparently was for defending the religion, whereas in fact it was for stimulating the people 
against the king’s policies. It goes without saying that it would be a consequential policy to 
frustrate the reforms and regain their lost privileges (Davoudi, Zamine va pishinehe eslah 
talabi dar Afghanistan, [Background and History of the Reform Movement of 
Afghanistan] 2000, 184). 
 Bache Saqaw’s Uprising 3.12.
In November 1928, in a conflict between a group of nomads of Soleymankhil and a group 
of Sangokhil Shinwari, the supreme ruling appointed by the government upheld 
Soleymankhil, which provoked Shinwari’s hostility to the government. Furthermore, some 
intense propaganda had been distributed among Shinwari people regarding the disbelief 
and injustice of the government, which meant secret and organized hands were trying to 
prepare the context for rebellion (Ghobar 1981, 818).  
Shinwaris occupied Achin and Kahi military posts and achieved large stores of weapons 
and ammunition, undermined the route of Kabul to Peshawar and finally arrived in 
Jalalabad. In consequence of the weakness of the government, lack of decision-making 
many Shinwari people joined the rebellion. Jalalabad the centre of the eastern province 
soon fell and the king’s summer palace was burned. When the king recognized the 
seriousness of the situation, was too late. Despite of the fact that the central government 
dispatched military forces to control the tribal area handle the rebels, it was not 
consequential. 
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 Sunni cleric called Molavi. 
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It is noteworthy that in the beginning, the uprising appeared to be some limited tribal 
conflicts, which had religious colour; however, it rapidly developed into a very large 
rebellion. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that this was in consequence of the 
widespread propaganda, news of the Shinwari victory, the activities of British spies such 
as Abdolvahed Shinwari, Mullah’s eloquent speech and sending messages to other tribes, 
establishing several Loya Jirga, and using the reforms as means of anti-regime by Mullahs 
and religious leader.  
Considering the conditions of the cease-fire, which on December 29
th
 were sent to the 
insurgents by Golam Sedigh Khan Charkhi - the envoy of King Amanullah for 
negotiations, demonstrates the hidden hands of colonialism. The demands of the insurgents 
were as follows:  
 Mahmud Tarzi and his family had to be exiled from Afghanistan; 
 King had to divorce Queen Soraya; 
 All girls’ schools had to be closed; 
 Afghan girls had to return from Turkey; 
 Except for Britain diplomatic representation, all the rest diplomatic 
representation had to be closed; 
 The new law and the statute had to be repealed; 
 Taxes had to be reduced; 
 The low of wearing European clothes had to be revoked; 
 The form of Chador had to be changed into its previous form; 
 Islamic law had to be declared as state law; 
 The regime had to provide appropriate positions for Mullahs within government 
(Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 2005, 84-216). 
However, the first demand of the rebels was exile of Mahmud Tarzi and his family from 
Afghanistan. At that time, Tarzi was a close expert adviser of the constitutionalists, and the 
rebels, therefore, endeavoured to deprive the constitutionalists of experiences of such 
nationalist and aware advisor and accordingly requested them to exile Tarzi from 
Afghanistan.  
The critical situation in the East of the country prepared the background of insecurity, 
prevalence of robbery and banditry in the north of capital - the region of Parwan and 
Kapisa - leading by Habibullah Kalakani, also known as Bache Saqaw. He had been 
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charged with robbery in British India and was sentenced to eleven months in prison. 
Nonetheless, he escaped from prison, returned to Afghanistan, and continued his criminal 
activities. However, Shinwar rebellion intensified in late November and involved the 
government in a huge crisis in the east. 
In December, the fire of rebellion of Nangarhar sparked and the local ruler Malek Mohsen 
and some other people were arrested and were accused of supporting Bache Saqaw. 
Subsequently, the government sent Ahmad Ali Khan Lodin - the governor of Kabul - with 
full authority in order to fighting the rebellion of Nangarhar. Additionally, Ahmad Ali 
Khan Lodin in Parwan and Kapisa adopted the same promised manner of the government 
which was the policy of “negotiation and understanding” in handling the rebels. He left 
Jabal al-Seraj for Saraye Khajeh and informed the government that in order to satisfy the 
people it was reasonable release those who had been imprisoned by virtue of supporting 
Bache Saqaw. After that a large Jirga was established and was performed the policy of 
“negotiation and understanding” with leaders of Parwan and Kapisa, which led to reach an 
agreement between two sides. Furthermore, Bache Saqaw recognized the weakness of the 
government and he, therefore, increased his activities and killed many military forces in a 
sudden attack on the route of Kabul. The central government ordered Ahmad Ali Khan to 
reach an absolute agreement with Bache Saqaw. Ultimately, they signed an agreement and 
Bache Saqaw promised to stop the opposition to the government.  
According to Ghobar, after this scandalous and unprecedented agreement Ahmad Ali Khan 
Lodin brought Bache Saqaw and his comrades to Saraye Khajeh and requested the 
ministry of war to provide eighty-two guns for them. The king issued separate commands 
to the ministry of war (Abd al Aziz Khan), minister of finance (Mir Hashim Khan) and the 
governor of Kabul (Ahmad Ali Khan Lodin) and affirmed the commitment of Ahmad Ali 
Khan (Ghobar 1981, 821). This demonstrates the incapability of the government to 
decentralize its authorities in the local and tribal areas, which forced the king to make such 
agreement with the opponents. 
Ahmad Ali Khan established another Loya Jirga in Tagab
1
 in order to encourage the 
people to support the government and find volunteers for fight with the rebels of Shinwar. 
Nonetheless, the people of Nangarhar declared that they never fight against brothers. 
Accordingly, he requested the religious leader of Tagab (Abd al Hamid) to attract the 
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 Tagab District is located in the east of Kapisa Province, in the north-east of the Afghanistan. 
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support of people, but nevertheless he was concurred with people as well. Concurrently 
Bache Saqaw became very powerful and on December 10, 1928 in the castle of King 
Amanullah, in collaboration with some Mullahs, Khans, and his comrade, announced 
himself as the Sovereign of Afghanistan. Thus, it was conducted the final and the 
considerable resist to the king (Ghobar 1981, 822). 
Hereinafter, the conditions were more prepared for the collapse of the king’s government. 
On December 11, Bache Saqaw pillaged the local government of Saraye Khajeh and 
disarmed some governmental forces in that area. He intended to attack the capital by three 
hundred people and simultaneously sent his friend Seyyed Hossein to Charikar
1
 and 
Saraye Khajeh. First Seyyed Hossein conquered Charikar, where was abandoned with no 
forces. Subsequently, Saraye Khajeh was conquered without fighting and the military 
forces were surrendered. On 12 December, Habibullah Kalakani attacked Kabul, where he 
confronted with resistance by government’s forces. The governmental forces forced Bache 
Saqaw to escape to mountains, but nevertheless he continued sporadic fighting (Ghobar 
1981, 822).  
On December 17, Britain’s embassy demoralized him by flying its aircrafts in the Kabul’s 
sky without authorization of the Afghan government. The British aircrafts distributed 
announcements in which they warned people, in case of threatening the life and property 
of the British embassy staff, Great Britain would strongly take revenge. Following this 
announcement, on 23 December, the British planes landed in Kabul and took the women 
of embassies, which was the second shock to Amanullah’s government (Ghobar 1981, 
822).  
Involving a large part of the military forces to cease the uprising of the eastern tribes, 
confronted Amanullah’s government with collapse along with Bache Saqaw’s attack on 
Kabul. On 7 January 1929, he released Mohammad Sadegh Mojaddedi 
2
from prison in 
order to pacifying the religious opponents and making relationship with Mullah Abdul 
Hamid, moreover, on 8 January he issued a decree and rescinded a substantial number of 
his proposed reforms, but nevertheless such policies were non-functional as the conditions 
were out of his control. Finally, on 14 January, the king left Kabul for Kandahar and left 
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 Charikar is located in the Kohdaman Valley and the capital of Parwan Province in the north of Afghanistan. 
2
 Mohammad Sadegh Mojaddedi (hazrat-e shor bazaar) owing to having supported Bache Saqaw was in 
prison. 
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Kingdom for his brother Enayatullah Khan who was the king only for three days (S. M. 
Farrokh 1991, 52). On 18 January, Bache Saqaw ascended the royal throne of Kabul.  
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the disapproval of the powerful and spiritual 
family of Shor Bazaar, their alliances with tribes against the government’s policies and its 
reforms had a key role in toppling Amanullah’s government. In fact, these alliances and 
subsequently rebellions in the country forced the king and other Afghan constitutionalists 
and reformists to be neutral and silent for half a century. In addition, Ghobar believed that 
“the collapse of the reign of King Amanullah and subsequently establishment of turbulent 
government of Bache Saqaw in Afghanistan was in fact a historical disaster” (Ghobar 
1981, 834). 
 The Connection between Uprisings and Reforms  3.13.
On one side, the uprisings chronologically happened after the first and third stages of 
reforms; on the other side, the government opponents considered the social reforms, which 
had been suggested by the government, as propaganda against the government, moreover, 
these reforms were main causes for resistance to Amanullah’s government, which resulted 
in its collapse. Accordingly, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the uprisings 
were results of the reaction of the people to the reforms. 
Evaluation the causes of uprisings and failure of the king’s plans depends on the analysis 
of its complex and abstruse factors. It is true that the uprisings caused to delay and 
interruptions of the reform processes and ultimately overthrow of Amanullah’s 
government, but nevertheless the failure to reform should be separated from the overthrow 
of his government. In order to recognize whether the reforms led to uprising or the reforms 
were victimized by uprising, the various factors of uprisings and their differences from 
what claimed by the religious opponents of the king should be examined. 
It is sometimes suggested that the king never thought his reforms would lead to uprisings 
and rebellions, contrary his government was victimized by political transfer, which was 
stimulated and supported by religious fanatic (Kargon 1985, 84). Nevertheless, some 
western historians and their Afghan followers consider the uprisings as a direct result of 
reforms. They are of the opinion that the main considerable issues during the Amani era 
are the prejudice and backwardness of Afghan society, the king’s acceleration in 
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performing his reforms and his misconception regarding the conditions of the country and 
Afghan society.  
Reviewing the view of experts on Afghan society can illustrate whether the Afghan people 
strongly opposed the process of modernity and progress. As stated by Ghobar, 
“Amanullah’s government after removing the British colonialism from Afghanistan 
initiated making domestic reform. Afghan people that desired for development seriously 
assisted and cooperated with the government. They practically welcomed all of the new 
reforms, and like during the war with Britain spent their lives and properties. They even 
accepted a particular type of tax, which called “contribution of education” in order to 
progress the new education. They offered voluntary service to build streets and strongly 
supported new industries and democratic system. Even women entered in social activities 
such as establishing some local schools, publishing a magazine that called Ershad-I-
Niswan (Guidance for Women), and establishment of an association that called Hemayat-I-
Niswan (Protecting Women). Overall, the Afghans cooperated in all of these unfamiliar 
reforms and without any prejudice and obscurantism supported the young Afghan 
government. Thus, despite the foreign conspiracies and the reactionary forces’ opposition, 
King Amanullah could successfully and courageously implement all of his reforms in the 
first stage (1919-1924). [...] After 1927, the reforms were intensified, as well as despite 
their general consequences, they were destructive. [...] It is not true the judgment of those 
who believed the failure of reform attempts was a sign of rigor and prejudice of the 
Afghan people. Normally the Afghan people wanted to develop the lifestyle like any 
developed community. Afghanistan’s history does not demonstrate that the Afghan people 
rebelled against civilization and culture in any era” (Ghobar 1981, 789). 
As it was reported by Fazl Ghani Mojaddedi, the grandson of Mohammad Sadegh 
Mojaddedi, “Amanullah’s reforms were not the real cause of sparking of the revolution. 
The Afghan people collaborated with him on implementing a substantial number of the 
reforms, but nevertheless which motivated the nation’s hostility to reforms were the 
manner of implementing the reforms, and attendance of the dishonest people within the 
government. In addition, the authority and local governors were involved in the ignition of 
revolution” (Mojaddedi 1977, 221). 
The government’s opponents utilized some part of reforms as propaganda against the 
government. Some social and cultural reforms especially those that were related to 
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customs and traditions, such as obligation to wear Western clothes, women’s emancipation 
and equal rights, prohibition of polygamy and child marriage, sending girls to study in 
Turkey, and regulations against the high cost of weddings, were among the controversial 
social reforms. The government’s opponents referred these reforms as the main reason for 
public opposition to the government. 
It is worthy of note that Amanullah’s reforms were comprehensive with the goal of 
modernization the entire country and not just conducting some social or governmental 
system with the developed world. For instance, in the economic programmes of products 
and tax regulations supported the commercial project and the agricultural initiatives. 
Besides, the economic projects could promote education plans, and the education 
programmes could promote economic projects. There is not a shadow of doubt that the 
extent and volume of the developmental measures, implemented by King Amanullah, 
could be inferred in the terms of the nature of reforms and in his speech that he said, “I 
hope to see a fundamental change in all the essential aspects and diverse activities in my 
country” (W.K 1967, 213).  
There is no dispute that the king was a young man and was not perfect and faultless. He 
was impatient and wanted to achieve soon his desirable and human goals, which were the 
welfare of the people and promoting the progress and development in the country. In some 
cases, he implemented some minor and unimportant reforms while the majority of critics 
criticized him with no examining exactly the reforms. It goes without saying that such 
judgement is unfair and far from reality, and in this regard the following points should be 
considered;  
 It is true that the implementation of some obligatory reform such as wearing 
western dress was limited to the court and official circles and in fact, it was 
voluntary. 
 It is true that emancipation of women was faced with a substantial resistance. 
Nonetheless, in this case, the government instead of the use of force and violence, 
endeavoured to convince the people and reach a deal with them, as well as the 
mentioned plan was not so efficient and effective. 
 It is true that some traditional reforms such as mourning ceremony and weddings 
took legal nature. Nonetheless, people generally did not consider it and continued 
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their traditions as before. Besides, there was no example in which offenders were 
brought to justice. 
In order to study and verify the reforms and their connection to uprisings the social 
reforms are supposed to be examined, which the oppositions regarded them as the main 
reason for the public opposition to the reforms. In this manner, it could be discovered 
whether the main reason for public opposition were Amanullah’s social reforms or there 
were other factors as well.  
Leon Poullada is of the opinion that in order to analyse the modernization programme, 
three important factors are noteworthy: 
 First, the scope of these programmes was limited to the provinces and important 
cities, and they were voluntary in the small cities, moreover they were not 
implemented in some parts of the country. 
 Second, in provinces, the impacts of these measures were largely in the upper class 
of the society, and the ordinary people neither were affected nor were interested in 
these measures.  
 Third, there are sufficient evidences that even the classes that were affected by 
social reforms demonstrated no resistance against them (Poullada 1973, 143144). 
Leon Poullada thought that if the social reforms were implemented on a limited number of 
people in Afghan society and people demonstrated no hostility and resistance, so the 
reasoning that stated opposition to social reform resulted in uprisings proposed based on 
what? (Poullada 1973, 146-147) However, in order to answer this question should be 
remarked that the social reforms were the best means of propaganda, frighten and 
intimidation of residents and inducing the tribal areas. Consequently, the classes of society 
that were not affected by the reforms and had no direct experience in this regard were 
deceived by many deceptions and rumours. Furthermore, some parts of the reforms 
intervened in the sensitive issues such as religion, ideology, and family affairs, which in 
the ethnic society by virtue of tribe and kinship are very momentous and fundamental. 
Accordingly, Amanullah’s opponents targeted his social reforms and the foreign press 
excitedly and affectivity utilized this simple interpretation of the reasons for the uprisings. 
Eventually, it became a general view and many writers confirmed it with no investigation 
into the main causes of uprisings (Poullada 1973, 146-147). 
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There are many criticisms regarding the reform programmes of King Amanullah. One of 
these criticisms is regarding the changes in the army’s conditions. A group of writers 
blames the king according to his speech in which he declared “[Now is] the era of the pen, 
not of the sword” (Adamec, The History of political relations in Afghanistan from Amir 
Abdul Rahman till independence 1970, 58). He reduced the military budget and the 
number of armed forces. His critics indicated the governments of Kemal Ataturk and Reza 
Shah and argued that Amanullah like them was supposed to rely on a powerful army to 
implement his reforms. They believed that the weakness of the military system was the 
reason for toppling of King Amanullah. There are many evidences that the king in order to 
establish a strong and viable military system, within the framework of his priorities on 
national development plan, made some non-functional efforts. He believed that by 
justifying and reasoning would convince his people and attract their contribution to 
advance the country’s development programme. He endeavoured to encourage his people 
and gain their political support by convincing them that his plans were convenient for the 
country and nation. Initially, he opposed using force and pressure to achieve the goal, as 
well as he was against the military establishment that widely imposes a burden on national 
income. He preferred economic and education development, which was not 
comprehensible for his opponents. He did not want to establish a weak military system 
however, he wanted the country’s military system to be fitted to the needs of a modern 
state and be consistent with his aspirations. The manners that were used to reach the goals 
could be examined, whereas in fact there are no doubts on the significance of his goals 
(Adamec, The History of political relations in Afghanistan from Amir Abdul Rahman till 
independence 1970, 112). 
It is remarkable that the foreign policy of the government that obtained somewhat the 
predicted successes set the context of gaining economic assistance for realization of reform 
programme and making innovation in the fields of economic, social, educational, civil, 
military, political and administrative. According to a document, dated 26
th
 December 
1923, from the U.S. National Archives, an Italian expert who assisted Afghanistan in the 
financial affairs stated that the king had sufficient money for his projects, but nevertheless 
a remarkable part of it was spent in the Khost rebellion (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan1914-
1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 
2000, 337).
 
 
79 
 
Another criticism was regarding the king’s trip. Unlike the assertion of high costs of the 
king’s trips to European and Asian countries, it should be noted that these trips were not 
just a political act but also they were the most important part of the reforms. The king in 
order to make fundamental economic and social changes, besides strengthening his 
political position required to attract the necessary assistances. Accordingly, Aman-e-
Afghan wrote, “This trip will be taken in order to prepare the conditions for welfare and 
improvement and increasing the development of our country” (Aman-e-Afghan 1927). The 
king could attract the attention of the industrial circles of some European countries. It is 
worthy of note that the strict observance of the principles of national independence was 
seriously regarded in attraction foreign capitals in the country’s economy. He did not 
travel to the United States as they declared that he must settle his travel expenses. Later it 
was realized that the American government as a result of the British authorities’ request 
endeavoured to dissuaded him and declared that he would not be as an official guest of the 
government. 
Enforcement of the new laws, which were contrary to Shariah (Islamic law), was another 
criticism regarding the reforms of Amanullah. New constitution, marriage law, criminal 
codes, commercial codes, women’s education, civil registration, recruitment, and tax law 
were the critical issues of discussion in the Loya Jirga in 1924. As it was previously stated 
this Loya Jirga on 16 July, at the peak of the Khost uprising occurred in Paghman. It was 
strongly influenced by an intense religious excitement, which had been arisen by virtue of 
the Khost rebellion. A number of notable religious scholars took advantage of the 
problems of the government and as the first time publicly argued against the government’s 
reform policies. In the mentioned Loya Jirga, the opposed religious scholars requested to 
repeal of all laws that in their opinion were contradicted Hanafi jurisprudence. In the 
second day of Loya Jirga, Molavi Mohammad Ibrahim Kamwi suggested that first of all 
the criminal codes should be reviewed. Ulema, those who had not shared in the 
codification of the laws all together requested the king to amend the criminal code in 
completely compliance with Hanafi jurisprudence. Further, they wanted to prepare new 
criminal codes based on Islamic Fatwa,
1
 which instead of Tamasok al Ghozat could be 
implemented. Ulema’s serious and public demands demonstrated their remarkable concern 
regarding recent changes in the legal system. Among their requests, there was restoration 
of judges’ rights regarding determining the punishment. They indicated that the Qur’an 
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 Fatwa is authoritative religious decree of Islamic law. 
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has not determined the punishment of minor offenses and religious scholars argued that the 
punishment before the offense was contrary to Shariah. According to the provisions of 
Shariah, type and amount of punishment depended on different circumstances of time and 
place and thus they suggested that Afghanistan’s scholars “based on strong and well-
documented reasons and their own knowledge issue sentences” (Kateb 1923, 318). They 
unanimously declared determining duration of imprisonment before the crime was illegal 
because duration of imprisonment in the books of Hanafi jurisprudence had been 
determined until the advent of signs of repentance and modification (Kateb 1923, 314).  
However, King Amanullah endeavoured to convince representatives to consider the 
following issues: 
 If a criminal before committing the criminal offense knew the punishment, he 
would not commit it. 
 In the past, criminals threatened judges while they were issuing their verdict as 
there was no determined punishment. Accordingly, if the punishment would be 
already determined, there was no possibility for the criminals to threaten the 
judges. 
 Setting punishment before the crime would be resulted in undermining the bribery 
gate and corruption context. 
Nevertheless, the king’s efforts had no result and opponents were disagreed about 
determining punishment before the crime (Kateb 1923, 311). 
It should be added that many Mullah believed that translation of the religious sources to 
Persian would reduce their religious sanctity among common people (Kateb 1923, 116). 
One of the scholars of border areas claimed that there were some false rumours among the 
tribes regarding the Afghan government’s cooperation with Qadiani sect. He insisted that 
in order to deny these rumours and remove false ideologies, should be emphasized Sunni 
in the constitution and should be declared the government’s adherence to Hanafi 
jurisprudence (Kateb 1923, 151). King explained that the underlying cause that avoided 
him from mentioning the Sunni as the official religion was that the Shiite minority in 
Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries like Iran would be threatened. Nonetheless, the 
king’s reason in this case and other cases had no effect and Ulema could impose their 
views in Loya Jirga. 
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In the new constitution, there was no difference between Muslims and non-Muslims, 
which was another concern for Ulema. Accordingly, they expressed their concern that lack 
of investigation into this case could result in violation of the Shariah and for Islamic 
government of Afghanistan would be risky. Even Molavi Abdul Vase Ghandehari, who 
had an outstanding role in drafting the constitution, declared his opposition to the article 
ninth of the constitution, as well as he indicated that this article had been added in his 
absent (Kateb 1923, 125-126).  
Ulema requested that the word of freedom, which had been utilized in the article ninth of 
the constitution, should be explained. Molavi Mohammad Ibrahim Kamwi stated that the 
word of freedom could interpret religious freedom or freedom of activities against the 
moral principles of Islam (Kateb 1923, 136). The king in a long speech responded to 
Molavi Kamwi and explained the meaning of individual freedom. He outlined the cruelties 
of the previous regimes and lamented that despite Ulema’s claims of being defenders of 
Islamic justice, they were silent at that time. Nonetheless, they opposed his proposals, 
which were conducted to improve social justice. 
The subjects of polygamy and child marriage created long and acute arguments in Loya 
Jirga. The king explained the social problems, which caused by the child marriage and 
polygamy, and endeavoured to attract the consideration of the opposition in this regard. 
The king declared that his main objective of approving marriage law was removing or at 
least reducing family problems, which was one of the main reasons for disunity and social 
disorder. Amanullah’s other statement was regarding advocacy of women’s rights pursuant 
to the guidance of the Qur’an, and informing Muslim men of Quranic principles of justice. 
The king by reciting a verse from Qur’an concerning the issue of polygamy stated that 
Muslim men had just accepted half of this verse, which told, “ marry one, two, three or 
four times”. Nevertheless, they disregarded the second part of the mentioned verse, which 
told, “If you concern that you could not abide by the principles of justice, you should 
confine just to one marriage” (Kateb 1923, 129-137).  
Molavi Abdul Rashid and Mohammad Hossein, both were members of the delineating 
board, by reciting a verse from the Quran and quoting Hadith
1
 from the prophet 
Mohammad regarding the women, approved the king’s statement and supported his idea 
for women’s rights. 
                                                          
1
 Collection of writings that document the sayings and actions of the prophet Muhammad, one of the main 
sources of Islamic law (second in authority to the Koran). 
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Molavi Abdul al-Bashir, one of the members of the supreme religious council, added that 
polygamy was not prescribed in Islam for Muslim men’s sensual pleasures; however the 
underlying cause that it were allowed was that women, who had lost their husbands in the 
war, would not remain without husband. Molavi Abdul al-Bashir’s statements about 
protecting women’s right and marriage law were faced with severe protests. Finally, 
Hazrat-e Shams al-Mashayekh, who was supervising the debates, suggested that in order 
to obviate the approved provisions of polygamy should be deleted from the marriage law 
(Kateb 1923, 73). 
King Amanullah, personally, was not opposed to religion and was a true Muslim. 
Nonetheless, like his grandfather Amir Abdul Rahman, he believed that some people for 
political and economic exploitation held the religious institutions in order to use the 
religion to obtain their personal benefits. Leon Poullada is of the opinion that methods that 
the king adopted to reform the religious affairs, all born of his own thoughts. The king 
regarded educating Mullahs as the most significant step. He likewise decided to reduce 
their power in educating children and their influence in judicial affairs. Additionally, 
reforming of these affairs was necessary for Afghanistan in order to handle the 
contemporary world. Religious institutions and religious scholars played a significant and 
considerable rule and had a stable position in the Afghans’ life. They spread their 
authorities not only in the urban centres, but also there was no village or fort that Mullah 
was not there. Even nomads and tribes were under their influence, sometimes they were on 
the move with nomads, and sometimes they waited for them to arrive. Besides, the army 
was under the influence of Mullahs, and getting master and disciple was prevalent in the 
camps. Religious institutions deeply affected all social classes, and Mullahs informally and 
effectively spread their preaching all over the country (Poullada 1973, 145-147). 
According to Leon Poullada, Amanullah’s problems with religious leaders were essentially 
political problem and not religious. In the beginning, the king was pro-Turks and anti-
British partner of Pan-Islamism and Mullahs were his fans and supporters. Nonetheless, 
the situation was gradually changed and some Mullahs changed their opinion about him. 
This change was not due to his weakness in the religious beliefs; in fact, they regarded the 
king as religious person. In fact, their real motivation was concern over implementation of 
the king’s reforms. The reform programme included the establishment of a systematic and 
proactive system of administration and threatened the benefit of the religious leaders in 
two levels. Religious leaders in the cities and governmental centres performed the duty of 
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the judge, mufti, 
1
 and scrivener. They knew that the establishment of a pure 
administration and pursuant to the law would offend their political and economic 
influence. King Amanullah with the intention of making their activities within the 
framework of law, provide a modern position for them and made them skilled and 
competent in conducting their traditional and religious tasks. Consequently, the religious 
scholars actively were shared in the state administration and their responsibility as 
prominent individuals in society got significant. However, they were not satisfied and 
always sought to regain their previous privileges, which in consequence of the reform they 
became deprived of them. 
Indeed, the situation was exacerbated everywhere; child education reform, which the king 
seriously pursued it, were in contrast with Mullah’s interests. Furthermore, some 
administrative reforms, such as tax collection and recruit troops jeopardized the interests of 
the rulers. Notwithstanding the administrative reform had no connection with religion, 
Mullahs that were the natural allies of authority and power in rural areas were affected by 
these changes. They, therefore, gave religious colour to their complaints and oppositions 
(Poullada 1973, 147-149). 
 Internal Factors of the Collapse of King Amanullah Khan’s 3.14.
Government 
As previously stated, one of the considerable consequences of the reforms was that the 
influential groups including clergies, khans and commanders lost their absolute authority, 
pension rights, and privileges, which resulted they became opponents of the king. In this 
regard, it seems to be consequential to examine the critical function of the opponent 
religious leaders, betrayed generals, commanders, and courtiers. 
First of all, the important function of the clergies and their motives for opposition to the 
regime should be examined. According to Senzil Nawid, Mullahs or rural low ranking 
Ulemas conducted the first outbreak of opposition to Amanullah’s reforms. In 1928, 
various religious groups in a united front revolted against the government and with 
provocative propaganda condemned the king as apostates and who had exceeded the limits 
of law (Nawid, Amanullah and the Afghan Ulama: Reaction to reforms, 1919- 29 1987, 
128).  
                                                          
1
 A Muslim who is an expert in legal matters connected with Islam. 
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Indeed, not all clergies opposed the reforms; a number of influential and anti-British 
clerics not only supported Amanullah’s government until late 1928, but also fought along 
with their followers to protect the regime in South turbulence. As previously stated 
Hazrat-e-Fazl Omar Mojaddidi (Hazrat-e Noor al-Mashayekh) and his brother 
Mohammad Sadegh Mojaddedi (Hazrat-e shor bazaar) had a prominent role in anti-
government activities. It should be remarked that Hazrat-e-Fazl Mohammad Mojaddidi 
who after the death of his father became head of Mojaddidi family along with his brother 
Fazl Omar demonstrated courage and dedication in Afghanistan’s independence war, and 
received from the king state titles, symbols, and governmental concessions. As mentioned 
earlier, during the South turbulence King Amanullah wanted to imprison Noor al-
Mashayekh unless he would expel from Afghanistan. Thus, Noor al-Mashayekh on the 
pretext of Hajj 
1
 left Afghanistan and resided in Dera Ismail Khan in India. His exile 
increased his hostility and tenacity to Amanullah’s government. Accordingly, his activities 
made an irreconcilable enmity between the king and powerful and influential Mojaddidi 
family. 
As reported by Fazl Ghani Mojaddedi, “King Amanullah at the beginning of his reign 
benefited from approval of the Islamic clerical establishment. Nonetheless, in the middle 
of his reign, especially after 1925, he lost the support of the Islamic clerical establishment 
as a result of the method and speed of implementation of reforms” (Mojaddedi 1977, 323). 
Olivier Roy, the famous French scholar of Islam believes that announcing the policy of 
modernizing Afghan society by the king disturbed his relations with influential Muslim 
clerics. It is worth pointing out that this point was the termination of the Pan-Islamism 
alliance, which had been established in tribes, society and reformist government. The main 
reason for this issue was disagreement regarding the relationship between Islam and the 
westernization. According to standpoint of fundamentalist clergies, defence of Islam was 
defined as guiding the society toward Islam and Shariah, however, King Amanullah was of 
the opinion that defence of Islam was the political issue of anti-imperialism, and the 
Afghan society could lead to modernity by tendency towards the Western society (Roy 
1992, 100-101). 
Regarding the reason for changing the regime’s policy should be mentioned that 
Amanullah’s political status in the independence war brought to him admiration and 
                                                          
1
 The religious journey to Mecca that all Muslims try to make at least one in their lives. 
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popularity. His initial policy was based on opposition to British colonialism, advocacy of 
Pan-Islamism and nationalism. The king after gaining independence continued to support 
the Caliphate and the Indian liberation movements. Nonetheless, after the peace agreement 
with Britain and consolidating his reign, the king took the policy of a relative friendship 
with the powerful neighbours Britain and Russia. On the other hand, transformations in 
central Asia, failure of Amir of Bukhara, Killing Anwar Pasha, abolition of the Caliphate, 
and other transformations that occurred outside Afghanistan, had their impacts in 
Afghanistan as well. 
Most of the historians believe that disagreement between Muslim clergies and 
Amanullah’s government was by virtue of political challenges and not religious matters. 
The underlying causes that they initiated to oppose his government, partially was by virtue 
of their political position and former privileges, which were in conflict with Amanullah’s 
progressive programmes, and to some extent, it was by virtue of diminishing their 
religious authority in the judicial affairs and their backward character. According to Leon 
Poullada the issue that scared Mullahs, contrary to the false accusations of heresy, was the 
king’s firm belief in Islam. Mullahs regarded the efforts to progress and develop the 
Afghan society as grave menaces to their own interests (Poullada 1973, 150). 
Fazl Ghani Mojaddedi, believes “Amanullah’s personal stance on Islam that was 
interpreted by some of his opponents and blaming him for avoiding from Islam were 
unfair. We disagree on this issue with the king’s opponents; through research, we 
comprehended that regarding faith he was better to his ancestors and was not reputed for 
drinking wine and having a mistress. Removing the veil cannot be owing to his 
blasphemy” (Mojaddedi 1977, 330). He added that “if we take into consideration 
comments of Mohammad Sadegh Mojaddedi - the king’s chief opponent - we cannot find 
any notes regarding the king’s unbelief and avoidance of the Shariah” (Mojaddedi 1977, 
221). 
Leon Poullada, scrutinized the role of the clergies and the reasons for their oppositions and 
believed that King Amanullah, in consequence of his trip, particularly was inspired after 
observing the strong programme of Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Turkey and Reza Shah in 
Iran. In the Loya Jirga in August 1928, in which more than one thousand people were 
summoned, he shared his dreams with the public. First, the king provided a report on his 
trip and then presented his reform programme for rapidly changing the socio-economic 
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conditions in Afghanistan. The programme, which targeted the heart of clerical rule in 
Afghanistan, was included Mullahs’ educations, establishing a school for judges, 
establishing a secular law school, complete abolition of endowments, eliminating master 
and discipleship in the army. However, conservative religious leaders considered these 
reforms as declaration of war (Poullada 1973, 125-126). 
Among the factors, that could be pointed to the undermining Amanullah’s government, 
was treason, and corrupt of subservient generals and courtiers. Groupings within the 
government, sabotage of the royal family, the abuse of the religious beliefs of laity led to 
instability in the central government. Disloyalty and in many cases disagreement and 
hypocrisy of courtiers and senior officers had a remarkable role in undermining the king’s 
government. 
One example in this regard is Sardar sher Ahmad Khan. He sent many messages by British 
agent to British India and informed them of disagreement between people and King 
Amanullah. He endeavoured to convince Britain to occupy and promised his support. He 
awarded British India of hostilities and conflicts in the royal family. Furthermore, Faiz 
Mohammad Khan Zakaria, a close friend of the king and Minister of Education at that 
time, was included those that according to British intelligence documents, later had contact 
with Noor al-Mashayekh and was involved in conspiracies against the king’s government.  
During the Mangal disturbance, when Mohammad wali Khan Darwazi was fighting in 
Khost, and Mahmud Tarzi did not still arrive from Paris to Kabul, Sardar sher Ahmad 
Khan was responsible for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He previously was responsible 
for Minister Plenipotentiary in Rome and later the head of parliament. On 17 September 
1924, Sardar sher Ahmad Khan in a meeting with Maconachie - British ambassador in 
Kabul - in addition to disclosure of the state secrets, criticized the king and Mahmud Tarzi 
in order to attract British satisfaction (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan1914-1929: The First 
Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000, 274). 
According to documents in the archives of London Sardar sher Ahmad Khan, was among 
the senior members of Amanullah’s government, with whom Noor al-Mashayekh during 
the anti-regime activities in British India, had regular contacts. In 1928, while intellectuals 
demanded separation of rule and monarchy, the king appointed Sardar Sher Ahmad Khan 
as Prime Minister in a new cabinet. Nonetheless, owing to the lack of special conditions 
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among political, intellectual, and conservative groups, they deprived him of their 
cooperation and reported his failure to handle affairs to the King.  
Another example regarding the treason, and corruption of generals and courtiers is Wali 
Ali Ahmad Khan who was Amanullah’s brother in law and the king had many confidences 
in him. Nonetheless, during Shinwar disturbance he was sent to the east, instead of using 
his influence to pacify the disturbances betrayed to the king and carried out anti-regime 
activities. He opened the gates of Jalalabad for rebels, and declared himself as King. 
British archive documents demonstrate that Wali Ali Ahmad Khan years before Shinwar 
disturbance, intended to plot a coup against the king and in order to take the power. In one 
of these documents is shown, on the 14 May 1927, when King Amanullah was busy in the 
north to visit and inspect, Shahghasy Ali Ahmed Khan - the governor of Kabul - invited 
Basil J. Gould - British chargé d'affaires - to a dinner party. Ali Ahmed Khan asked him if 
the Soviets attacked Afghanistan or intervened in Afghan affairs, what policy would be 
taken by Britain? Basil J. Gould predicted that regarding the upcoming conditions, 
practically giving an answer would require a few weeks or months. Ali Ahmed Khan 
remarked that Afghans hated Amanullah’s policies, manners, and advisors that all were 
subordinate to the Russian interests and related to an objectionable doctrine. He added that 
the detestation spread in a large part of the army, the population of Kabul, Jalalabad, 
Kandahar and all tribal areas. In an appropriate time, the responsible nationalists and 
Britain’s fans should confirm themselves. As well as Ali Ahmed Khan introduced himself 
as an influential and powerful person among tribal and local solidarity groups and alarmed 
the British of an impending coup, which could increase the Soviet domination in 
Afghanistan and threaten the British position in the region. (Poullada 1973, 314). 
Destructive activity of Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan, who was another of the 
significant senior officers of Amanullah’s government, could be understood from the 
follow examples of the British intelligence documents: 
 The secretly supporting the British policy in Amir Habibullah’s court; the issue of 
entering into war against the British and in favour of Turks, during the First World 
War, divided Habibullah’s court and ruling circles into two opposing groups. One 
group wanted to remain neutral in the war, including Amir Habibullah, 
Abdulghodous Khan – the Chancellor - and a number of traders that were trading 
with the British India. The second group that the so-called War Group was 
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included the traditionalists under the leadership of Sardar Nasrullah Khan and 
Chief Justice Haji Abdolrazagh Khan, and it was supported by the clerics, tribal 
leaders and reformists under the leadership of Tarzi, and also Amanullah were the 
member of this group. Nonetheless, the British intelligence documents revealed 
that the position of Mohammed Nadir Khan (brother of Mohammad Hashim Khan) 
and his brothers was not completely clear. They favoured the British interests and 
preferred to be neutral in the conflict. In addition, the fear of being accused pro-
British, forced them to formulate their policies in a manner that it would adhere to 
the decisions of Amir Habibullah. Mohammed Nadir Khan and his other family 
members endeavoured to take control of the tribes from fighting against British 
forces (Olesen 1999, 101). 
 Spreading virulent propaganda against Amanullah’s government by Sardar 
Mohammad Hashim Khan among Mohmand tribes; in the secret note of the British 
intelligence agency in the North West Frontier Province states, was observed a 
correspondence on 15 February 1923, between Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan 
and an Afghan ruler in Mohmand. It demonstrated in the summer of 1922, the 
tribes on the east side had been excited as a result of the spreading a rumour 
regarding deviation of the King, Ministers and scholars of Kabul from explicit 
observance of Islam and pursuing the anti-religious innovations and reforms. 
Mohammad Hashim Khan in September assured his correspondent and asked him 
to propagandize the king’s religious belief and his supporting of non-Islamic 
education (British Secret Service Bureau, British Intelligence Agency North West 
Frontier Province, for the week ending 15 February 1923 1923, 84th Paragraph).  
 The king’s concerns in relation to deteriorating the situation by Sardar Mohammad 
Hashim; in another document of British Intelligence Agency of North West 
Frontier Province on10 April 1924 was reported that King was apparently 
concerned with deterrent measures of the Supreme Ruler of Jalalabad, which 
hindered the process of implementing social reforms and exacerbated resistance. 
The king plans to dismiss the Supreme Ruler from his position. He also issued two 
orders concerning Shinwaris and others, in which the King emphasized him to deal 
with people moderately and use reconciling methods. However, the Supreme Ruler 
abandoned the Nazyan and regarding the murder of two military forces arrested 
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several people of Sangokhil
1
. Further, deputy commissioner of Peshawar informed 
Mohammad Hashim regarding maltreatment of the Supreme Ruler with 
“Kodakhill” and “Isakhile” [warrior tribes that were armed struggle against the 
British] behaved violently and rudely with them and threatened them that they 
would face with punitive reactions from Afghan and British joint expedition. This 
is because he thought these people were involved in the murder of two Afghan 
soldiers that were working for the British agents. However, Mohmand people 
claimed that they did not shelter Dawood Shah, but nevertheless they obviously 
stated that if they arrest him [Dawood Shah], they would never hand over him to 
supreme Ruler (British Secret Service Bureau, British Intelligence Agency North 
West Frontier Province, for the week ending 10 April 1924 1924, 198th 
Paragraph). Dawood Shah and Ardali were two people of Shinwari Sangokhil that 
on 8 April 1923 killed two British military officers, who were the security forces of 
building rail lines in Khyber Pass. Such events demonstrate grave challenge 
between public and the authority, which prepared the background of the public 
backlash. 
 Undermining Amanullah’s government; Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan was in 
Russia as the Afghan ambassador in Moscow, He established confidential 
relationship with British diplomats and the ambassador in Russia and discussed the 
unrest in Afghanistan (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan1914-1929: The First Opening 
to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000, 303). In this 
regard, a report dated on 17 November 1926, from the British representative in 
Moscow is considerable. In this letter, the British representative appreciated Sardar 
Mohammad Hashim Khan, the Afghan ambassador, and emphasized that he had 
extremely friendly relationship with British representatives during his two years 
staying in Moscow. The British representative also remarked that Sardar 
Mohammad Hashim Khan and his brother Mohammed Nadir Khan were disagreed 
with the Kabul government regarding sending young people to study abroad. 
Further, it was indicated Mohammad Hashim Khan’s idea about growing 
discontent and dissatisfaction in Afghanistan and probability of an impending 
revolution. (British Secret Service Bureau, Hutcheson British ambassador in 
Moscow to the Foreign Ministry Dated 17 November 1926). 
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 Sangokhil is the name of one part of Shinwaris. 
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These few examples of the courtiers’ disloyalty and betrayal in Amanullah’s government 
are sufficient to fulfil the political weakness of his regime. Besides, it could be argued that 
the king was dealing with grave problems even before the uprisings, as well as these 
instances demonstrate that the venality and corruption in ruling circles provided the 
context of undermining the foundations of the government. The government employees’ 
corruption besides the courtiers’ disloyalty and betrayal, and the conspiracies of others 
caused the king lost his best friends and supporters. The influential ethnic people, who 
were between him and their tribes as bridge, became disappointed. Accordingly, 
expanding the scope of political influence in tribal areas became very problematic for the 
government. 
Disagreements and groupings within the court regarding the government’s domestic and 
foreign policies and negative competition of the groups, were among the factors that 
deteriorated the government from inside. A typical example of such disagreements was 
between Chancellor and Foreign Minister. It could be observed in a letter dated on 17 July 
1920 that Abd-al-Ghodos Khan from Kandahar sent to Noor al-Mashayekh, in which 
spoke about his concerns and threatened to quit the government. He indicated in his letter 
that the solution for the constitution was following Shariah, constitutionalists should be 
obligatory killed and then the new sciences should be taught. He indicated that he wanted 
to start teaching the new education in Kandahar, but nevertheless according to Shariah the 
constitutionalism should be destroyed. Accordingly, Abd-al-Ghodos Khan asked Noor al-
Mashayekh’s collaboration in this regard. (Mojaddedi 1977, 223, Ghobar 1981, 802). In 
the context of his request of Fatwa from Ulema of Kandahar, Sardar Abd-al-Ghodos Khan 
wrote explicitly “... Something that I cannot accept it as my principle is just one thing that 
is constitution. […] therefore, I want to remove these principles with your agreement…” 
(Ghobar 1981, 802). Additionally, the religious scholars positively responded to his 
detailed question and just endorsed the monarchy. They knew that all the rests including 
political, natural constitutional or Republican, the Bolsheviks, and the Mensheviks were 
rationally and religiously rejected (Ghobar 1981, 804).  
According to Ghobar, despite the fact that the religious scholars of Kandahar rejected the 
constitutional regime with this answer, they refused to issue a fatwa to demonization of 
constitutionalists, which was requested by the Chancellor. Ghobar mentioned that not only 
the Chancellor had fundamental disagreement with foreign minister and King, but also in 
the central government and the provinces, a major part of the government officials 
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opposed the government’s new plans and became its enemy, thus they decide to quit the 
government. This situation gradually prepared the context of a serious disorder, and those 
who mysteriously moved on a certain plan, did not hesitate to use different sorts of 
undermining. For instance, the government sought to modernize the army and in this 
regard employed some detectives and foreign officers such as Zia Baig and his colleagues. 
They took under their control a substantial unit in Mahtāb Qal`ah, and with the new orders 
and educations trained soldiers and officers and changed into a modern unit. The unit that 
was the perfect example for the entire army called “Sample Unit”, nevertheless the 
opposite officers formed another unit, which called “Breaker Sample”. Finally, “Sample 
Unit” was removed, and the classic mode remained in the camp. 
In the British intelligence documents on August 1920, it was reported forming a group by 
Generalissimo Mohammed Nadir Khan and its opposition to Mahmud Tarzi. The 
mentioned report stated Ghulam Haider Khan Minister of Commerce, Pir Mohammad 
Khan and Niranjan Das were the members of this group. Report added that inclusion of 
Niranjan Das demonstrated the ability of the mentioned group (British Secret Service 
Bureau, British Intelligence Agency North West Frontier Province, for the week ending 26 
August 1920). Another report of British intelligence agency elucidates that Nadir Khan’s 
influence on King Amanullah was increasing the opposition to Tarzi and it was hoped that 
in Missouri conference they would have the opportunity of criticizing Mahmud Tarzi. 
(British Secret Service Bureau, British Intelligence Agency North West Frontier Province, 
for the week ending 17 June 1924 1924). 
In another one of these reports from British intelligence documents, Chelmsford on May 
25, 1920 reported directly to the king of Britain regarding the situation of Afghanistan. 
The report described that there were two groups in Afghanistan; one of them was under the 
leadership of Mohammed Nadir Khan, the Afghan army generalissimo (P N Chopra, 
Prabha Chopra, Charles I. Randall 1998, 200). The Britain authority recognized in 
consequence of the weak position of Amanullah, his government was incapable of 
controlling the army. 
Reforms deprived influential groups, including religious leaders, commanders, and Khans 
of their former absolute influences, privileges, and pension rights. Accordingly, they 
became opponents of the government. Betrayal of commanders besides competitions and 
oppositions of groups within the government, undermining family of companions, 
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courtiers’ corruption, and flattery led to weakness and instability in the central 
government. British colonialism always regarded Afghanistan as a strong obstacle and 
King Amanullah as a major threat to achieve its political, economic, and military interests. 
Great Britain that by various plots could not obtain its desired objects, took advantage of 
this opportunity to collapse of the king’s government. However, the next section examines 
the external factors that had a substantial function in the collapse of his government. 
 The Function of External Factors 3.15.
The most important external factor in the overthrow of Amanullah’s government is British 
conspiracy. Great Britain, from the beginning, opposed prince Amanullah Khan and 
believed his rise to power was incompetent with their interests. In the early 1917, British 
officials received some reports, which informed them of the peak of nationalist struggles, 
prince Amanullah Khan’s liberation, and anti-colonial ideas, increasing his popularity and 
the possibility of his rise to power (Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923; a diplomatic history 
1967, 108).
 
Britain, therefore, always endeavoured to sabotage in order to prevent the king 
from catching the power and obtaining Afghanistan’s independence that they never 
succeeded in achieving these goals.  
When the king ascended the throne, declared Afghanistan’s independence and cancelled 
all of the previous treaties. Thus, the British government was in front of accomplished 
facts and confronted with critical problems to handle. Great Britain became very puzzled 
about accepting or rejecting Afghanistan’s independence as an indisputable fact. 
Additionally, British India had no motive to challenge the status of the new King and 
under existing conditions could not refuse his request for signing new treaties between two 
autonomous nations. Great Britain’s government regarded the Anglo-Afghan treaties as 
obligations that had been contracted with the Afghan king accordingly, at this time it was 
difficult for Britain to accept Amanullah’s request for signing a new treaty with 
Afghanistan. There was a school of thoughts in the Foreign Ministry of British India that 
after the declaration of independence of Afghanistan the lives of the previous personal and 
national contracts were terminated (British Secret Service Bureau, British Intelligence 
Agency foreign frontier branch, for the week ending October 1920 1920, 712th 
Paragraph). Accordingly, it is obvious that Britain regarded the king as an obstacle to 
getting its interests in Afghanistan so always endeavoured to remove this obstacle. 
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One of the British strategic warfare in the battle of 1919 was removing King Amanullah. 
The king decided to gain Afghanistan independent either by negotiation or by war. 
Nonetheless, Great Britain’s reluctance and delay in recognizing the independence of 
Afghanistan compelled him to initiate the fight. The British sought to portray third Afghan 
War as an insignificant war. According to Brian Robson the underlying causes that the 
British endeavoured to portray this war insignificant, are as follows: 
 In this war, the British killed many unarmed people; 
 They could not gain any interest in the war; 
 The British were involved in other global changes and events such as the Bolshevik 
October revolution, Paris Peace Conference, economic and political reconstruction 
of Europe after World War I; 
 The British government was very imperious by virtue of victory in the World War; 
in the beginning they did not consider Amanullah’s demand, and violating the 
accepted norms they did not respond to the king’s letter on time; 
 The British Minister of State in India wanted to ensure that this war was just a 
border war and would handle it as a border fighting; 
 Sir Hamilton Grant one of the British leaders who participated in this war 
considered this war one of the most meaningless, idiotic and unnecessary war in 
history (Robson 2004, 3). 
It is noteworthy that the British offered peace had different factors. They were incapable of 
continuing the fight, and except for Khyber front, they had failed almost on all fronts. They 
feared not only of Afghanistan’s relations with the Bolsheviks, but also of the wrath of 
Muslims in India. The British in relation to negotiations and armistice conditions adopted 
bribes and threats policy. Denys Bray the state secretary for Indian affairs regarded the 
policy of peace and reconciliation; he urged Afghans to close their doors to foreigners, 
especially Russians and forced them to pursue British policies in the foreign affairs. It 
could be argued that in the modern history, Afghanistan was one of the first eastern 
countries, which achieved independence and their independence inflicted a severe damage 
to British prestige and interests.  
The history of the British intelligence activities in Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent 
was initiated from the seventeenth century. They gradually expanded their intelligence 
activities in Afghanistan. However, considering the plans that implemented by Britain in 
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Afghanistan, India and Arabic countries could bring this idea in mind that the purpose of 
their activities was concentrated on conspiracy, influence in ruling circles, appointing 
puppet Kings and princes. They influenced courtiers, influential ethnic people, and 
spiritual circles of the countries with special skills and awareness; however, the best 
manner of achieving their goals was using money. Indeed, they use it to buy or recruit 
people, provoke disturbances and distribute the propaganda against the government. 
Further, they made disbelief and disagreement within the royal circles, political groups and 
common people (Wali 2008, 73).  
The British elements endeavoured to provoke dissatisfaction and conflict in the Afghan 
Royal family and courtiers for exerting pressure on the government of Afghanistan. In 
1919, after announcing Amanullah’s reign, they encouraged Saradar Nasrullah Khan to 
come to British India. British always endeavoured to convert the natural borders and 
spread the context of discord and war in the future. For instance, by imposing the Durand 
Line border, attempted to separate Pashtun tribes and families in Afghanistan, moreover, 
they provoked border disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
One of the useful methods utilized by the British colonial was fuelling the fires of religious 
discord. The Colonial Secretary of Britain, besides other activities, commanded its spies to 
provoke the religious conflicts and retain the Muslims in ignorance and unaware. Besides, 
the British spies were commanded to spread chaos and corruption among the government 
officials. In addition to provoking religious disagreements, the British established and 
strengthened Qadiani religious groups for their colonial purposes. The British for control 
of Afghanistan employed so many spies such as William Moorcroft, Abbé Huc, Charles 
Stoddart, Arthur Connolly, Joseph Wolff, and Josiah Harlan.  
Ghobar is of the opinion that the British government’s policy in Afghanistan in the 
different stage, either through military operation or through implantation policy, attended 
certain objectives and strategies. Indeed, collapse and division of the Afghan government, 
resulted the country became disunited, weak and separated from the world. Owing to the 
fact that in a direct invasion the people could recognize the external enemy and would 
react, the most destructive part of the British policy in Afghanistan was domination the 
country through its rulers. In addition, the enemy under the internal face could penetrate 
and confuse its intervention (Ghobar 1981, 444-445). 
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The British endeavoured to prevent the establishment of Afghanistan’s political relations 
with the world. After declaring independence of Afghanistan, one of the main objectives of 
the foreign policy of Amanullah’s government was the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with the other countries. Thus, a diplomatic mission headed by ambassador 
General Mohammad Wali Khan darwazi, was sent to Europe and America. Between 1921 
and 1922, the Afghan government succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with 
France, Italy, and Germany. The purpose of Mohammad Wali Khan’s mission was 
introducing the new and independent Afghanistan (Inayatullah Shahrani, Burhanuddin 
Namagh 2007, 201). 
Indeed, this diplomatic action of Amanullah’s government was the second major measure 
to diminish the prestige and dignity of the British Empire after the declaration of 
independence. For this reason, British colonialism in order to defeat Afghan mission and 
frustrate Mohammad Wali Khan’s activities, endeavoured to prevent the leaders of the 
other countries from welcoming the Afghan mission. In Paris, French Foreign Minister 
welcomed Afghan mission and French President met with them. British ambassador in 
Paris declared the French authorities that despite the fact that Afghanistan had apparently 
gained its freedom, it was still Great Britain’s sphere of influence. Italy was one of the first 
countries that signed trade agreement with Afghanistan and it was scheduled an Italian 
delegation that in July 1919 move toward Kabul. Several attempts were made to prevent 
Italians from making any relationship with Afghan, but nevertheless they were 
unsuccessful.  
Although the Afghan mission met with Harding - the President of the United States - and 
this meeting could be regarded as innately recognition of King Amanullah and 
Afghanistan’s independence, no relationship between US and Afghanistan was established, 
which demonstrated another sign of the British obstructionism in Afghanistan’s affairs.  
On 2 July 1921, Mohammad Wali Khan’s mission moved towards the United States. In 
New York, on 11 July, Mohammad Wali Khan stated that he came to the USA to establish 
diplomatic relationship. He added that the king for the economic development was 
interested in the America’s investment in Afghanistan (Ma’aroof 1987, 22). 
On 17 July, Mohammad Wali Khan, before meeting with Secretary of State of America, 
declared to the press that relations between Kabul and Washington would provide 
remarkable opportunities for American businessperson investments in Kabul. The British 
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never wanted to establish diplomatic relations and friendship between America and 
Afghanistan. Even Great Britain previously had reminded some issues to the American 
ambassador by the British ambassador in Paris. 
 Analytic Summary 3.16.
Amanullah’s reforms had root in the rationalism and westernization, which in the 
seventeenth century emerged as the age of enlightenment. Their main objectives were 
rationalizing the government and its policy, which intended to remove superstition and 
ignorance in both government and its policy. In terms of the type, the reforms had large 
and comprehensive dimension and involved in the economic, social, and political affairs. 
In the economic affairs, King Amanullah regulated the tax system, boosted the trade, and 
sought to industrialize the country. In the social affairs, the king focused on national 
alliance, social justice, equality of all people before the law, expansion of education and 
training, promoting political awareness through releasing the press and constructing 
schools, and eliminating the supremacy and avarice in the country. In the term of political 
affairs, he wanted to create a constitutional government based on codified and democratic 
law whose policies would be aligned with the interests of citizens and the public welfare. 
It is often argued that the British conspiracy, extreme westernization, ignore the rule of 
tradition and religious values by King Amanullah and his state officials, corruption 
sabotage of the courtiers and Mullahs, and finally public backlash against reforms were the 
main causes of the failure of his reforms and his government. First of all it should be 
regarded that in order to create a modern, rational, and constitutional state the government 
was inevitably supposed to take the same manner that were smooth by the Western. It is 
remarkable that for the first time the western world realized the power of reason to 
discover the facts and progress. The West realized that the best criterion for evaluating the 
divine issues and claims of religious and non-religious scholars is reason. Conservatives 
and traditionalists regarded rationalism as an irreconcilable enemy of traditions, 
superstitions, rearing disciple and myth. Further, they regarded it as their personal and 
professional interests. Accordingly, they became hostile to the reason and accused the 
rationalism in the name of westernization and anti-religion.  
Owing to the fact that the foundations of government’s policy became rational, they 
became incapable of interpreting their personal and professional interests as public 
interests and convincing the people to pursue their ideas, thus they declared their 
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opposition to the government’s policies. In the rational government, any adopted policy 
has to be indictable in the collective wisdom; accordingly, just the action or policy that 
provides the public interests would be approved, whereas self-interested people would not 
accept such sort of policy. Accordingly, the best ways to divert people mind, human 
consciousness, exploiting laity and make the people disciple and imitator were prevalence 
traditions, superstitions, hero-worship, rearing disciple and myth in society, fighting 
against rationalism, and charging of westernization. It is quite clear that the Afghan 
authorities were forced to implement the anti-rationalism policy in order to obtain 
legitimacy by religion and tradition. When King Amanullah requested them to provide 
evidence for substantiating their religious educations, they became irritated owing to the 
fact that presenting rational or objective evidence signified that Mullahs’ religious and 
scientific education was questioned.  
Likewise, the rational review of religion and tradition would threaten Mullahs’ interests, 
and religion and tradition would come out from their monopoly and would be public. 
Accordingly, it is obvious that a modern and intellectual government is in contrast with 
tradition and superstition. Accordingly, it is impossible to integrate them and a society can 
choose one of them and has to desist from another. The process of the reform programmes 
during Amani era was faced with such ideological obstacles, which could be regarded as 
substantial roots of the failure of the reform programmes. However there are some other 
remarkable obstacles in this regard, which are as follows:  
I. Plenty of inherent shortcomings could be recognized in the reforms, which as 
imperfect plans could not achieve the position of national success. These plans 
were so raw and proposed in the inappropriate time and place, and also they mostly 
were implemented by non-meticulous methods. In fact, the Afghan society in terms 
of culture was regressive as well as religious fundamentalism was a dominant issue 
in the society. Thus, the society did not have the necessary background for the 
king’s reform programme. Furthermore, intellectual and political context of the 
society suffered from intensity of long-term effects of cultural and political 
reaction. Reform experience in the Amani era, besides its intrinsic raw, was 
implemented in an inappropriate place that inevitably was faced with resistance of 
political and cultural reactionary factors because any effort to reform was 
disappointing to classic interests of the old ruling class, thus, ultimately, it was 
defeated. 
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II. It is particularly significant that the reform experience of King Amanullah was 
powerless and it did not consider substantial or intrinsic matters, or at least they 
were not regarded as a priority. For instance, in this experience, “democracy” was 
not as a fundamental premise of the reform efforts and it was not a priority. This 
caused his reform experience remained an experience in its essence and just an 
isolated elite experience. Accordingly, different strata of the society were excluded 
from political participation, having role in management reform experience and in 
implementation of its related projects. Consequently, the reform process did not 
influence from surfaces to nature and from elitism to democracy, thus, it is quite 
clear that lack of national force and public commitment led to its failure.  
III. Amanullah’s reform experience was based on patriarch’s charisma and was not 
been changed into a systematic experience that could rely on systematic activities. 
Thus, the king’s reform programme after leaving the first originator did not retain 
continuity in institutions and as a historical phenomenon joined history. There is no 
dispute that the survival and continuity are essential for the fundamental reform 
experiences to change them into systematic activities, which in his reforms cannot 
be seen.  
IV. The king’s reforms had procrustean character and did not consider national 
reconciliation and determination. Overall, the king’s intellectual and attitudinal 
results were in consequence of dealing with the Western civilization, and they were 
not preceded by any kind of discussion and national reconciliation. In fact, this 
reform experience was not introduced as a product of disputes and consultations of 
active intellectual, social, and political movements in the society. Furthermore, for 
acceptance and absorption in the society, the necessary background was not 
provided. Thus, the reform programme could not earn the national commitment to 
short-term and long-term goals. Consequently, despite all their importance, they 
remained unsuccessful. 
V. The foreign colonialism especially the British were always looking for an 
opportunity to bother the Afghan government in launching its reform policies. The 
colonial power of Britain was always stimulating and funding conservative and 
anti-reforms movements in Afghanistan. It also attempted to frustrate any kind of 
endeavours and movements that was supposed to provide independence for 
Afghanistan, afford remarkable self-sufficiency in governmental politics and 
manage its internal and external affairs. Further, the foreign colonialism 
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endeavoured to remove the factors that release the country from vulnerability of 
colonialism and external dependency. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that 
colonial powers using the political and cultural reactionary factors could frustrate 
Amanullah’s reforms.  
The next chapter studies the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (1978-1989), as 
the second case study.  
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Figure ‎4-1: Structure of Chapter Four 
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 Introduction  4.1.
The previous chapter painstakingly examined King Amanullah’s, and pinpointed their 
dimensions, targets and causes of their failure in regards to the views of different scholars 
and writers. This chapter studies People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, under the 
Soviet hegemony 1978-1989, as the second case study. The method applied in this chapter 
is descriptive and analytical, which is conducted using historical texts and political 
documents, and macro paradigms of reforms.  
The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (the PDPA), also known as Afghan Marxist 
political party, was established simulations with implementation a new system and 
constitutional reforms in Afghanistan (1963-1973), which gradually led to freedom of 
political parties. At the beginning of 1965, the PDPA was formed and Nur Mohammad 
Taraki was selected as the first secretary-general, Babrak Karmal became his deputy. 
Although the PDPA ideology was democratic and nationalist in the beginning, in 1978 it 
had Marxist-Leninist orientation. The party was divided into two factions, the Khalq 
faction led by Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, and the Parcham faction led by Karmal. The 
Khalqis were from rural areas and out of capital and majority of them were Pashtuns while 
the Parchamis were from Kabul and principally composed of Persians and Tajiks (See 
Figure  4-3).  
On 27 April 1978, the two factions were united in their coup against the monarchy of 
Daoud Khan and took control of the country. In the same year, the PDPA initiated making 
a number of political and radical social reforms including land tenure, education, women’s 
right, and making some changes in family law even regarding dowries and banning forced 
marriage. These reforms, which were stemmed from party’s antireligious and anticlerical 
ideas, provoked Afghans, who believed in religious laws and accustomed to traditional 
system, and landowners and old military commanders, who were at stake their interests in 
the wake of political reforms. 
In late December 1979, the Soviet Armed Forces (SAF) invaded Afghanistan and 
remained there until 1989. The Soviet invasion sparked Afghan resistance and brought 
suffering to the people. The PDPA followed its reform programme also after the Soviet 
invasion. Pro-Soviet conducted National Socialism programme and both factions regarded 
the Soviet as a model to implement the mentioned policy. This programme was to be 
attained through revolutionary manner of conciliation and compromise, which put 
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Afghanistan into internal conflict and forced the Khalqis to rise up against the government 
and Najibullahis’ national reconciliation policy. Failure of attempts and national 
reconciliation policy brings this question in mind, that what was the cause of the failure of 
reforms? Furthermore, did the external factors contribute to the failure of the reform and 
inciting the people against the government? Researchers have given many different 
answers to these questions. This chapter is going to answer above questions and examine 
the ideas of different theorists. 
The importance of this case is that the PDPA held close ties to the Soviet intelligent 
agency, however in the process of implementation of reforms confronted public resistance 
and could not achieve significant success. Thus, the PDPA reform programme instead of 
achieving further success, even could not achieve Amanullah’s initial success in 
implementing the reforms. Accordingly, the questions are  
 What were the obstacles to state-making and reform-making, during the PDPA 
rule in Afghanistan? 
 Why the PDPA’s government from the beginning was an unpopular 
government?  
 What was the role of the Cold War in the state building process in this era? 
 What was the Soviet Union role in disunity and disagreement in the PDPA? 
Conspiracy and intervention of the Soviet spies; contradiction between Marxist-style 
reform programme and traditions; the government’s brutal treatment; disunity and internal 
dispute in the PDPA; treason and sabotage of government officials and party members 
appear to be the cause the of failure of attempts and resistance to the government. The 
urban society unlike the rural and tribal population supported the government. The internal 
rivalries and conflicts in the party, which caused the split in the party and ethnic and 
religious contention in the Afghan society, made them in trouble to rule efficiently over the 
people and lead the society towards a communist society. Furthermore, launching 
aggressive and repressive policies and making decisions by a communist revolutionary 
programme regardless of the feelings of the population, resulted in many popular uprising 
led by local leaders. The Soviet policy was based on intervention on the progressive matter 
of the Afghan civil war and there was no motivation and benefit for them to support and 
develop the PDPA reforms. Their invasion caused further controversy in the Afghan 
society, which means the Soviet in order to make further disagreement and disunity in the 
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Afghan society imposed some social and military policies, and as a result, tribes and ethnic 
groups felt grave menace. Stalinism policy was not able to unify all the strata of the society 
to handle entrenched reactionary matters. Furthermore, lack of an organized and powerful 
army made them weak in handling those, whose interests were threatened by the PDPA’s 
reforms. Increasing civil war and having just one popular basis that was concentrated in 
Kabul deprived the government of having an independent organisation of the ordinary 
people. 
 
 
Figure  4-2: Conceptual Model for the Roots of the Failure of the PDPA 
 
The principal methodology of this chapter is a systematic summary of the PDPA regimes 
based on literature and media review. This idea discovers every methodological theory by 
bringing the historical background in every occurrence. The study verifies the state’s 
performance in reforming and reasons for resistance against the government. Lastly, 
subsequent to these examinations, the chapter presents a comprehensive analytic summary 
regarding the second case study.  
First of all, the chapter discusses the Saur coup and the PDPA’s rise to power. Then, it 
scrutinizes political, social, and educational reforms of the government, and the adopted 
manner of implementing the reforms. The Soviet Union stance on reform programme and 
their role in the PDPA’s policies are meticulously examined. It also depicts the public 
reaction to reform and the government’s function in handling it. Further, it verifies the 
internal dispute in the PDPA, effects of the Soviet invasion, resistance to their occupation, 
and failure of Najibullah’s national reconciliation policy. Finally, it offers an analytic 
summary. 
The PDPA officially was created in 1965, when political parties were allowed to operate 
freely. Indeed, this party is originated from the anticolonial Young Afghans movement of 
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the 1920s. The first formal meeting of the party was in January 1965, in which people 
from different social groups participated. From the beginning, the party split into main 
faction, including Parcham (flag) and Khalq (people). The party’s secret constitution 
approved by the first party meeting and clarified party’s doctrine as “adopting the 
Marxism-Leninism principles”, which was a copy of rules of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. The Parchamis and Khalqis had ideological and tactical differences. The 
Parchamis were non-Pashtun and principally were from the cities; however, the Khalqis 
were mostly Pashtun and were from the rural population (See Figure  4-3).  
 
  
Figure ‎4-3: The PDPA’s Structure 
 
Indeed, they could not be united and integrated, and also they were not able to make any 
considerable progress in Afghan society. They were constantly competing and winning the 
position in the ruling apparatus. In 1969, the Parchamis made a Secret alliance with 
Mohammed Daoud Khan and when he seized the power selected his civilian ministers and 
advisers from the Parcham faction; thus the Parchamis were hoped to catch the power 
after his death. Nonetheless, Daoud Khan gradually demoted the Parchamis in his ruling 
apparatus, which infuriated the Parchamis and their supports in the Soviet Union. Thus, 
the Soviet endeavoured to make reconciliation in the PDPA to overthrow Daoud Khan 
from power.  
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 The Saur Coup in 1978 4.2.
On 28 April 1978, (Saur 7, 1357 Hijri solar calendar year) a coup occurred in Afghanistan 
that was the beginning of the unrest and conflicts, lasted more than twenty years and 
caused the superpowers such as Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Furthermore, it goes 
without saying that this coup caused Afghanistan involved in the ruinous civil wars. 
Following this ominous coup and its painful consequences, Afghanistan lost everything 
and its oppressed people endured many countless suffering. The coup resulted in 
irreparable damages in different aspects of political, cultural, economic, humanitarian 
issues, which was not compensated for any time and for years kept away Afghanistan from 
civilization and the progress made in Afghanistan. 
The mentioned coup was performed by militaries of People’s Democratic Party, which in 
the ruling class of this party was called the Saur revolution and sometimes was mentioned 
as the proletarian revolution. Even the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was linked to the 
coup changes in leadership of the Party from Hafizullah Amin to Babrak Karmal, which 
was regarded as the new stage of evolution of the Saur Revolution. Some elements of 
Marxist and leftist groups, whose publications were the sources of intellectual power of the 
PDPA, did not mention the coup of this party as revolution. Besides, they expressed this 
critical and doubtful point after the collapse of the socialist Russian camp and deterioration 
of the PDPA.  
4.2.1. Threatening Factors to the Soviet’s Interests in Afghanistan 
The main factor that threatened the objectives and interests of Russians was Mohammed 
Daoud Khan’s tendency to the western country. The various factors such as people’s 
hatred for communists and also Daoud Khan by virtue of his totalitarian methods and 
collaboration with communists, the growth of the Islamic movement, failure of the 
government to solve social, economic and political problems, caused Daoud Khan under 
the pressure of the Soviet Union implemented a series of measures. In the first step, in 
1974 he removed the people from the Parcham faction from the cabinet and governmental 
system. In 1977, he initiated purging of the leftist from armed forces. However, it was not 
a successful strategy because Moscow’s influence in the sensitive military centres led to 
take further time to identify and purge them. In order to release from the political and 
economic pressure from the Soviet, Afghanistan expanded its relationship with Pakistan 
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and Iran and the Arabic countries - united with west - in the Middle East and requested 
their financial aid, which was accepted by them. 
Mohammed Daoud Khan’s tendency to the west led to satisfaction and contentment of 
USA, and the Soviet partly lost its former position in Afghanistan. Daoud Khan averted 
Russia, moreover, in the conference of non-aligned countries demanded the expulsion of 
Cuba, the close ally of the Soviet Union. Mir Mohammad Sediq Farhang, quoted in 
“Afghanistan in the past five centuries”, Daoud Khan in his last trip to the Soviet Union on 
12 April 1977, during negotiations with Leonid Brezhnev got irritated and left the meeting 
by virtue of Brezhnev’s criticism regarding Western experts’ activities in northern 
Afghanistan. He said that he would not permit anyone to suggest him how to run his 
country (Farhang 1995, 44). 
It could be argued that such policy was incompatible with the Soviet’s economic, military, 
and political investments in Afghanistan that they had already implemented in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century. The Soviet Union until that time about one Milliard 
dollars as loans and new weapons had granted to Afghanistan’s government. Furthermore, 
with the large cultural and political activities, they had organized groups that were oriented 
to Moscow’s policies. Afghanistan’s efforts to approach the Western countries cut 
Russian’s hand and thwarted their sixty years of planning.  
Furthermore, rise of the Islamic revolution in Iran and shaking the foundations of the 
monarchy in this country, was one of the major factors that, especially in terms of 
ideology, threatened Russian interests in the region and in the world. Russians considering 
the attraction of Islamic Revolution for Muslims predicted that after the Islamic revolution 
not only Marxism would be insignificant in Islamic countries and the Third World, but 
also the occupied republics of the central Asia and Caucasus would be affected by this 
revolution. Accordingly, they decided to undermine the Islamic Revolution in the region 
from the beginning. The only manner of performing it was interfering in Afghanistan 
affairs, where people had always wanted to found an Islamic state and the Islamic 
movement. Later, the high-ranking Soviet officials admitted that their campaign in 
Afghanistan had to be on the target to prevent Islamic revolution from growing. 
Considering above-mentioned threatening factors, Russians immediately utilized the 
opportunity in order to protect their interest in Afghanistan and handle potential threats. 
The opportunity that Iran, an important neighbour of Afghanistan, was burning in the fever 
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of the Islamic Revolution. Thus, America and the western world that their interests were at 
stake in Iran, hurriedly sought to preserve them. Accordingly, they did not desire to be 
involved in the crisis that Russians had created in Afghanistan. Furthermore, America and 
the Western countries did not have very much interest Afghanistan at that time. 
Additionally, arresting leaders of both factions of the PDPA by Daoud Khan in such 
circumstances provided very convenient excuse for Russians and their agents, who 
launched the Saur Revolution to rescue the party leaders,. Furthermore, it should be 
mentioned the PDPA leaders were not ready for such coup, which could be realized in 
disagreements between the Parcham and Khalq factions’ leaders regarding the coup. 
4.2.2. Pre-Saur  
As mentioned above, Russians desired to overthrow Mohammed Daoud Khan’s regime 
immediately, however the Saur coup did not occur suddenly and with no previous plan. 
Accordingly, Nur Muhammad Taraki a week after the coup, said at a press conference, 
“from three years ago we were ready to launch coup, however we asked nobles to share the 
power with us as a party” (Afghanistan. Viz¯arat-i Ittil¯a‘¯at va Kult¯ur 2007, 59). 
Some substantial issues prepared the conditions for Russians to topple Daoud Khan’s 
regime. Russians provided the background for his overthrow, keeping their main plans. 
Accordingly, on 9 December 1975, they sent to Kabul Nikolai Podgorny, Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR, to renew the treaty of neutrality and non-aggression 
between the two countries in order to seduce Daoud Khan for another decade. After that, 
the Russians did systematically their efforts to overthrow the Afghan government. The 
mentioned steps were as follows: 
I. The two factions of the People’s Democratic Party, the Khalq and Parcham 
became united; Daoud Khan changed his policy by virtue of disapproval of the 
different classes of people and armed operations that occurred to him in 1975, got 
close to Islamic countries such as Iran, and reduced hostile propaganda against 
Pakistan. The Khalq and Parcham felt grave menace as a result of the government 
new policies. Both factions that until that time accused each other of being CIA’s 
mercenaries suddenly put aside their disagreements, and distributing a leaflet in 
January 1977 announced their alliance. In this alliance, Nur Muhammad Taraki as 
General Secretary of the Party and Babrak Karmal as his deputy were appointed.  
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II. While Daoud Khan was under political pressure from Khalq and Parcham, 
Russians suspended the economic contracts and agreements between Afghanistan 
and the Soviet Union to put economic pressure on Daoud Khan.  
III. Another step was the assassination of Ali Ahmad Khorram, Minister of Planning on 
16 November 1977, who was an adherent of the West in Daoud Khan’s cabinet. 
The government accused a Muslim militant called Mohammad Mrajan of murder 
of Khorram, but he did not have sufficient incentives to assassinate Khorram, 
moreover, there were not sufficient documents to accused him. There are those 
who maintain that Russian agents involved in the assassination of Khorram and 
introduced Marjan as a dependent factor on PDPA. Accordingly, if Marjan was the 
murderer, there would be no doubt regarding the involvement of the Russians. It 
does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the Russians had two goals of 
Khorram’s assassination; first, seducing Daoud Khan and second, concealing the 
Soviet’s opposition and intimidating Daoud Khan. Russians using the plot of 
Khorram’s assassination wanted to ensure Daoud Khan of their agents and 
introduce the Islamic movement and his western supporters as the main threat to 
his regime. Thus, Russians could implement their interventional plans and Daoud 
Khan got involved in killing Islamic factors. In other hand, in case of the disclosure 
of the Russians’ involvement in the mentioned plot, Soviet could have intimidated 
Daoud Khan would have avoided him from opposition to Soviet influence in 
Afghanistan. This indirect threat could be understood seven months after Daoud 
Khan’s trip to Moscow and his radical and liberal handling Brezhnev. Additionally, 
disclosure of this plot later caused Daoud Khan became more upset with Russians 
and convinced him to release himself Moscow’s domination. Nonetheless, when 
these attempts were made, Russians had already influence on Afghanistan’s 
military and security forces, and Afghanistan had owed four million dollars to the 
Soviet Union. 
IV. Coordinating hired officers with the PDPA could be another remarkable action. 
Russians in order to deprive Daoud Khan of opportunity for handling the critical 
situation the resistance issued mobilization order to the unknown mercenary of 
Kremlin in Afghanistan’s army and coordinated them with Hafizullah Amin. It is 
worth pointing out that Russians during the reign of Zahir Shah and chancellery of 
Mohammad Daoud Khan from 1960 had begun influence operations in 
Afghanistan’s army. Nonetheless, communists’ organizational activities in the 
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army had begun from 1970, and in 1973, Hafizullah Amin was commissioned by 
the Khalq faction to implement the party activities in the army. 
V. Mysterious murder of Mir Akbar Khyber on 17 April 1978, one of the leaders of 
the Parcham faction, was the introduction of the Saur coup. The leaders of both 
factions of Khalq and Parcham with thousands of party members converted his 
funeral Khyber into a street meeting and demonstration and requested Mohammed 
Daoud Khan to arrest and punish Khyber’s killer. Mir Akbar Khyber in the early 
years of the Republic of Mohammed Daoud was responsible for the secret military 
organization of the Parcham faction. Khyber was one of the figures on the left 
movement in the seventies and for some time the royal government imprisoned him 
by virtue of his revolutionary ideas and his activities in the development of the 
leftist Marxist thoughts. In the early years of the activities of the PDPA, he had a 
close relationship with Babrak Karmal, the leader of the Parcham faction, and as 
mentioned above Khyber was one of the leaders of this faction. Although he was 
regarded as founders of the PDPA, he did not attain the membership of the first 
congress of party formation due to his job in the state police. Concerning his terror, 
which led to Saur coup different theories were presented by both factions of the 
PDPA. Abdul Quddus Ghorbandi, a supporter of Hafizullah Amin and member of 
the Parcham faction, linked Khyber’s terror to Babrak Karmal and charged him for 
this terror. Ghorbandi claimed that Taraki and Khyber’s family had the same 
opinion; moreover, Khyber had declared that Karmal had threatened to kill him 
(Ghorbandi 2000, 57). Nevertheless, Karmal and his advocates accused Amin of 
Khyber’s assassination. Sultan Ali Keshtmand mentioned that regarding Khyber’s 
assassination Karmal expressed that the prevailing concept was based on involving 
Amin in this conspiracy. Amin always had intense hostility with Khyber and 
regarded him to be his serious rival by virtue of his good position among party 
members, Pashtun nation and militaries (Keshtmand 2002, 325). It is remarkable 
that there are no evidences regarding involving Daoud Khan’s government in this 
assassination, but nevertheless regarding Russians’ involving there are some 
evidences. Dr. Anahita Ratebzad’s confession could be taken into consideration as 
evidence. Ratebzad, who was one of the senior members of the Khalq faction, in 
celebration of the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the PDPA, said, “there 
are still evidences Mir Akbar Khyber, member of the central committee of our 
party, by his (Hafizullah Amin) homicidal gang and in collusion with reactionaries 
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and savage terrorists has been martyred” (Afghanistan. Viz¯arat-i Ittil¯a‘¯at va 
Kult¯ur 2007, 571). It is worth pointing out that Russians pursued two goals in 
Khyber’s assassination; first, alliance between Khalq and Parcham in that critical 
condition for Russians was very important. Khyber who opposed Taraki and Amin, 
had no desire to make alliance with the Khalq faction, therefore, Russians removed 
Khyber that was an obstacle to making this alliance; second, they wanted to create 
disruption and chaos in the society in order to provide context and pretext for 
staging the coup. It could be argued that regardless of the fact that which political 
group or factions of the PDPA could be regarded as the elements for Khyber’s 
assassination, it was the starting point for a bloody conflict in the PDPA, and it 
initiated from the first days of the coup and continued in all the years of ruling of 
the party. Furthermore, it led to the military coup and establishment of the rule of 
the coup in the country, which converted the country into the field of regional and 
global competitiveness and invasion. 
4.2.3. The Coup d'État 
On 28 April 1978 the PDPA initiated the coup against Daoud Khan’s government 
following the order of Hafizullah Amin. Although it was supposed that the coup would be 
initiated in August, subsequent to killing of Mir Akbar Khyber and arresting the leaders of 
the Khalq and Parcham factions, its time was changed to April (Azimi 1998, 135). It is 
remarkable that, the government did not arrest some of the leaders of two communist 
factions, low-ranking individuals in the army and military forces. Accordingly, Hafizullah 
Amin the chief commander of the Khalq faction could issue the order to start the coup and 
direct it. 
“On the morning of 28 April, Hafizullah Amin, before being arrested, sent the news of 
arresting of the party leaders to some specific places by his son and issued the command to 
start the coup” (Ataee 2004, 397). On the morning of 28 April, Hafizullah Amin’s through 
his son informed Sayed Mohammad Golabzoy that the party leaders have been arrested and 
the coup should be initiated. After victory the coup and Daoud Khan’s assassination, there 
were still some resistances in some parts of the army, which soon got frustrated. Thus, the 
military parts in the capital and other provinces were under control of the coup regime.  
One of the most important and considerable issues concerning the Saur coup is the role of 
the two faction of the PDPA. Although many members of the Khalq and Parcham factions 
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mentioned the Saur coup as revolution and sometimes as armed uprising leaded by the 
PDPA, their expression and analysis regarding the process of events were different. For 
instance, Sultan Ali Keshtmand, one of the leaders of the Parcham faction, in one comment 
regarded this coup as a long-term decision of Taraki, Karmal, Nur Ahmad Nur and Dr. 
Shah Wali, but nevertheless in another comment he mentioned that Hafizullah Amin’s 
main motivation for launching the Saur coup were his adventure and ambitious tendencies. 
In fact, Keshtmand believed that the Saur coup was an accident and not a pre-planned 
event (Keshtmand 2002, 347). It is sometimes suggested that Dastagir Panjsheri, one of the 
members of the Khalq faction, believed that the Saur coup was a pre-programmed plan of 
both factions, led by military leadership (Panjsheri 1998, 79). 
Furthermore, involvement the Parcham faction in the coup was another obscure and vague 
point in this event. Although a number of the militaries of the Parcham faction assisted the 
militaries of the Khalq faction, this coup occurred with no command given by the leaders 
of the Parcham faction. Nur Ahmad Nur the responsible for the military part of the 
Parcham faction in the army, in the coup day made no connection with the member of the 
Parcham faction in the army. In fact, many members of the Parcham faction in the armed 
forces of Afghanistan had no information regarding the Saur coup (Omarzai 1994, 39). 
After the victory of the coup, the Khalq faction and especially Amin discussed the weak 
function and contribution of the Parcham faction, and in division of powers regarded it as 
a point of weakness for the Parchamis. Thus, the Parcham faction members got fewer and 
weaker share than the Khalqis in the government.  
Another considerable issues concerning the Saur coup is the role of Soviet Union in it. 
There are those who refuted the Soviet interference and involvement in the Saur coup, but 
nevertheless there are some factors, which refuted their theory. Selig S. Harrison an 
American researcher of Afghanistan quoted from Colonel Samyran, responsible for 
military part of Indian embassy in Kabul, that Qader informed the Soviet military and 
intelligence services of Amin’s plan while he had received no command about 
collaboration with the Soviet in the coup. Nonetheless, in early 1978, many of Soviet 
technicians were deployed to Kabul and Bagram airfield to train the Afghan air force and 
maybe the Saur coup could not succeed without the support from Soviet technicians (Selig 
S. Harrison; Diego Cordovez 1995, 27). Political consultant appointed by Moscow to the 
Central Committee of the People’s Democratic Party in Kabul did not believe the 
contribution of Moscow to the coup, but nevertheless he admitted that the Soviet 
112 
 
intelligence agents were aware of the details of the coup. Admittedly, the Soviet 
intelligence agents (KGB) and the Soviet military intelligence (GRU) that were in the 
Afghan army as military advisers had a significant role in the planning of the coup (See 
Figure  4-4). 
A very important discussion on the coup is Hafizullah Amin’s relations with Russians. 
According to Keshtmand, the Soviet Union was not aware of the Saur coup because Amin 
did not inform the Soviet agents of his plan. In fact, Moscow, Washington, Carter, and 
Brezhnev had no information about the coup because they had stated before their 
opposition to launch any coup, Accordingly, informing them of the coup was a substantial 
mistake (Keshtmand 2002, 348). 
There is a school of thoughts that Russians had a substantial function in Saur coup. As 
stated by Farhang, “The coup order was prepared in the Soviet embassy in Kabul and by 
an officer who called Sarwar Mangal was sent to Hafizullah Amin” (Farhang 1995, 81). 
Dr. Haqshenas mentioned that Russian aircrafts flew from Tashkent and bombed Daoud 
Khan’s palace. There is not a shadow of doubt that the Soviet military intelligence (GRU) 
was aware of the coup (Haqshenas 1989, 417). Selig S. Harrison and Diego Cordovez 
mentioned that studying the details of the Saur coup demonstrates that the coup was 
organized in the last opportunity by the Afghans. Additionally, if the Soviet intelligence 
agencies assisted Afghans in this regard, it was performed after starting the operation; it 
does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Soviets were dealing with an accomplished fact 
(Selig S. Harrison; Diego Cordovez 1995, 25). The KGB was informed of the coup despite 
the fact that Amin kept secret the coup order from the Russians. Furthermore, the KGB 
neither prevented Amin from conducting the coup nor informed Daoud Khan of the coup. 
According to Alexander Morozov who initiated his deputy weeks before the Saur coup, 
Moscow’s recommendation to the PDPA was based on avoiding from staging the coup. 
Furthermore, the KGB found out that Amin had commanded to conceal the coup from 
Russians (Selig S. Harrison; Diego Cordovez 1995, 27). It is obvious that the underlying 
cause that Amin kept secret the coup from the Soviet was the Soviet’s recommendation for 
avoiding mounting the coup and not due to his distrust of Soviet or vice versa (See 
Figure  4-4). 
113 
 
 The Khalq Rule 4.3.
On 29 April 1978, the transfer of power from the military council to the revolutionary 
council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was announced. Communists in order 
to seduce people utilized the title of “Armed Forces Revolutionary Council” in their first 
announcement and avoided mentioning explicitly the title of the PDPA and the name of its 
leaders. In the first step, their goals were the prevention of provoking the sentiments of 
people and the Muslim part of the armed forces, as well as they wanted to determine 
explicitly the coup results. The revolutionary council, which composed of members of the 
central committee of the PDPA issued the first decree as “The Decree Number One” on 30 
April. In the decree, it was declared that the revolutionary council at its first meeting 
elected Nur Muhammad Taraki as chairperson of the revolutionary council and head of the 
government, and this council as the highest state authority unanimously adopted the 
following:  
 “After this date (10 Saur 1357 / 30 April 1978) Afghanistan in terms of political 
organization, is the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. 
 Government, as the supreme executive power of the country, will be elected by the 
revolutionary council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and will 
be called the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The government is responsible 
for the revolutionary council of the DRA. 
 The revolutionary council of the DRA unanimously adopted that until further notice 
military rules will exist throughout the country. 
 The revolutionary council of the DRA in the earliest opportunity will elect the 
deputies and members of the government of the DRA and will approve and 
announce their policies. 
 The supreme affairs of the government will be executed based on the commands of 
the revolutionary council of the DRA and the government” (Afghanistan. Viz¯arat-i 
Ittil¯a‘¯at va Kult¯ur 2007, 1).  
The revolutionary council of the DRA issued the second decree on 1 May 1978 and 
appointed Babrak Karmal as vice president and Hafizullah Amin as foreign minister 
(Afghanistan. Viz¯arat-i Ittil¯a‘¯at va Kult¯ur 2007, 2). Among the twenty-one cabinet 
members, twelve people were from the Khalq faction nine people were from the Parcham 
faction, and the revolutionary council had thirty-five members. 
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Figure ‎4-4: Nominal People’s Democratic of Afghanistan Party Structure 1980 
(Mullins 2011, 51) 
 
 
4.3.1. Foreign Reaction 
The Soviet government that after falling of the monarchy of Zahir shah and establishing a 
Republic government in Afghanistan, immediately recognized Muhammad Daoud Khan’s 
coup on 17 July 1973 this time after one day it recognized the Saur coup as the first 
country. The Soviets did not rush to recognize the Taraki regime owing to the fact that 
they wanted to ensure the success of the coup. Further, they sought to demonstrate their 
unawareness of how the coup had been implemented and pretend that they had no role in 
the coup. After the Soviet, all the eastern countries at that time, India, western and third 
world countries one after another recognized the communist regime.  
The three neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and Iran despite the fact 
that recognized Taraki’s government, they expressed their concerns regarding the new 
conditions in Afghanistan. When the Saur coup occurred in Afghanistan, political unrest 
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had been initiated in Iran and every day its scope and depth became more momentous. 
Party publications always recommend Iran to develop the relationship with the Afghan 
revolution. After the coup, Huang Hua foreign minister of china, travelled to Iran and 
Pakistan, and in meeting with the leaders of these countries and expressed his country’s 
concern regarding the progress of his so-called “social-imperialist”. Subsequent to the 
Saur coup, Pakistan’s government declared its support for the opposition to the 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which led to unpleasant relationship between two 
countries. Pakistan’s government assisted the oppositions of central government of 
Afghanistan in establishing parties, camps, training and arming that finally led to 
overthrow the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. America 
recognized the communist Saur coup and continued its economic, technical, and cultural 
aids. Theodore Lyman Eliot, an American ambassador in Kabul, sent a letter to White 
House and encouraged America’s officials to assist Afghanistan. He continued 
negotiations regarding the future aids of United States Agency for International 
Development (AID) and the cultural programmes of Peace Corps Volunteers and 
endeavoured to achieve the agreement of Senate Parliament in this regard.  
Americans disregarded the Soviets’ involvement in the Saur coup and regarded it as a 
nationalist coup and an internal event. Even Jimmy Carter declared that the new 
government in Afghanistan could not be considered as a puppet government. In fact, 
Americans believed that the DRA was not a Communist government and Soviets had no 
intervention in the Saur coup (The New York Times 1987, 18). 
Statements of the political officials and American experts regarding the Soviets policy of 
non-interference in the Saur coup and their doubts regarding communist nature of the coup 
can only be justified in terms of political considerations; otherwise, there are many reasons 
to confirm the Soviets interference in the coup. Besides, the communist nature of the coup 
is so obvious that there is no need to discuss. In fact, Americans had already accepted the 
Soviets influence in Afghanistan and avoided being involved in the problem of this 
country. Further, they did not have the capacity and possibility to interfere in 
Afghanistan’s affairs. Some people argued that why America did not prevent the Saur 
coup and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The answer to this question is quite clear; 
America’s interests at that time did not require such action. Accordingly, America 
permitted the Soviet Union to involve in Afghanistan’s issues, in order to collapse earlier 
the Soviet Union.  
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It is obvious that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Shah of Iran were the comrades 
of America in the region at that time. They are not willing to assist the people of 
Afghanistan and overthrow the communist regime. America’s position in the Saur coup is 
not unrelated to theory of western and American political experts. When the Saur coup 
occurred, there was a theory between the western political experts that the spread of 
Communist coups in third world developing countries put demanding pressure on poor 
economy of the Soviet Union, which led to political and military defeat of this country.  
Unfortunately, Afghanistan was one of the poorest and most vulnerable countries in the 
third world, where theory of incapacitation the Soviet Union could be better experienced 
than some other countries. In addition, the mentioned theory was experienced in 
Afghanistan and subsequently the Soviet Union collapsed, however, it does not seem 
unreasonable to suggest that Afghans were the victim of this experience. 
4.3.2. New Reforms 
Nur Mohammad Taraki’s government following the patterns of the communist 
government initiated its reform programme and issued eight decrees during eight months 
in order to change Afghanistan’s political system and social, cultural, and economic 
organizations. The decrees were as follows:  
I. As was mentioned earlier the first decree meanwhile introduced Nur Muhammad 
Taraki as chairperson of the revolutionary council and head of the government, 
changed Afghanistan’s political system as well.  
II. All the properties of the previous Kings, Mohammad Zahir Shah, Mohammed 
Daoud Khan and commanders of Nadir Khan’s family were confiscated.  
III. The previous constitution was abolished and was formed the new Supreme Judicial 
Council and military tribunal. 
IV. The decree number four that was issued on 12 June 1978 was about changing 
official insignia and the national flag (See Appendix B). 
V. All languages in the country were respected and the languages of Uzbek, Baluchi, 
Turkmen, and Nuristani were utilized in the publications.  
VI. On 12 July 1978, was issued a decree regarding prohibition of lien,1 limitation of 
landowners’ profit, discount amount and timing of payments, moreover, in certain 
                                                          
1
 The right to keep somebody’s property until a debt is paid. 
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cases, it was performed the complete cancellation of farmers’ debts (See Appendix 
B).  
VII. According to this decree, which was issued on 16 November 1978, women’s dowry 
was determined based on Sharia ten Dirham (according to the price of silver in the 
bank at the time), which was according to three hundred Afghanis. In this case, the 
bride price was abolished and was regarded equal rights for men and women. 
Marriage age was determined 16-year-old for girls and 18-year-old for boys (See 
Appendix B). 
VIII. On 29 November the land reform programme was issued. The decree stated that 
who works on the land would be recognized as landowner (Afghanistan. Viz¯arat-i 
Ittil¯a‘¯at va Kult¯ur 2007, 1-4). 
After issuing the governmental decrees, the political and ideological nature of the 
government pretty unfolded and it was obvious that the government intend to move in line 
with the Soviet model, which was as follows: 
 The non-capitalist manner of development, 
 Reliance on Warsaw Pact countries, 
 Building a Russian kind of the democratic society. 
It is particularly significant that the new decrees could not assist in establishing the 
communist rule and social order because all the decrees were issued hastily and were not 
based on the ideas and beliefs of the people of Afghanistan. The first decrees made the 
people shocked and they heard new words in the official system, which they had never 
heard, such as "the leader of the Democratic People", "the president revolutionary 
council", "the central committee" and several other terms. Thus, Afghan people were 
amazed and felt that these words could improve their conditions.  
A meticulous examination of the decree number one and number four demonstrates that 
these decrees were issued in order to change the Afghan national and political identity and 
make this country a part of the Soviet colonialism. There is not a shadow of doubt that 
such matter could be acceptable for nobody except for the communists that were affiliated 
to Moscow. There is not a shadow of doubt that the majority of the Afghan laity could not 
easily comprehend the anti-religious and communist nature of the Saur coup and its 
leaders. Additionally, raising the red flag, applying obsolete and Marxist words and terms 
such as “Khalq”, “democratic”, “socialism”, “feudalism”, moreover, praising excessively 
118 
 
the friendship between Afghanistan and Soviet Union, and the Afghan government’s 
impression of the socialist revolution of October, assisted the people to comprehend the 
communist nature of Taraki’s regime. 
One of the major shortcomings of the underdeveloped countries, especially Afghanistan, 
was lack of stable and strong system in the legal, legislative, and executive processes, 
which was trusted by the people. The governments always used to abolish the previous 
laws in order to create new laws, which were according to the desire and willingness of the 
new rulers. This important issue could be observed after falling of King Amanullah in the 
period of Nadir Shah, Zahir Shah, and Daoud Khan’s Republic.  
On 14 May 1978, the coup government issuing the third decree abolished the constitution 
of 1977 and announced the establishment of the new civilian and military courts. 
Furthermore, on 14 June of the same year, the government announced deprivation of 
citizenship of 23 people of the royal family. In fact, these two decrees threatened the legal 
immunities of citizens and beside the deep crisis in the customary and traditional system, 
which had been emerged as a result of the mentioned decrees, the people lost every type of 
their legal backing in the customary, traditional, formal and civil aspects. This legal 
weakness gradually took on broader aspects, thus mechanisms of war and armed conflict 
destroyed law, social order, and personal and social safety. 
It goes without saying that in order to establish a legal system in a society, the three 
branches of the legal system should be stabilized, separated, and strengthened. 
Governments not only are responsible for the law and the people, but also in case of 
convicting and violating the rights of others, they should defend themselves before a fair 
and non-corrupt judiciary system. Governments should not dominate judiciary and 
legislature system and according to their desires influence on them. They should not 
prosecute their political and ideological opponents in the military courts and according to 
their desires deprive the citizenship of their citizens.  
In many centuries, especially in Afghanistan, one of the considerable problems of the 
ruling system was that the government confused its historical, civil, and national identity. 
The communist government of Afghanistan regardless of the historical and cultural 
identity of the Afghan society, made some changes in the official insignia and the national 
flag. Indeed, the official insignia and national flag are the symbol of historical identity, 
civilization, culture and the existence of a society, which is created due to consensus of the 
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majority of its population and over time, it became the symbol of national identity of the 
society. The government, regardless of these profound meanings and just due to the 
ideological emotions, endeavoured to change the historical and national identity in a short 
time. Selecting the red flag - the Khalq faction’s symbol - shook the society and meant the 
declaration of war against all beliefs, customs, traditions, norms, and habits of the people. 
This was the best weapon in the hands of opponents and rivals of the government and its 
supporter, Soviet Union. Furthermore, this was the beginning point of the Islamic religious 
propaganda against “communist red flags”. 
Decrees No. 6, 7, and 8, whose majority items were completely at variance with long-
standing social traditions and religious beliefs of people, stimulated people’s emotions 
against regime, and also they encouraged the widespread public backlash. It could be 
argued that these decrees were in pursuit of a sudden change in the social structure of 
Afghan society. Therefore, owing to lack of any background in the Afghan society in this 
regard, public did not accept them and consequently they effectuated extreme social 
tensions.  
In these decrees, the intellectual and spiritual context of the religious and traditional part of 
the Afghan society was disregarded. The decree number sixth not only was disappointing 
to owners and capitalists, but also made the most remarkable losses to peasants. As a 
consequence of issuing the mentioned decree, the lands remained in the owners’ hand and 
the farmers still did not gain the money. Subsequently, the lands were ceased from farming 
that led to a shortage of crops in the country. Furthermore, capitalists were willing to 
obtain financial resources and debtors that did not have anything involved in further 
problem. Additionally, they were forced to cooperate with the communist and opposed 
capitalists in order to settle their debts. 
On 12 July 1978, the decree of prohibition of lien and limitation of landowners’ profit was 
issued. A while after the government announced that eleven to twelve million peasants 
were relieved of profiteers’ domination, large landowners, the traditional system, and the 
old feudalism. Historical experiences have shown that in the process of underlying growth 
and development, reconstruction of the dominant traditional structure of the society 
without reforms and fundamental changes in the social and economic structure of society 
is not possible. 
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When the Saur coup occurred in Afghanistan, a complex customary and traditional system 
based on various pre-capitalism relations was dominated in the country. Economic and 
social relations and contracts in the field of trades, profit sharing, cultivation, loan, change 
or transfer of ownership had been implemented based on customs, Islamic Shariah and 
traditional relationship. It should be added that the banking system, new financial 
institutions still found no manner of reaching the rural society. 
The coup government without doing the necessary research and considering the practical 
alternative abolished the customary and traditional relations and turned the economic and 
financial chaos in the rural system into a deep crisis. The government’s action made 
disappointing effect on transactions, credits, properties, businesses, investments and the 
normal economic process of the society, which led to the widespread popular uprisings, 
public protests and long-term wars. 
In order to eradicate cruel contracts and unfair relations from the society, the government 
has renovate and reconstruct the structure of the society in terms of political and civil 
capacity, to become consistent with the economic, social, and cultural developments. In 
order to achieve this important matter long-term plans and programmes are required. 
Attractions and dominance of the customary and traditional system are stemmed from 
people’s trust, moreover, lack of an alternative system causes the society would be 
addicted to it. It is worth pointing out that instead of this mentioned critical decree, the 
government expanded the banking system, cooperative and loan organizations, as well as it 
increased development aid to farmers through agricultural banks, familiarized the farmers 
with insurance system, and established other necessary institutions.  
The government in the running for the new decrees established the cooperative funds in 
the rural areas and endeavoured to implement them at the initial level in the chaotic and 
critical context of rural community, which were not consequential. As stated in Etefagh-e-
Islam - a state newspaper - “From 1980 to 1981, 12116 peasant cooperatives were 
established, which was composed of 200 thousand farmers” (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper, 
3). The people did not trust in the mentioned cooperative funds and the government did not 
have sufficient knowledge and experience in the establishment and management of them. 
These cooperative funds did not have the necessary funds, and poor farmers could not 
provide their requirements. Likewise, these cooperative funds were not established in 
consequence of the peasants’ desires and needs, but nevertheless the government 
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implemented its political and ideological goals, which was not compatible with the 
dominant culture and tradition of the society. Spreading popular uprisings and wars led to 
collapse of all these loose organizations, and gradually the society got into violence, armed 
conflict, and widespread crisis.  
The decree number seventh was directly opposed to the religious beliefs of the people. 
This decree emphasized on the equal rights of men and women, marriage age (16-year-old 
for girls and 18-year-old for boys), elimination any kind of bride price, dowry, and 
traditional wedding ceremonies. The marriage of boys and girls did not require the 
permission of girl’s father any more (Law on childbirth leave enforce 1979). Accordingly, 
many girls and boys in the important cities went to court to marry and complained about 
their parents’ treatments. Thus, in the new constitution the Shariah laws were not 
regarded, which caused the religious scholars stood in front of it and provoked the people 
to support them. Additionally, after issuing this decree, occurred disagreements among 
many families and a new feud between people was formed. Girls and boys, those whose 
families opposed their marriage, without the consent of their parents and with the 
government’s support could marry. 
The decree number eighth was the most controversial decree. Some peasants seized the 
land of owners and their reason was that they worked on the lands, and not owners. The 
mentioned decree assigned 30 acres 
1
 of land to owners and 5 acres of land to the peasants. 
Nonetheless, a large part of the lands had not been divided legally and religiously between 
the heirs and the land of grandfather was legally in the name of one person. According to 
the mentioned decree the land of grandfather less than 5 acres was divided among the 
heirs, but nevertheless this little land might be not sufficient for owners. Additionally, the 
peasants that were working on the land of owners, who had migrated to cities, 
consequently claimed the land. Accordingly, this was one of the considerable problems of 
land reforms and the government supported the peasants. Land division effectuated the 
dispute among a substantial number of villagers and it led to the immigration of many 
people to the cities. Subsequently, the most intense disapproval of the majority of the 
Afghan society performed against approvers of the mentioned decrees. Furthermore, 
religious scholars supported the people and declared the decrees against Islamic law. 
Besides, it forced the central government to arrest religious scholars, influential people, 
critics, and many people that were not associated with the government. Until the second 
                                                          
1
 A unite for measuring an area of land, equal to 4840 square yards/ 4050 square meters. 
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half of the year, uncontrolled arrests and executions of people by the government prepared 
the grounds for opposition and uprising in the country.  
Likewise, the mentioned decrees demonstrate that the communists after taking political 
power, seriously wanted to implement the Marxism ideas in the society and fight against 
Islam. The government, in order to implement the eight decrees, promoted the slogan of 
“Bread, Clothing and Home” through mass media and wrote on the walls of the city 
Lenin’s sayings and other communist slogans, and Marxist sociology and philosophy were 
taught in schools and universities. 
Purgation of the army and other governmental organs from Muslims and nationalist 
initiated because the communists came to power and every day they arrested many anti-
communists and handed them over to the courts for imprisonment or execution. Basement 
of Department of Defence, Department of Interior, Department of Finance, Chancellery 
and dozens of residential homes were converted into torture chambers. The intelligence 
service of Afghanistan (AGSA), which was organized by experts of the KGB, leading by 
Asadullah Sarwari initiated to the brutal murder of people in Afghanistan. 
In addition, the dance party was held in the city streets and parks, in order to focused 
people especially the younger generation’s attention on pleasure and hedonism, and held 
them unaware of what was happening in their country. The communists’ function during 
their ruling in Afghanistan especially in the first years of the coup was very surprising. It 
was surprising that, on the one hand, they intensely and brutally endeavoured to impose 
the atheistic ideologies on them without any consideration and preparation. On the other 
hand, they wanted to seduce the people, who previously had been made aware of regime’s 
anti-Islamic and anti-national nature. In other words, in the beginning of their communist 
decrees and in some of their speeches addressed to the people they utilized the sentence of 
“In the name of God”, moreover, in the Ramadan the leaders of the PDPA participated 
apparently in the prayers and Taraweeh
1
 ceremonies in the mosque of the presidential 
palace. It is worth pointing out that none of these apparent measures could seduce the 
people but also they made their feelings hurter. 
The land reforms was announced on 28 November 1978. However, after a while, the 
government declared successful realization of this plan, but nevertheless in the practical 
                                                          
1
 Taraweeh is a kind of Islamic prayers, which are performed during Ramadan.  
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process its failure was confirmed over the time. The process of land reforms in terms of 
economic, cultural, and technical had obvious deficiencies. In fact, it had not been 
performed the necessary investigation and study on the social and economic structure of 
society and the previous economic and developmental plans were ceased. The government 
had not performed a comprehensive survey of the cultivated land area, barren land, amount 
of water, the culture of cultivation and land use, the possibility of developing the arable 
lands in case of reform and rebuild the irrigation network. The government did not have 
the necessary information about the forms of properties according to religious and 
customary rules in the society, the intellectual and ideological level of the people, the 
population that was absorbed in agriculture. The leaders of the government did not take 
into account the actual possibilities of the government, urban society and the capacity of 
the rural communities in the substitution of a new structure after land reforms. Further, 
they did not consider using the new technologies over the long-term plan for improving 
land and water, and finally they did not consider growth and development of industry and 
trade before division and transfer of the properties. Besides, it could be argued that they 
did not perform a comprehensive analysis and review of the positive and negative aspects 
of the land reforms.  
Land division from the perspective of the religion and custom was contrary to the Islam 
and tradition. It is worth pointing out that in terms of the economy, politic and sociology 
the early collapsing the custom and tradition of the previous system before growth and 
development of the real elements of the new structure, led to social and economic crisis 
and chaos. 
The mentioned reforms could not create a fundamental nature and essential effect in the 
economic and social structure of the Afghan society, as they had not been conducted with 
the development plans in the field of agriculture, industry, and culture. In fact, the 
mentioned action had further the form of fulfilling the political and ideological sentiments 
of the party and constantly was followed by the revolutionary ways. It could be said that 
this reform was, in fact, a kind of division and transfer of properties, which in the same old 
and inactive system could not accelerate the growth of the agricultural economy. 
Furthermore, division of the large and medium properties into limited properties increased 
the hidden unemployment, decelerated the process of production, and avoided largely the 
development of new technologies and increasing the quality. Consequently, the Production 
level and the country’s per capita income descended. 
124 
 
In order to adjust properties and correct the traditional farming system in Afghanistan 
(regarding the beliefs, customs and traditions of the rural population) it was necessary to 
implement some fundamental measures. In fact, the government did not implement the 
basic steps for changing the old structure, improvement of irrigation networks, 
modernization the land use method, using the new technologies of growth and 
development in the industries related to agriculture, and economic regulation of the labour 
force in agriculture and in the related industries. 
Indeed, the growth and development of agriculture and related industries leads to 
increasing the national income and not only the people income can increase, but also the 
government’s annual income can increase as well. Government can use this revenue to 
promote social justice and through assisting with people, networks can assist the poor 
people.  
The economic and social growth and development, creation useful job due to new internal 
and external investments, growth of trade and transit in the country, accelerating the 
economic growth, adequate exploitation of natural resources and mineral wealth, could 
eradicate poverty from society, which cannot be observed in the communist government of 
the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Distribution poverty, misery, and backwardness 
of the name of land reforms put the people increasingly under pressure and their situation 
became inferior to before. 
In the technical and operational view, the mentioned reforms had obvious shortcomings. In 
fact, there were not sufficient professional and skilled personnel and in the course of the 
land reforms, the government performed more ideological propaganda. The previous 
landowners, rural proprietors, influential people, and villages’ religious scholars were 
treated disrespectfully and violently, which led to provoke the feeling of dissatisfaction of 
people. 
Failure of the land reforms was evident in the first few months. The government 
announced the number of land receivers between one and half to two million people, but 
previously, the number of farmers in the country had been announced between eleven and 
twelve million people. As stated in Etefagh-e-Islam “In the first phase of land reforms, two 
hundred ninety seven thousand hectares of land was distributed between 297 thousand 
peasant households” (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper 1982, 3). 
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If was estimated Afghanistan’s population at 17 million, and 85 percent was regarded as 
the rural population, the number of the rural population was more than 14 million people. 
Undoubtedly, the majority of them did not reach land, and despite the fact that they 
worked hard, they lost their economic support. Then, owing to spread of anti-government 
uprisings and wars, they lost their security as well.  
The government with the hasty commands and unilateral contracts with the Soviet 
endeavoured to destroy the private sector and medium and large land ownerships, 
eliminate the prevailing customary and traditional system, and be away from the West 
capitalist. Besides, the government endeavoured to prepare the grounds for non-capitalist 
manner of development, increase the influence of Warsaw and the Soviet bloc, and 
implement the radical programmes.  
In the first year, all the previous contracts were renewed by the Soviet Union and new 
contracts were signed as well, which are as follows: 
 The contract of gas utilization on 29 April 1978,  
 The contract of exchange of information and cooperation between the Afghan 
government and the Soviet Union on 1 May, 
  Purchase contract for equipment required for mining projects on 11 May, 
  Agreement of technical and economic study of Enrichment Institute of copper 
smelting on 16 May,  
 Contract of survey and construction projects and exploitation of the Kokchah Sea 
on 17 May,  
 Agreement of fight against locusts on 25 May, 
 Contract of completion of economic and technical reports, which was signed by 
representatives of the Ministry of Mines and Industries and Techno Export 
company on 29 May, 
  Agreement of modification three textile factories on 16 June (Cultural Council of 
the Nasr Organization of Afghanistan 1980, 117). 
The government hastily and intensely initiated a comprehensive struggle against the 
dominant social and economic system in the political, economic, cultural, and ideological 
aspects and it directly was in opposition to the majority of the people. As stated by Fred 
Halliday, “Programme of People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan is a revolutionary 
programme and its goal is the socialist transformation of society in Afghanistan and 
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deposing the present ruling class. In the internal policy involves the three basic steps: land 
reform, nationalization of industries and the removal of the anti-democratic elements from 
the state apparatus” (Halliday 1978, 76). The government continuously endeavoured to 
control the country’s major industries and brought the private sector under the control of 
the government. Additionally, achieving this goal required the fundamental reforms and 
sufficient time. The government implemented the land reforms with no study and 
investigation; likewise, it endeavoured to impose its domination of the private sector. 
Taraki, the leader of the revolutionary council said, “The government will take under its 
control at least 51% of industries” (Halliday 1978, 66). The initial extreme measures of the 
government expanded chaos and crisis in the political, religious, and ethnic circles in the 
rural and urban societies and among private landowners and capitalists. Furthermore, 
within the party implemented intense competition between the Khalq faction led by Nur 
Mohammad Taraki and the Parcham faction led by Babrak Karmal, which resulted in the 
removal of high-ranking people of the Parcham faction. When the government’s ambitious 
plans still had had no result, it was arisen another strong divisions within the ruling party 
by virtue of disagreement between Taraki-the leader of the Revolutionary Council - and 
Hafizullah Amin - the Prime Minister of the government, which led to Taraki’s 
assassination.  
The government’s radical decrees and plans, acute and bloody conflicts within the 
government apparatus and expansion of popular uprisings and armed conflict threatened 
seriously the survival of the government. The Soviet invaded Afghanistan on December 
27, 1979, in order to prevent the collapse of the coup government.  
4.3.3. The Public Backlash 
Reform programme and function of Taraki’s communist government from the beginning 
were faced with disapproval of the overwhelming majority of the people of Afghanistan. 
The communists in order to implement their programmes and eliminate their opponents 
that in fact were all the people played their role rapidly and intensively. Local and limited 
resistance rapidly grew across the country in terms of quality and quantity, and got 
widespread and popular uprising. The major factors of the resistance could be outlined as 
follows: 
 Religious belief; Afghan people soon found that Taraki’s government was a 
communist and anti-religious regime. The content of the eight decrees, especially 
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regarding the distribution of land, abolition of women’s dowry and changing the 
colour of the national flag and official insignia, were obviously in direct 
contradiction to principles of Shariah and Islamic values, which provoked different 
classes and groups of people including peasants, workers, clergymen, shopkeepers, 
clerks, students, and academics against the communist regime. 
 Social and national traditions; the major sections of the eight decrees were 
inconsistent with Islamic Sharia and social and national traditions of the Afghans. 
For instance, some people attacked the name of feudal and forcibly took their 
lands. This action not only angered tribal and local elders and landowners who the 
communists called them exploiters, but also it annoyed the peasants and those the 
confiscated lands were distributed among them. Consequently, farmers were under 
pressure; moreover, production of agricultural products decreased and raised 
expensiveness and inflation. The plan of mandatory literacy courses for women 
was recognized opposed to the social aspects because there was no possibility of 
accepting it pursuant to Islamic values. 
 Intimidation; the coup regime, according to the Marxist principle of “Dictatorship 
of the proletariat” so brutally proceeded to arrest and massacre. In fact, it was 
created a system of repression and terror, and some of the communists admitted 
this problem. For instance, Babrak Karmal in his first radio statement, which was 
broadcasted concurrently with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, mentioned this 
problem. He said, “Before presenting the policy of the Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan, I would like to dedicate to you the deepest impressions and 
compassion, the extraordinary respects [...], on behalf of the central committee of 
the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, revolutionary council, the DRA and 
on behalf of myself Babrak Karmal, [...] owing to imprisonment, exile, forced 
migration, persecution, inhuman and brutal torture, martyring, the mass murder of 
tens of thousands of our mothers and fathers, brothers, sisters, daughters, sons and 
children that were performed by direct orders from this murderer and executioner, 
Hafizullah Amin” (Afghanistan. Viz¯arat-i Ittil¯a‘¯at va Kult¯ur 2007, 7). It is 
obvious that the crimes and oppression that the communist imposed on the Afghan 
people did not implement only by Hafizullah Amin whereas in fact all of them and 
generally both faction of Khalq and Parcham were involved in these crimes. 
Communists were more cautious regarding literate people, scientists, religious 
scholars, especially the Shiite community of Afghanistan. A substantial number of 
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teachers of schools and universities, and Muslim students that did not cooperate 
with the PDPA were arrested and disappeared. The Mojaddedi family members, 
who were the influential Sunni leaders, arrested in Kabul and other provinces and 
killed. Wherever they found Shiite religious scholars, immediately handed them 
over to torture chambers and Shiite common people with a little doubt were 
arrested and killed. There were countless cases of terrorism and crimes, whereas in 
fact these terrorism and crimes instead of suppressing the opponents, forced the 
people to confront the regime. Finally, resistance was widespread throughout the 
country and the flag of Jihad was raised. 
4.3.3.1. Waygal, Jadran and Nuristan Uprising 
The first uprising against the communists was from South and North east of Afghanistan 
and initiated from Waygal and Jadran valleys. Less than one month after the Saur Coup, 
Muslim religious scholars of Afghanistan comprehending the heretical nature of Taraki’s 
regime reacted against his regime. The Afghan people in some areas and later in further 
provinces and localities, with the fatwa issued by Islamic scholars, raised the flag of Jihad 
for protecting Shariah and for saving the country from foreign domination. The uprising of 
Waygal Valley dwellers in Nuristan was regarded as the first spark of a series of armed 
uprisings of the Afghan people against communists. This uprising occurred on 22 May 
1978, 24 some days after the Saur coup. Jadran tribe in Paktia province led by some 
family members of Babrak Khan - one of the fighters of third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919 - 
revolted and expelled the government forces from the Jadran valley. On 20 July, the 
people of peach valley - one of the districts of Kunar province in East of Afghanistan -
fought back the government forces. Nuristani people after this fight initiated nationwide 
uprising in Nuristan valleys, Waygal, Beshgal and Ramgal. Finally, on 4 October 1978, 
they took Nuristan province under their control. In Kunar province until 1979, the 
communists killed more than thousand people. In addition, the uprising of Waygal Valley 
dwellers in Nuristan was more important from the point of view that it was the outset of 
Islamic Jihad in Afghanistan. 
4.3.3.2. Darya Suf Valley Uprising  
The people of the Darya Suf Valley opposed the government’s policies comprehending the 
nature of the communist system. Therefore, the government decided to detain some of the 
Mullahs and lords of the mentioned area. The government accused them of seizing the 
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people’s properties, misleading them, and provoking them against the authority. Thus, in 
September 1978, owing to the fact that the communists regarded the Mullahs as the main 
factor in uprising the communists arrested many Mullahs the so-called by the communists 
“Ikhwan Al-Shayatin” (the brothers of Satan). The people of Darya Suf Valley involved in 
many problems during Taraki’s government. The government initiated recruiting and 
prevented the people from moving from one village to another village. The uprising 
occurred on 14 February 1979, when a delegation consisting of the Mayor, finance officer 
and government troops were sent by the government to the mentioned village in order to 
arrest and repress, especially the clergymen. The Muslim people initiated to defend 
themselves and the invading forces were forced to retreat. Subsequently, task forces with 
many weapons and equipment moved from the centre of Samangan province in order to 
suppress the people of Darya Suf Valley. These forces after approaching the mentioned 
area were faced with the armed resistance of the people. A fierce battle occurred and 
consequently eight fighters were killed, however the people succeeded in killing 24 of the 
enemy forces including the provincial chief of police and took Darya Suf Valley under 
their control. On 17 February 1979, armed forces of three thousand with tanks and artillery 
attacked Darya Suf Valley. Popular forces were forced to retreat and subsequently the 
government forces looted people’s properties and desecrated the women. Besides, violence 
by the government forces could not cease the people’s uprising; they arose again leading 
by combatant Ulema and on 6 March 1979, and conquered the district of Darya Suf 
Valley.  
Dr. Haqshenas regarding Darya Suf Valley uprising wrote: “On 25 February 1979, 
shouting Allah Akbar and revenge the revolution expanded across Darya Suf Valley. Its 
brave and faithful people arose against godless government and thus a bloody battle among 
them occurred, Taraki subsequently sent troops that had no precedent until that date. In 
addition, the enemy entered the battle with the entire aerial and ground equipment and 
shattered heroic movement of the brave but poor people of Darya Suf Valley. Atrocities 
and crimes that Russian mercenaries committed in the mentioned Valley are such shameful 
things that it is better not to discuss them” (Haqshenas 1989, 584). 
It is remarkable that in this uprising, the Shiite and Sunni people participated together and 
this collaboration had an important impact in encouraging the people. After the Darya Suf 
Valley uprising the people of Charkint rose on 22 February 1979, subsequently, on 12 
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March the people of Urozgan and Farah upraised; on March 15 the bloody uprising of the 
people of Herat occurred and this trend continued.  
4.3.3.3. Herat uprising  
One of the largest urban uprisings was Herat uprising, which occurred on 15 March 1979 
and left hundreds dead, wounded, and disabled. This and subsequent uprisings confirmed 
the existence of a regime in the country that the people did not consider it as a legitimate 
regime and did not accept its authorities. In the view of people and their leaders and 
religious scholars, this regime was heathen and opposed to their beliefs, customs and 
traditions. Thus, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi declared Jihad against the regime and this 
declaration of Jihad accelerated uprising among people. Arrestment of the influential 
people, elders and religious scholars in this province, implementing programmes and 
commands of the government such as land reforms and literacy courses that everyday were 
implementing in one part of the province, were intolerable for the people. In addition, the 
government with the arrestment of two prominent and influential religious leaders, Hazrat 
Abdolbaghi Mojaddedi and Sayed Moazam, injected a substantial shock to the society. 
Orgy of the Governors and the Communists caused Friday preacher and a number of the 
influential local elements encouraged the people to oppose the regime. On 28 February, 
protests and movements initiated in Ghurian and Gozareh districts; and the people evicted 
the staff of the land reforms and the literacy courses from the city or killed some of them. 
On 14 March, the people closed public roads of Herat to Kandahar airfield. Finally, on15 
March, the rest of the people joined them and thus the uprising was spread out. In addition, 
the government violently suppressed the uprising that its reflection in the country created 
other outbreaks of the uprisings in the next months. 
Wilhelm Dietl, German Journalist recognizes the Herat uprising as a unique uprising in 
Asia (Dietl 1986, 42). When the Herat uprising occurred, the inhuman brutalities of the 
communist regime in Herat and all over Afghanistan had reached their peak, on the other 
hand the Islamic revolution in Iran had won, which was an important factor in boosting the 
morale of the Muslims.  
4.3.3.4. Chandawal Uprising  
The first public opposition occurred in the capital as an armed uprising. After more than 
one year of communist government’s life, on 23 June 1979, the people took up arms in the 
centre of Kabul and approximately one kilometre away from the Presidential Palace, in 
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one of the old quarters of Kabul, called Chandawal. It is still not obvious how this uprising 
and the identities of its stimulators. Additionally, there are some assertions stating that a 
group of people from religious and political groups after conducting some military 
operations took under their control the mentioned area and were ready to attack the central 
government. This uprising was organized very well, and its purpose was provoking of 
Sunni and Shiite Hazara, so the organizers distributed some leaflets against the puppet 
communist government (Hyman, Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 1964-81 1982, 
153). Nevertheless, the communist military forces attacked the people with the support of 
Russian people. The military forces of the government surrounded the mentioned area and 
arrested a substantial number of people from every tribal, especially Hazara people 
because the majority of opponents were from Hazara community. Notwithstanding the 
government claimed to be the supporter of workers, peasants and the lower strata of 
society, all those who had been incarcerated were from these strata. This uprising 
destroyed the position of Communists and provided the background of the subsequent 
uprising in all over the country. According to one of the military officer at that time the 
cause of the Chandawal uprising was arrestment of religious leaders and elders of Hazara 
and Shiite (Azimi 1998, 192). 
 The Split  4.4.
The two factions Khalq and Parcham that both had communist ideas and were supported 
by the Soviet Union, for a long time had controversial competition and dispute for 
reaching social influence, approaching Soviet Union, and gaining seats in the parliament. 
Both factions after coming to power, in order to gain further power increased their 
competition and dispute in a manner that they stood against each other. As stated by 
Mesbahzadeh “Although comrades of Khalq and Parcham made alliance together before 
the coup under pressure of internal and external factors, they could not put aside their 
differences during the coup that even was not sure to be successful. The Khalqis accused 
the Parchamis of supporting Daoud Khan during the coup and claimed that Babrak 
Karmal encouraged the central committee of the PDPA to escape and intimidate into the 
failure of the coup. For this reason, the party leaders including Karmal and Taraki, were 
transferred to Khwaja Rawash airfield, in case of the failing the coup they would escape 
out of the country” (Mesbahzadeh 1999, 48). As stated by Ataee “Approximately two 
months after the Saur coup, the two factions of Khalq and Parcham opposed each other. 
The Khalq faction, led by Hafizullah Amin, treated autocratically and endeavoured to 
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monopolize all the power. They said that the leader of Parcham was not faithful to the 
revolution because the Saur coup was a national democratic movement and not a 
revolution in the view of the Parchamis. These disputes and arguments intensified and 
soon the Soviet advisers regarded the best interest in making away the leaders of Parcham 
from the country and sending them as ambassadors to abroad. Soon the leaders of 
Parcham were deported from the country. Indeed, they were dispatched as ambassador or 
chargé d’affaires to the other countries. (Ataee 2004, 404).  
Two months after coming to power their disagreement intensified. Sultan Ali Keshtmand 
mentioned “Approximately two months after the Saur coup the totalitarian policies of the 
leader of the Khalqis in the party and public administration took the absolute power. They 
did whatever wanted, and resistances conducted by Babrak Karmal, the leader of the 
Parcham faction and other Parchamis were regarded as an unforgivable sin from the view 
of the leader of the Khalqis” (Keshtmand 2002, 375). Keshtmand also believed that 
differences between two factions were growing intensely, and in his opinion, the reason for 
differences was the Khalqis’ monopolization, especially Amin’s concepts and actions, 
which were in competition and conflict with Babrak and endeavoured to capture all the 
power. Keshtmand added, “He gradually took over in all three departments of power: the 
state, party and army” (Keshtmand 2002, 376). 
In the meeting of the Revolutionary Council on 12 June 1978, the disagreements between 
the two factions reaches its peak. Accordingly, in this meeting Taraki requested both of 
them to resolve their disagreements through voting among party officials. However, Amin 
succeeded received the support of majority of party and government officials from his 
faction and thus he was certain of defeating Barbak and consequently the Parcham faction. 
The gap between the two factions was evident on 8 July 1978, in the meeting of the 
political bureau of the central committee of the PDPA (See Figure  4-4) headed by Nur 
Mohammad Taraki, and in which some changes occurred in the cabinet members. New 
appointments indirectly demonstrated that Babrak Karmal and Nur Ahmad Nur had been 
set aside since Karmal was the secretary of the central committee of the party and Nur 
Ahmad Nur was Minister of interior. In July ending, several names were announced as new 
ambassadors of Afghanistan in some countries that all of them were from the Parcham 
faction. It is particularly significant that after sending abroad the heads of the Parcham 
faction, it was announced that a coup was discovered in which the Parchamis were 
involved (Keshtmand 2002, 405). 
133 
 
After the deportation of six leaders, in the extraordinary meeting of the Political Bureau of 
the Central Committee of the PDPA (See Figure  4-4) on 18 August 1978, the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Defence was given to Taraki and it was ordained that 
Hafizullah Amin assisted him in the affairs. In fact, practical and administrative 
responsibility of the ministry of defence was given to Hafizullah Amin. Furthermore, in the 
mentioned meeting it was issued a notice regarding the discovery of a conspiracy against 
the government, in which was stated as follows;  
“... The government recently discovered and investigated a conspiracy, in which a number 
of traitors to the people and the country participated. Among them General Abdul Qadeer, 
Defence Minister, Major General Shapur the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mir Ali 
Akbar the president of Jomhoriat hospital were arrested” (Afghanistan. Viz¯arat-i 
Ittil¯a‘¯at va Kult¯ur 2007, 447). 
In August ending, it was announced that according to authoritative documents, Keshtmand 
Planning Minister and Mohammad Rafi Public Works Minister participated in the 
mentioned conspiracy as well. The mentioned people were arrested, but nevertheless there 
was no mention of Karmal’s participation in the conspiracy until 28 November 1978. 
Taraki in the plenum of the central committee stated that Babrak Karmal, Nur Ahmad Nur, 
Anahita Ratbzad had a remarkable role in the conspiracy. Furthermore, he accused some of 
the Khalqis of trying for the rehabilitation the Parcham faction against the Khalq faction. 
Taraki in the mentioned plenum requested severe punishment for Karmal, Nur Ahmad 
Nur, Anahita Ratbzad, Mohammad Rafi and Qadeer, which was approved by the member 
of the central committee of the PDPA.  
After this event, the government urged the ambassadors to return to the country, but they 
stole all of the assets of embassies and escaped to Moscow (Sharq 1994, 165). 
Additionally, in the country Keshtmand, Qadeer, Mir Ali Akbar were sentenced to death. 
The death penalty did not perform and was commuted the punishment of some others, such 
as Mohammad Rafi that was sentenced to twenty years in prison. Furthermore, some the 
Khalqis voluntarily were withdrawn from political Bureau of the PDPA and remained at 
the level of experimental members of the party.  
In connection with the mentioned coup, Babrak and his comrades in the Parcham faction 
were charged that they planned to arrive in Afghanistan through Pakistan and Iran, in order 
to lead the coup and create a government of national common front. The Khalqis likewise 
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claimed that in the Parchamis’ coup, the foreign factors were involved too, however they 
provided no evidences in this regard. In the introduction, which Khalqis wrote for 
confessions of Keshtmand, Mohammad Rafi and Qadeer, was stated about foreign 
intervention as follows; 
“... In the answers of Mir Ali Akbar and other conspirators, explicitly and evidently was 
indicated to involving the foreign factors, [but] for the time being, will be avoided from 
announcing them, because it has not been found sufficient evidences to arrest them” 
(Afghanistan. Viz¯arat-i Ittil¯a‘¯at va Kult¯ur 2007, 1268).  
The confessions of Keshtmand should be regarded to clarify the coup and its objectives. 
Although most of these confessions were made under coercion and torture, they are more 
detailed and comprehensive than the others. According to his confessions could be argued 
that the Parchamis did not intend to change the nature of the communist regime and 
wanted to share the power with the Khalqis. It is worth mentioning that in the mentioned 
coup, were made some efforts that the opposition and the so-called progressive forces, who 
were out of the Parcham and Khalq factions but in fact were under the leadership of the 
PDPA and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, could enter into the system of 
government. As stated by Keshtmand “Gathering all dissidents of the society, could be 
regarded as the main goal of this alliance. Perhaps in the future this alliance would be 
called the United National Front Alliance. About the foreign policy should be said that 
some efforts were made in order to focus on neutrality and non-aligned policy to attract the 
support of all countries. In this government various forces participated, and it, therefore, 
would be beneficial to get support of all countries...” (Afghanistan. Viz¯arat-i Ittil¯a‘¯at va 
Kult¯ur 2007, 1283). 
Indeed, after revealing the coup plot, it was conducted an extensive purgation of the 
Parchamis from the party and the government. A substantial number of the Parchamis 
were imprisoned and murdered, but nevertheless the Soviets prevented killing of Parcham 
leader in order to use them in another opportunity.  
4.4.1. Conflict within the Khalq Faction 
After purging the Parchamis from the high-ranking of the government and making sure 
that they would not threaten the Khalqis regime any more, the Khalqis clashed together to 
obtain more power. Hafizullah Amin, who was introduced himself as a faithful disciple of 
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Taraki got in a competition with him. He obviously claimed that he had been more 
intelligent in the rescue of the revolution from the collapse, but nevertheless other party 
members regarded him a dictator and Stalinist. 
At first, some party members opposed him and selected Taraki as their advocate. 
However, Taraki was not against him and he provided the context for improving the 
political conditions. Additionally, Amin was afraid of the conditions and in all circles 
introduced himself as his faithful disciple in order to avoid revealing his suspicion. Amin 
could not trust Taraki and appointed some people to report his meetings. Taraki regardless 
the warnings of his comrades in the party and government and Pozanf, the Soviet 
ambassador in Afghanistan, gradually increased his power. As it was mentioned earlier 
Taraki appointed him as Defence Minister, however, in order to consolidate his position 
rapidly utilized his supporters in this ministry (Ataee 2004, 407). 
Regarding the disagreements between Amin and Taraki and Amin’s plan to deal with 
Taraki, Mesbahzadeh said, “… Thus, in late August 1979, he (Taraki) travelled to Cuba to 
attend conference of non-aligned countries and on his return departed to Moscow to meet 
the Kremlin officials and Karmal that was in the Soviet and had a discussion with them 
concerning Amin’ situation. In this discussion, it was decided to remove Amin from the 
scene, but nevertheless Amin was succeeded to remove Taraki and took the power on 16 
September” (Mesbahzadeh 1999, 50). Amin, in order to release from his so-called master, 
planned a plot to kill him. Accordingly, on 17 September the so-called faithful disciple 
ordered to kill Taraki. Following this event, Amin became the first person in the country. 
Amin in the period of three months and a few days of his government, besides killing the 
people in all around the country, many times spoke on radio and TV. He always claimed 
justice, safety, and legality, but nevertheless he forgot the motto of “food, housing and 
clothing”. It is very strange that Amin endeavoured to rebuild the mosques that he had 
killed their worshippers. Additionally, none of these measures could postpone the time of 
his murder by Russians into the country’s legal system and change people’s views 
regarding him. The Soviets were severely upset about the arbitrary killing of Taraki and 
they were very furious with Amin. In fact, the Soviets consider him to be held in contempt 
by them and thus they would retain their composure to him, and initiate to praise and 
compliment him as a brave commander of the Saur coup. Finally, Soviet invaded to 
136 
 
Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, and Soviet officers killed Amin terminated one 
hundred days of his bloody governance.  
Extreme commands and programmes of the Amin’s government, acute and bloody disputes 
within the government apparatus, and expansion of popular uprisings and armed conflict, 
seriously threat to the survival of the DRA. In this regard, the Soviet interests were 
threatened, which forced them to attack Afghanistan in order to control the situation in this 
country. (Sharq 1994, 171). 
4.4.2. The Soviet Invasion  
On 27 December 1979, 700 people of the Soviet Union in Afghan uniforms, including 
Special Forces of the KGB and the GRU from Alpha group, seized the important 
governmental and military centres, radio, and television building along with the main 
target of the Presidential Palace in Kabul. The Soviet military command at Termez - 
located on the border with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan - through Kabul Radio announced 
that Afghanistan became released from the dominion of Amin’s rule. 
At this time, the Revolutionary Council appointed Babrak Karmal as leader of the 
government. He was former Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the Parcham faction, but 
following takeover of power by the Khalq faction he was demoted to less important post of 
Czechoslovak Embassy and later he was dismissed. He was the Soviet puppet and insisted 
on the Soviet military presence. With the arrival of Soviet forces in Afghanistan initiated a 
new round of panic, and blood and fire engulfed the country. On the night of 27 December, 
Karmal spoke on the Radio Central Asia and mentioned Amin as traitors, anti-people and 
against the interests of the country. When Karmal riding the Russian tanks entered the 
country, the people gave him the title of Russian Shah Shuja. Besides, Shah Shuja in the 
last moments sympathized with the people, whereas in fact Karmal never supported the 
people and always preferred Russians to his nation.  
Indeed, one hundred and twenty thousand Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, and in return 
the people initiated nationwide uprising against the Soviet and the fronts and bastions of 
anti-Russian resistance became gradually stronger. On each side, it was undermined 
Russians’ forward progress in Afghanistan and finally they were disappointed at complete 
and permanent control over Afghanistan. The Parchamis after coming to power 
demonized the Khalqis and Amin’s supporters, and at the earliest opportunity executed 
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some of the Khalqis’ leaders and imprisoned a substantial number of the Khalqis. 
However, the Soviet sought to to mediate between the Parchamis and Khalqis to find a 
solution to the conflict among them. In this regard, the Soviet could convince the 
Parchamis to appoint some of the Khalqis as minister. For instance, Sayed Mohammad 
Gulabzoy was appointed as Interior Minister and Mohammad Aslam Watanjar as Minister 
of Communications. 
Karmal announced that his government’s main purpose was defence of the remarkable 
achievements of the Saur revolution (Afghanistan. Viz¯arat-i Ittil¯a‘¯at va Kult¯ur 2007, 
8). In order to fulfil this purpose from the night of 27 December, some rapid measurements 
was implemented. Thus, Parcham members were released from custody while a number of 
activists and members of Khalq leaders were imprisoned (Omarzai 1994, 376). His 
government through public meetings and publications endeavoured to attribute the 
injustices of the almost last two years to Amin and gave good tidings that the people would 
not see the cruelty any more. According to one of the Russian general, who was in the 
government, the KGB was converted to KHAD KhADamat-e Aetla’at-e Dawlati (State 
Intelligence Agency), (See Figure  4-4), (Lyakhovsky 1995, 4).  
Babrak Karmal was wise and seasoned veteran of the political affairs. Although he entered 
the country when the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, he took on long-term projects. 
Although he failed to implement them, he could undermine early success of Mujahidin. He 
established the National front of Pedar-e-Watan (Fatherland Party) and conducted some 
projects like giving autonomy to some areas, establishing assembly of Islamic dignity, the 
Ministry of ethnic groups and tribes. Although these measures delayed the defeat time of 
the Communists, it was not a propitious time to perform these measures and the war 
changed from the regional aspect and to general and public aspect. 
On 15 June 1981, National front of Pedar-e-Watan arose during a seminar in the 
Presidential Palace in Kabul. This national front attempted to bring together all political 
and social organizations, in order to strengthen the rule of the central government and 
cease the struggle against it, but nevertheless his measures did not succeed in achieving 
these goals. According to Keshtmand, the prime minister at that time, the underlying 
causes that Karmal could not achieve his goals were as follows:  
 Abnormal conditions of continuing the war in the country; 
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 Increasingly arming, financing, encouraging and emboldening the armed people on 
Pakistan’s territory, and intensifying their attacks on Afghanistan; 
 The Soviet Union military presence in the country; 
 Lack of readiness of forces in the country; 
 Lack of political will from the top for power sharing; 
 Rejection of political pluralism (Keshtmand 2002, 672-679). 
Indeed, Karmal was not able to reach any result with their projects and thus some 
differences within the party were revealed which confused him in dealing with the 
situation. Finally, he resigned from the leadership of the party and later from presidency of 
Afghanistan. It should be highlighted that in his resignation, structural changes in the 
Soviet regime and the death of the old leaders in that country, which occurred 
successively, played a remarkable role. It is worth pointing out that after the death of 
Konstantin Chernenko, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power that was not concurred with the 
Soviet military present in Afghanistan and he had remarked this issue previously. 
Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and immediately Babrak Karmal with a number of 
leaders of the Parcham faction, who was in power, were summoned to Moscow. In the 
negotiation that settled between the new leader of the Soviet and the Afghan boards, the 
Soviet leader was not satisfied with the presence of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. He 
asked Karmal whether they could defend themselves if Soviet withdrew its troops from 
Afghanistan and Karmal’s response was negative. However, Mohammad Najibullah 
responding to the same question announced they had sufficient equipment and could 
defend themselves (Ataee 2004, 440). Consequently, after this negotiation was appeared 
that the Soviet leadership considered Najibullah to be the president. In fact, the Soviet 
Union was involved in many internal problems and required to withdraw its troops from 
Afghanistan, which Najibullah regarded it in his speech. After this event, Karmal did not 
return to Kabul and Najibullah provided the conditions for coming to power. Three months 
later Karmal returned to Kabul, surrendered the power to Najibullah, and returned to the 
Soviet. It could be seen that the communist government in Afghanistan had no power in 
handling its internal and external issues. The Soviet Union decided for the Afghan 
government in the every political, social, economic issue and launching any policy without 
approval of the Soviet was not possible. In fact, the government had no sufficient financial 
capacity to implement any kind of reform. As well as all, the communist rulers 
endeavoured to demonstrate their faithfulness to the Soviet Union. Najibullah was not 
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concerned whether it was possible to handle the internal and external issues of the country 
without the Soviet Union’s presence in Afghanistan. He knew the Soviets could not spend 
further time in Afghanistan. Accordingly, in order to catch the power in Afghanistan, he 
proposed the plan of withdrawing the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which was pursuant 
to the Soviet Union’s desires. It goes without saying that, his personal interests were 
preferable to nation interests in this regard. It is worth pointing out that invading 
Afghanistan was already a substantial mistake, but nevertheless leaving the country in 
critical conditions at that time could be regarded as another political blunder of the Soviet 
Union.  
At the beginning of 1986, the disagreement among the leadership of the PDPA once again 
increased, however, this time without changing the top leaders, it could not be subsided. 
Most members of the political bureau regarded the matter of changing the leader as serious 
and essential matter (See Figure  4-4). They gradually reach the conclusion of determining 
Najibullah as the successor to Karmal in the position of the leadership of the party. 
Besides, among the leaderships of the party there was a critical situation as if everywhere 
there was disbelief and stagnation (Keshtmand 2002, 725). 
Karmal wrote his resignation, which omitted him from Secretary General of the Party and 
was published on 3 May 1986. Subsequently, the Party Central Committee unanimously 
elected Najibullah as president and this was the first time that the exchange of power 
between the Communists occurred peacefully. Thus, the third most powerful communist 
after Amin stepped down from the party leadership, approving the party members and the 
Soviet leaders that determined the power in the communist countries at that time. 
Nonetheless, Karmal remained as ceremonial president and finally on 20 November 1986, 
he was relieved of all the assigned posts and this time the scene was ready for political 
manoeuvring of Najibullah. There are those who maintain that when Najibullah came to 
power Karmal was exiled from Afghanistan and was sent to the Soviet (Keshtmand 2002, 
240).  
In the Karmal’s period, several thousand young people were sent to the Soviet and 
European countries in order to prop up the urgent needs of the future in many aspects. 
Furthermore, in order to strengthen the party and implement the purposes of the Saur coup 
some institutions such as Organization of Democratic Youth, Organization of Democratic 
Women were established under the leadership of the PDPA. His government apparently 
140 
 
wanted to take up irregularities in context of land reforms. Thus, maintaining the same 
purposes was issued a new decree as supplement of Decree No. 8 that had the aspect of 
giving bribes to convince a number of people to join the ranks of the armed forces. 
Karmal’s government’s policy followed the basic principles of the Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan. According to these principles, Afghanistan would follow the policies that 
countries under the Soviet control had to pursue it (See Figure  4-4). Inclusion of some 
expedient articles in the “main lines” had no interest in his government. Here two 
examples will be mentioned: 
I. In the context of Islam, they mentioned “the resolute compliance with holy religion 
of Islam”. Although it was obvious that the members of the PDPA beliefs were 
irreligious and had materialist beliefs, his government endeavoured to prevent 
further abstraction of the Party. Furthermore, owing to existing gap in terms of 
opinion between the party and the majority of the society, the PDPA government 
pretended to be Islamic. Additionally, neither their claims nor dramatic 
movements, such as the participation of leaders in mosques and religious circles, 
did not convince the people to consider the PDPA as an Islamic government. On 
the other hand, persecution acts of the government, inadmissible measures of the 
Soviet forces and occupation of their country, forced the people to stand opposite 
them. 
II. Karmal’s government claimed offences against human dignity and torture were not 
allowed (Osool-e asasi hezb-e democratic Khalq e Afghanistan, [Fundamental 
principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] 1980, No. 30). 
Nevertheless, in his government like the previous periods still there were torture, 
forced confessions along with the various harassment, human rights violations, 
shootings, and hangings of opponents.  
The Karmal’s government exerted a strong influence on all educational system and 
cultural institutions and forced them to promote the ideology of the party. In the 
“fundamental principles” of Karmal’s government for scientific and artistic activities such 
framework was specified: “Freedom of scientific, technical, cultural, and artistic activities 
must be pursuant to the objectives of the Saur Revolution” (Osool-e asasi hezb-e 
democratic Khalq e Afghanistan, [Fundamental principles of the Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan] 1980, No. 29). Accordingly, the quality of education has deteriorated and 
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especially in the rural areas, the basic educations collapsed. Mohammad Akram 
Andishmand in his extensive research regarding the status educations at that time wrote, 
“This decline after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan expanded…” (Keshtmand 2002, 
158). 
Indeed, prosecution, inspection the houses, imprisonment, torture, executions of 
opponents, and the implemented inadmissibility could be regarded as the reprehensible 
characteristics of the Khalqis’ government. In fact, these acts increased malice and 
hostility and meanwhile the tensions between the Khalqis and Parchamis were still going 
on, as well as the Soviet officials gradually realized that the invasion of Afghanistan 
brought crisis and catastrophe for them.  
4.4.3. Social and Economic Crisis 
Advancing the Soviet Army into warm waters and energy resources in the Middle East and 
South Asia was opened a new page in the history of the competition poles in Afghanistan, 
in the region and in the world, and gradually Afghanistan’s issue got national and 
international dimensions. The various struggles of the people, which had spontaneous and 
local potentials, got public and national view over the time. These struggles with the 
foreign multilateral supports became the form of “Anti-communist Jihad” and “Struggle 
between Atheism and Islam”. Thus, Afghanistan became a battlefield of the world’s 
dominant poles. 
The Parchamis led by Karmal did not have anything to say and any practical and 
comprehensive plan for reform. The presence of Soviet troops on the one hand put them 
against national and religious feelings of the people, on the other hand, against the outright 
opposition from the West world and the Arab Islamic countries. Karmal in his statement 
that was broadcasted from the Soviet territory, addressing Amin as Mir Ghazab 
(unmerciful) blamed all the mistakes, shortcomings, and crimes on him.  
In the early of Karmal’s period, in order to gain public support, it was announced a series 
of superficial and propagandist reform such as the release of political prisoners, ban on 
prosecution and investigation into individuals’ homes and freedom of the press and 
assembly, which did not have favourable results. Providing a long list of executions 
provoked further public outrage, and release of a few of prisoners could not assist to calm 
the situation. The events such as shooting at the student protest on the street and the 
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repression by the state offered no opportunity for freedom of the press and assemblies. 
Military pressure increased over time, and home inspection and unreasonable detention 
became very normal actions. 
After failing the first phase of reform, Karmal’s government officials, according to advices 
of the Soviet consultants, endeavoured to develop the political, economic, and social 
reforms. In fact, they partly conceived the negative effects of their primary decrees and 
superficial plans, which fuelled the popular uprisings and armed conflicts. Nonetheless, 
they did not intend to cease their ideological goals and excessive revolutionary acts 
pursuant to realities of Afghanistan, the region and the world. Due to this reasons, the 
proposed reforms that were formed in line with the radical aims and inconsistent with 
Afghan society, were not successful. 
As was mentioned earlier, Karmal’s government in order to strengthen the spiritual and 
political bases of the party and government established the National front of Pedar-e-
Watan. Subsequently, the government created “the primary core of people and tribes and 
nationalities”. Furthermore, it established “Islamic affairs” in order to reduce the 
ideological outrage and the religious feelings of the people. On the other hand, in the field 
of economic and social affairs, land reform adjusted and provided further fields for private 
enterprises. 
Indeed, the reforms of this stage did not have the sufficient depth and the government still 
did not want to abandon its radical goals. For instance, Karmal in his statement in October 
1982, in Herat province said: “Indeed, land and water reforms are the main and major core 
of our national and democratic revolution” (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper 1982, 3). 
Additionally, some adjustments had been taken place in land reforms, which appear to be 
very late and negligible. “After the evolutionary and the new phase of the revolution, land 
ownership increased from one acre to two acres” (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper 1982, 3). 
Despite the fact that during the Karmal’s era some reforms were implemented, there was 
no change in the main goals of the government and the country’s dependency on the 
Soviet. In fact, the government endeavoured to improve the tactic and method of 
implementing the same basic goals and adjust its programme with a better comprehension 
of the circumstances and situation of the society. In the Ninth Plenum of the Party Central 
Committee on 27 July 1982, it was mentioned that “During the political interaction with 
masses of party, social organizations and ideological institutions of the country, the 
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character of the strata and different social group should be regarded and handled them in 
various manners. Besides, the principles of the holy religion of Islam, the traditions and 
customs of the people, historical and cultural values of nationalities, people and tribes of 
Afghanistan, which announced by the PDPA and the government of Democratic Republic 
of Afghanistan, continuously should be regarded” (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper 1982, 1).  
In October 1982, Karmal in his speech appreciated the Soviet aids as follows, “Selfless 
and generous aids of the Soviet Union and our confident ally played a valuable and unique 
role in solving the economic problems” (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper 1982, 3). 
Furthermore, in this period, some efforts were made to encourage private entrepreneurs 
and increase the government’s economic ability. In fact, the private sector developed under 
the leadership of the governmental sector and by the government’s aim. In this regard, in 
Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper was mentioned as follows:  
According to decrees of 18 and 22 of the basic principles of the Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan, “The government encourages, supports and controls private enterprises. 
Thirty-six medium and limited projects have been purposed with a total investment of 498 
million Afghanis, which involves different sectors such as raisins, cleaning, textile, poultry 
farming, soap, cotton production” (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper 1982, 1).  
4.4.3.1. Severe Military Pressure and Reforms 
After the failure of the government reform programme and further development of the 
armed struggle, the joint Soviet and Afghan government forces increased severely the 
pressures on Mujahidin’s areas in villages and winter quarters, and many villagers were 
forced to leave their homes. Inhuman policy of destruction residential areas in villages was 
expanded throughout the country, and the peak of this destructive action was from 1983 to 
1985. Under these political and social pressures, the economic situation of the peasants, 
winter quarters, and nomads became completely destroyed.  
At the beginning of the Saur coup, owing to the clumsy planning reforms of the 
government, the economic and social construction of the peasants involved in fundamental 
flaws and under the firebombs and heavy weapons ripped apart. More than five million 
people were forced to migrate to foreign countries, especially Pakistan and Iran. In fact, 
instead of the previous normal structure of the society there were mechanisms of war; thus, 
the society involved in the war and crisis.  
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In the midst of harsh military pressure, new changes emerged in the Soviet Union. 
Following the death of the old leader of the Soviet, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 
February 1985. Regarding acceleration reforms in the Soviet Union, the process of 
governmental reforms was accelerated in Afghanistan. Subsequently, criticism of the 
previous policies of the Soviet Union increased. Pravda newspaper, the official organ of 
the Soviet Communist Party, in an interpretation on 19 February 1986, stated the Soviet’s 
mistakes in Afghanistan. “Some mistakes has taken place in the early stages of revolution 
[in Afghanistan], because in surpassing the revolutionary periods, the economic and social 
reforms had been implemented regardless considering the existing realities and the 
national and social characteristics, and ultimately they have had a negative effect” (Saberi 
1991, 27). 
Indeed, Karmal, who was still under the previous illusions, in the new stage of the 
reforms, was not a competent leader to improve the reforms in Afghanistan. Furthermore, 
according to the offensive nature of the Soviet, Karmal in his international policy was 
exactly in line with the overall alignment of the regional and global policy of the Soviet 
Union. Moscow’s government officials, even in determining the details of Kabul policy 
were very sensitive. Notwithstanding the forces of the Soviet Union were still present in 
Afghanistan and in consequence the independence of Afghanistan was unacceptable, 
Karmal called Afghanistan “including the Non-Aligned Countries”. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had a huge reaction in the global scope that perhaps it 
was not predictable for the Kremlin leaders. Many countries and international 
organizations were against the invasion. The United States of America due to their 
competition with the Soviet Union were more serious in intensifying the struggle against 
the Soviet. US attention to this invasion was so meticulous that Jimmy Carter on January 
8, 1980 mentioned it as the grave menace to peace, since the Second World War (Bradsher 
1999, 150). Despite the fact that a part of the sanctions such as banning wheat exports, 
boycott of the Olympic Games, cancellation of the second stage of treaty of limiting 
strategic weapons were imposed, America by implementing some serious measures 
provided the background of the complete failure and collapse of the Soviet. Besides, in the 
Ronald Reagan era US opposition were looking more seriously. 
Increasing aid to Mujahidin by the government of Pakistan and implementing the 
diplomatic, military campaigns and intelligence operations between the superpowers at 
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that time brought the most remarkable impacts on the Afghan governments. The Soviet 
invasion and the Karmal’s government created many opportunities for Pakistan and china. 
According to Pierre Metge one of the analyst authors of these events, it must be admitted 
that Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan saved General Zia-ul-Haq, who seized 
power in 1977 in Pakistan, however this event brought to him political support and 
funding from Washington (Metge 1984, 20).  
The DRA headed by Karmal was not deprived of receiving any contribution that was 
proposed for its settlement. The Soviet Union and its allies provided all equipments, 
facilities, and advices for the Afghan government. Although they did not hesitate about 
making any kind of effort and using all the facilities, equipment, and committing crimes to 
subdue the people, none of these measures led to any considerable result. Besides, the 
Soviet leadership gripped a huge crisis regarding Afghanistan issue that was appeared no 
prospect to rescue it. Accordingly, Moscow decided to review its multi-year policy in 
Afghanistan. In addition, the Soviet Union in revising the previous policies went to such 
an extent that Eduard Shevardnadze Gorbachev’s foreign minister said, “We were against 
human values” or “we have lost the battle for the PDPA” (Lyakhovsky 1995, 4). 
Accordingly, Karmal’s presence at the head of party government had no advantage for 
them; therefore, some measures were taken to overthrow him (Lyakhovsky 1995, 4). 
Finally, On 4 May 1986 a coup occurred in Kabul to overthrow Karmal. Dastagir 
Panjsheri wrote according to the order of interior minister, approximately 20 people of 
Karmal’s close comrades and colleagues and relatives were arrested by Khalil Aminzadeh 
- Kandak institutions commander - and were transferred to Golkhaneh castle in the 
Presidential Palace (Panjsheri 1998, 79). There is not a shadow of doubt that the Soviet 
Union’s aids to Afghanistan were in order to launch its own policies and protect its 
interests in Afghanistan. In Karmal’s period, lack of financial resources to make any 
policy and his government’s excessive dependence on the Soviet Union, caused all the 
conducted policies and implemented reforms were pursuant to the Soviet Union’s 
approval. 
In consequence, the same hands that assisted Karmal to occupy the head of government 
and party ousted him in 1986. Karmal was first dismissed from the leader of the party and 
subsequently lost control over his government, which was characterized by elements of 
brutality, blood shedding, and corruption.  
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For more detailed comprehension of Karmal examining several points of his weakness is 
very essential. Vladimir Basov, who was for some time a member of the International 
Relations Branch of CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), regarded the blindly 
following the Soviet Union and lack of an independent and national plan as the factors of 
continuation the crisis in Afghanistan. He believed that Karmal always followed the Soviet 
consultants, who were very trustworthy for him (Tanin 2005, 329). When the crisis 
continued, the number of the Soviet advisers in Afghanistan, who had often decisive role 
had increased. Vladimir Basov likewise added, “The number of the Soviet advisers 
astronomically increased. The Soviet advisers were engaged in the departments of the 
Army, Interior Ministry, the KGB, party, economic and diplomatic sector, moreover, it was 
to the extent that they requested sending to Kabul some consultants in the religion affairs, 
in order to regulate the relations between the state and Islam” (Tanin 2005, 329-330). 
Lieutenant general Boris Gromov, who for a while was the commander of Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan and as the last Soviet military left Afghanistan on 15 February 1989, declared 
that “It is obvious that in 1979 the KGB made a mistake appointing Karmal as the leader of 
the new government of Afghanistan. [...] Karmal neither was trusted by his colleagues and 
the people nor was trusted by our counsellors. He was an unreasonable person and 
supporter of factionalism that could elaborately hide it amidst the revolutionary speeches. 
This talent assisted him to create a halo of a leader in his surroundings (Gromov 1996, 
152-153). Furthermore, Karmal was addicted to alcoholic beverages, Boris Gromov wrote 
in this regard, Karmal’s apparent willingness to alcoholic beverages caused his collapse 
character became increasingly aggravated (Gromov 1996, 152). “Likewise, the PDPA anti-
Islam campaign forced young Army conscripts to drink alcohol” (Joes 2010, 188). It does 
not seem unreasonable to suggest that who did not consider Islamic issues, could not 
modify the society pursuant to Muslims’ desires. 
One of the dark points of Karmal’s life was that his assumption of power coincided with 
the arrival of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Thus, the Soviet leader, Gorbachev, 
considered this issue. He believed that the people did not respect Karmal and they 
regarded him as the Soviet puppet. Owing to the fact that his rise to power was coincided 
with the arrival of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, he was supposed to be removed from 
the political scene. In his opinion, the restoration of national and international reputation 
was too late (Azimi 1998, 308). Additionally, it was decided in Moscow that Babrak 
Karmal would be removed from the political scene. “They wanted someone to come to 
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power in Afghanistan that would obey indisputably the orders of Moscow and certainly 
would provide the conditions of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan […] 
Moscow believed that if it put one of the submissive Pashtun leaders in power, it could 
provide the conditions of withdrawal of its forces” (Azimi 1998, 311-312).  
Doctor Najibullah was only desirable person who the KGB could trust him. He explicitly 
stated his support regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. He 
believed that only in a short time could organize the Afghan armed forces to defend 
independently the territorial integrity and national independence (Azimi 1998, 311-312).  
 Increasing of the Internal Tensions within the Party 4.5.
Najibullah was appointed as general secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA 
through the eighteenth plenum of the Central Committee. The mentioned Plenum held on 4 
May 1986, and accepted Karmal’s resignation from general secretary of the Central 
Committee and instead selected Najibullah in this position. In fact, the eighteenth plenum 
of the Party Central Committee was Najibullah’s bloodless coup against Karmal within the 
PDPA, which realized by virtue of Soviet military presence. Notwithstanding the coup 
scenario was written in Moscow, the eighteenth plenum provided the view of a normal 
transformation in the party organization.  
Najibullah at the beginning of leadership spoke about the party the collective leadership 
and endeavoured to reduce the intensification and expansion of intra-party disputes. 
Furthermore, he endeavoured to win the confidence of the Parcham and Khalq factions 
and their different fractions. He even went to Karmal’s supporters and using threat and 
encouraging policies endeavoured to reduce their oppositions against his government. It is 
striking to note that Najibullah, in order to convince Karmal’s supporters to accept the 
change in the leadership of the party, introduced it as the willingness of the Soviet 
leadership and a result of transformations in the Soviet Union. 
Contrary to the notion of providing party unity with the leadership of Najibullah, under his 
leadership the party was more involved in disunity and discord. The Soviets assumed that 
with the leadership of Najibullah would provide the unity between the two factions of the 
PDPA and the Parcham faction that was divided into two or further groups. As stated by 
Sultan Ali Keshtmand, “After the mentioned plenum (plenum 18) so incessant struggle 
occurred in the party, which gradually had a new form. On one hand, Karmal’s adherents 
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did not desist from the opposition and it became more organized and numerous over time; 
on the other hand, Najibullah increased the opposition to them and utilized various forms 
of pressure such as collective incarceration. He likewise summoned Karmal’s longstanding 
opposition from both the Khalqis and Parchamis and gave privileges to them in order to 
restrain them. Nonetheless, after occupying the leadership position by Najibullah, the 
Khalqis’ opposition not only did not subside, but also it took on some new aspects. Some 
new groupings among the Khalqis emerged that some of them were Najibullah’s 
adherents, some others were in position of hostility […] as well as owing to Najibullah’s 
dual policy the leading member of the Parchamis were divided into factions, and each one 
individually was regarded or rejected by him. Furthermore, mediocre policy regarding 
Karmal’s adherents continued until the end” (Keshtmand 2002, 980). 
In addition to Keshtmand, some activists and leaders of the Khalq faction discussed his 
dual policy in this leadership. As stated by Mir Sahib Karval, “Despite the fact that 
Najibullah in the early days [as necessity] depended on the Khalqis, he changed very soon 
his policy and as a result of the pressures of the Parchamis’ leadership especially Noor 
Ahmad Noor, Sultan Ali Keshtmand and Karmal’s adherents endeavoured to calm down 
and lure them. He endeavoured to demonstrate that he had never been surrendered to the 
Khalqis, and would maintain and strengthen the Parchamis doctrine even more than 
Karmal” (Karval 2005, 152). 
4.5.1. National Reconciliation 
Najibullah after taking power in the Revolutionary Council performed some measures for 
consolidating his power in the party and made some appointments and dismissals in the 
new cabinet. The officials from the Khalq faction were dismissed and instead of them, the 
Parchamis were appointed. Najibullah continued the pursuit and arrest of Karmal’s 
adherents who were spreading propaganda against him. In October 1988, dozens of 
Karmal’s adherents between prominent officials were arrested and sent to prison.  
Changing, replacement, promoting and demoting of senior members of the PDPA at the 
highest leadership organs of the party was another part of Najibullah’s measures for 
consolidating his power. Najibullah from the beginning of his leadership continuously was 
replacing the party circles especially in the political bureau and the Central Committee. 
Although Najibullah with handling his adherents of both factions in the key the ministries 
endeavoured to strengthen the basis of his authority, this measure created a new and deep 
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rift in the party and government. As he was unable to attract solidarity and support of all 
branches and elements of the Parcham faction, even regarding the Khalq faction he could 
not succeed so. The main part of the Khalq faction led by Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy 
was in opposition and hostility. Gulabzoy initially demonstrated his agreement to these 
changes while later when he was assigned to the embassy in Moscow continued to oppose 
Najibullah. Apart from the opposition stemmed from traditional confrontation and hostility 
between two factions of the PDPA, it arose from competition between the two factions 
over managing the intelligence agency of the Ministry of Interior as well. Both sides in 
order to strengthen their own official organs endeavoured to close themselves to the Soviet 
Onion. “President forcefully opposed the appointment Gulabzoy as the president of 
Garrison of Kabul and putting all the stationed troops in Kabul including the special guard 
at his disposal. President indicated that Gulabzoy wants to make a huge system that it was 
not required” (Lyakhovsky 1995, 58). 
Creating various military units within the framework of intelligence agency and the 
Ministry of State Security (MSS), and increasing the forces of the National Guard was an 
important part of his function to strengthen the basis of his authority. Najibullah, after 
becoming the leader of the party and government established Supreme Command 
Headquarters of the Armed Forces included the forces of the Ministry of Defence, Interior 
and Security and Supreme Commander headed this camp. He had many motivations and 
energies in leadership of the party and the government, and thus by continuously working 
at the presidential chief of the Armed Forces Headquarters and the leadership, established 
another organ of the Supreme Council that called Defae Vatan. This action assisted him to 
provide his relationships and control over the military forces and their operations across 
the country and enhanced the mental and qualitative capacity. In the meetings of the camp, 
always Senior Soviet military advisers used to participate. Najibullah’s military adviser 
claimed, “Every evening or morning before the holding of meeting of Supreme Command 
Board, president and I used to verify plan of his orders. I usually remind him the main 
issues that should have been issued an order about” (Gharif 1998, 153). 
After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, Najibullah in order to strengthen its position made 
further changes in the military forces of the government. He removed some certain 
brigades of border regions of Pakistan and the forces of these brigades were integrated into 
the army of the Ministry of Defence or combined them to create a new army. It should also 
be stated that the formation of a new force within the Ministry of Security or intelligence 
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agency of the government that called the Presidential Guard and then it was renamed the 
National Guard was one of the substantial steps in creating an accessible and reliable force 
under his command. Mir Sahib Karval, the senior officer of the Ministry of Defence and a 
member of the political bureau of the PDPA (See Figure  4-4) believed that National Guard 
was established as a parallel force to the forces of the Ministry of Defence and it was based 
on advice and support of the KGB and the Soviet advisers. It is worth pointing out that its 
staffs were provided from the party member and social organisations. The security of all 
key areas such as airports and other locations was provided by the National Guard, which 
in terms of logistics, modern weapons, and the other financial assistance was supported by 
the Soviet Union. It is worth pointing out that Najibullah’s Soviet advisers always warned 
him not to trust the forces of defence and interior the ministries. A special group headed by 
three general of the KGB were assigned to ensure that Najibullah understood the Soviet’s 
intentions and the required conditions would be prepared for the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops. This group created Joint Staff consisted of skilled persons in Kabul and adjusted 
economic and military plans for the defence of the regime. Furthermore, this group 
negotiated with Najibullah about receiving a series of better and further aid from the 
Soviet. The KGB warned him not to rely on the loyalty of the Afghan army. Thus, they 
provided him with money and the necessary equipment a new presidential guard with new 
high salaries and benefits and this presidential guard was as his private army (Karval 2005, 
178). 
One of the Soviet generals and Najibullah’s advisers likewise spoke about president’s 
reliance on the National Guard and the forces of intelligence agency. “President in his 
relations with the armed forces gave priority to special guard of the Ministry of State 
Security. This action stimulated the displeasure of the Khalqis, army command staffs and 
the security forces, moreover, it was obvious that he was highly dependent on the Ministry 
of State Security and did not trust the army and the Interior Ministry. Although he knew 
without the support of the army would not be able to resolve the military and political 
issues, he feared of strengthening it” (Lyakhovsky 1995, 38). Further, the garrison of 
Kabul was regarded as a new force in securing the capital, which was under the leadership 
of the Ministries of Defence, Interior, and National Security.  
Spreading the militia or paramilitary forces was another part of Najibullah’s measure to 
consolidate his authority, which during the rule of the PDPA was developing year by year. 
This process had very negative impact on the social and political system of the country, 
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and consequently it provided the context of lawlessness, violence and the collapse of social 
order. The remarkable point is that the policy of the militia finally was one factor in 
downfall of the PDPA. In fact, this policy increased the party’s internal divisions and 
disagreements, which caused the collapse of the government, army, and party. Militia 
forces initially were regarded as the grass roots and local forces in support of the PDPA’s 
government, party and state institutions in rural areas. Nonetheless, increasing weakness of 
the army, police, and government regular forces strengthened the militia forces and in 
many areas took over the responsibilities of the police and army. Fleeing the soldiers from 
the army and avoiding the qualified youths from doing military service during the rule of 
the PDPA resulted in increasing the militia forces. 
The number of militia forces in many other provinces increased during Najibullah’s 
regime. Antonio Giustozzi is of the opinion that Kandahar governor’s in his attempt to 
extend militia forces went to such an extent that he did not attract recruits to the army 
anymore and instead for those who were willing to join militia, paid twenty thousand 
Afghanis. Najibullah not only for the tribal youth, who joined self-defence local units, 
offered exemption from military service, but also demonstrated willingness to release 
those who previously joined military forces (Giustozzi 2000, 226). 
Indeed, during the rule of Najibullah in the key provinces of Afghanistan militia forces 
played an important role in the defence of the government of the PDPA. To the same 
extent that the militia forces were strengthened during Najibullah’s regime, their role was 
increased in the years of war. During these years, the militia forces were equipped with 
heavy weapons, including armoured tanks and some types of missiles and artillery. After 
the Soviet withdrawal in 1988, they were adjusted as an independent unit within the 
framework of the Ministry of Defence and National Security. Increasing and strengthening 
of the militia forces resulted in increasing their authority in the provinces. Militia leaders 
and commanders in proportion to their military activities against opponents of Najibullah’s 
regime successively received military ranks and increased their authority within the 
government. Several factors and motivations caused the president strengthened the militia 
forces. 
The process of enhancing the militia forces initiated from the early eighties, however 
during his leading in the intelligence agency and then during his leadership in the party and 
government these forces constituted his most trusted forces. The opposition and hostility 
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between him and the Khalq faction and Karmal’s adherents forced him to trust and rely on 
the militia forces and intelligence agencies. Furthermore, expansion of the state’s social 
base outside the capital and important cities was another part of the motivation of 
Najibullah to strengthen the militia forces. Najibullah’s policy of strengthening and 
increasing the militia forces was taken into consideration as the competition between these 
forces as well, which resulted in the intensification and expansion of social and ethnic 
divisions in Afghanistan. He made militia forces from different ethnic groups and tribes 
and in the combat operation utilized various ethnic militias. 
Another part of Najibullah’s measures for consolidating his power was the policy of 
national reconciliation, which was including adopting the new policy, agreement with the 
opposition forces and participation the leftist groups in the government. In fact, the idea of 
national reconciliation in Kabul was reflection of Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika 
policy. Najibullah endeavoured to moderate his policies in order to pave the way for the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. These adjustments and changes in the set of 
policies and practices of Najibullah were formed in the name of national reconciliation, 
which had been conducted by Karmal. Antonio Giustozzi believed that initially, 
Najibullah took steps along the way that Karmal had been traced, but nevertheless he 
could implement just a part of the process only in the last years of his leadership 
(Giustozzi 2000, 155). Najibullah’s national reconciliation policy was the continuation of 
the ten tactics of Karmal, which was declared and approved in the sixteenth central 
committee plenum. However, Karmal and his supporters could not go beyond the 
framework of ten tactics. (Vadan 1999, 18). Lieutenant general Boris Gromov regarding 
Najibullah’s national reconciliation policy told, “After the selection of Najibullah as the 
secretary general of the PDPA, with immediate assistance and support of the Soviet party 
consultants, new strategies were developed with the aim of removal of internal 
confrontation in the country” (Gromov 1996, 192). 
Indeed, Najibullah adopted ceasefire plan, national reconciliation, and the formation of a 
coalition government as his main policies and goals. The politburo and the presidium of 
the Revolutionary Council regarding these policies passed some rules and established a 
National Reconciliation Commission, which had 295 members. Then, the Revolutionary 
Council of the PDPA said in a statement in case of agreement of the opposition from 15 
January 1987 would be established a six-month ceasefire. The PDPA conference in support 
of the national reconciliation policy was held in Kabul from 18 to 20 October 1987. 
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Outlines and the main points of the policy of national reconciliation in the conference were 
determined as follows; 
 Alliance organizations and leftist group with the PDPA, 
 Freedom of political parties,  
 Creating coalition organisation with the armed opposition and employing them at 
high levels in the ministries,  
 Continuing unilateral ceasefire,  
 Drafting a new constitution,  
 Preparations for the election of the president,  
 Organizing the second congress of the PDPA. 
Loya Jirga approved the new constitution on 29 and 30 November 1987 (See Appendix 
B), and the name of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was modified into Republic of 
Afghanistan. Dozens of adherents of Hafizullah Amin in the Khalq faction, those who after 
the overthrow of his government had been detained, were released within the framework 
of national reconciliation policy and were appointed to government’s positions. Political 
parties were permitted to operate although most of these parties were remnants of the 
democratic left in the sixties and a few came from the state intelligence agency. Najibullah 
utilized a number of non-party people in his cabinet. For instance, in May 1988 he 
appointed Mohammad Hasan Sharq as Prime Minister instead of Sultan Ali Keshtmand. In 
June, the National Council replaced the Revolutionary Council as the legislative organ of 
the DRA that a number of its members were appointed by election. 
In 1989, the president conducted some measurements to eliminate the Soviet influence in 
Afghanistan. Afghan-Soviet friendship rooms in Kabul University and other educational 
institutions, and the office of Soviet advisers in the departments and official agencies were 
closed. The state monopoly over transportation fuel and sugar were removed. Besides, the 
issued commands of the Revolutionary Council during Taraki concerning the cost of the 
wedding and land reforms were abolished. Finally, some adjustments were made in the 
constitution and revoking the citizenship of Mohammed Zahir Shah and his family were 
declared invalid.  
Regarding national reconciliation issue some significant changes in political and economic 
system was enshrined. Market economy was regarded and it was approved selling farms 
and government institutions - in both agricultural and industrial sectors - to private 
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companies. In June 1990, holding the second congress, the PDPA changed its name to 
Hezbe Watan and were created fundamental changes in plans and objectives of the party. 
In fact, the party changed from democratic left party based on Marxism-Leninism ideology 
to the right. 
Indeed, during the ruling of Najibullah there was no consistent vision and policy of 
national reconciliation within the party and government. Not only politicians of different 
factions of the PDPA did not have a common position on concept and policy of national 
reconciliation, but also the comprehension and interpretation of highest institutions of the 
party, such as the political bureau of the Central Committee of the Party, and national 
reconciliation was different. Although Najibullah claimed that reconciliation is a mutual 
peace that two sides should participate in it, the policy of national reconciliation never 
regarded equal partnership and bilateral cooperation with Mujahidin. In fact, he wanted to 
attain his goals with the escalation of war and repression on Mujahidin; moreover, in his 
view, national reconciliation was accepting the ruling of the PDPA by armed opponents or 
Mujahidin. Although he was speaking to promote national reconciliation, he expanded and 
strengthened the militia forces in various provinces. In the first session of the commission 
on national reconciliation, he inconsistently expressed his opinion regarding reconciliation, 
and he threatened his opponents and tacitly supported the Soviet Union and his 
international friends. 
Najibullah, on one hand emphasized national reconciliation policy; on the other hand, he 
mentioned the power of the army and the irreversibility of the revolutionary process under 
the auspices of the Soviet Union. He said in one of his speeches; “We recommend truce; 
we recommend peace”, but nevertheless then he said, “Revolutionary process in 
Afghanistan is irreversible and it could not be ceased; it does not accept any cease. 
Extremists several times announced that it would be terminated the revolutionary power. 
However, Democratic People’s Republic of Afghanistan is alive, powerful and fights 
successfully” (Azimi 1998, 464). It is remarkable that despite the fact that Najibullah 
announced the national reconciliation policy to reach peace with Mujahidin, in a press 
conference - at the termination of six months after the announcement of the national 
reconciliation - he gave an interview to the foreign journalists regarding national 
reconciliation. He regarded the conflict in Afghan society as a class conflict between 
progressive and reactionary classes in society and not a conflict between Islam and 
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disbelief (Asnad-e tarikhi darbarehe mosalehe melli, [Historical documents about national 
reconciliation] 1986, 85). 
Collapse of the ruling People’s Democratic Party, five years after the implementation of 
the national reconciliation policy demonstrates the failure of this policy. Nonetheless, in 
the context of this defeat there are signs of success and progress regarding bringing a 
number of Mujahidin commander in alignment with the government and getting their 
agreement to desist from fight against the government. In this regard, the Najibullah’s 
policy from some points of view appeared to be effective and consequential. Nonetheless, 
joining a number of armed forces of Mujahidin and their commanders to Najibullah’s 
government, or refraining from fighting against government forces, were the results of the 
government’s security and intelligence activities and not in consequence of the policy of 
national reconciliation. Negotiations and agreements with the Mujahidin commanders 
inside the country and even with their leaders of some Jihadi organizations or their 
representatives outside the country implemented through intelligence and security 
institutions in order to force armed opponents to accept the ruling of the PDPA. In the 
mentioned negotiations instead of bilateral cooperation on a political platform, the 
Mujahidin commanders regarded trading and earning money. According to Alexander 
Lyakhovsky, commanders and the local authority did not want to be notorious by virtue of 
negotiation with a weak regime, but nevertheless some middle-class groups endeavoured 
to establish a relationship and alliance just by virtue of money worship, financial benefit, 
and obtaining arms and ammunition from the government. In addition, alliance was very 
unstable and by providing favourable conditions at any time, they refused to cooperate 
with the government and joined the rebel camp. Accordingly, joining opposition groups to 
Najibullah’s regime could not be trusted by the government (Lyakhovsky 1995, 8). 
Besides, joining these forces and Mujahidin commanders to the government and the 
national reconciliation policy brought about the motivation and willingness of government 
forces in the war against Mujahidin considerably reduced. 
The idea of national reconciliation policy from the beginning was regarded obsolete. 
Regarding the fact that this plan was raised by the party-state, there was not a shadow of 
doubt that it would have failed. The only manner of success was that such plan should 
have conducted by a third force such as religious scholars (Giustozzi 2000, 168). The 
underlying cause that this policy, raised by the PDPA’s government, did not have 
sufficient efficiency and effectiveness was that the government had been already involved 
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in the numerous conflict and crime during its life, which threatened its success as a 
trustable side of reconciliation inside and outside Afghanistan. Najibullah proposed the 
national reconciliation policy in order to establish significant changes in the programme 
and objectives of the Party. The party that until that time led the country based militarism 
and intelligence service could not be considered as a symbol of peace and reconciliation in 
society.  
The influence of internationalism of Marxist-Leninist ideas in the PDPA, tendency to the 
Soviet Union and presence a number of obedient leaders and cadres in the party by the 
Soviets, undermined the character of nationalism in the party (See Figure  5-2). Besides, 
the PDPA’s government by virtue of the tendency to maintain the monopoly of state power 
was incorporated into a new political organization, which called the state party. 
Accordingly, the party could not conceive its existence apart from the state and the 
principle of division of powers and withdrawing from it, which was proposed by the 
national reconciliation policy, was impossible for them to implement. 
Najibullah during the national reconciliation, especially after the withdrawal of the Soviet 
forces, always benefited from the financial and military support from the Soviet and 
consulted with the KGB agents. As stated by Mahmoud Gharif, he had close ties with the 
KGB agents and significantly was obedient to them. “Najibullah presumably could not 
find time to meet with Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army ground forces that was 
visiting Kabul while he spent several consecutive days with the KGB officers who visited 
Kabul” (Gharif 1998, 172). Thereby, the PDPA dependency on the Soviet caused disbelief 
and distrust against Najibullah and his national reconciliation policy. 
Many elements of circles within the party factions believed that Najibullah utilized the 
national reconciliation policy to consolidate his power and undermine his opponents within 
and outside the party. One member of the political bureau of the Khalq faction wrote, 
“Najibullah entirely utilized the national reconciliation policy to consolidate his personal 
power in the party and state. Although he made some changes, transformations and 
appointments in the several positions in the cabinet, when somebody went beyond the 
limits he rapidly removed him from his positions” (Karval 2005, 154).  
As it was mentioned earlier, the name and objective of the PDPA changed within the 
framework of the national reconciliation policy, but nevertheless all of the leaders and 
officials of Hezbe Watan were the same as the PDPA, and the party with the new name 
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refused to abrogate the monopoly of power. In fact, many opposition parties that in the 
ruling party were formed based on the national reconciliation policy were made by 
intelligent service of the party. Even some members of the PDPA acknowledged this issue. 
“With the exception of the Afghanistan’s Revolutionary Organization that to a certain 
extent had facilities in the Northern Province particularly in Badakhshan and Takhar, the 
majority of other factions were superficial and formed by intelligent service (KHAD), and 
they had no role at all in defending the sovereignty” (See Figure  4-4), (Karval 2005, 154). 
The national reconciliation policy had opponents within the party that was by virtue of 
different stances of the party members regarding this policy and the conflict over power 
between the different factions and branches of the party. Different factions of the party 
utilized this policy in order to manage intra-party challenges. The opposition was very 
wide and, in fact, many different factions and branches of the party despite participation in 
governance were incompatible with the policy. The Khalq faction that regarded the 
replacement of Karmal by Najibullah as an unfair action believed that the success of this 
policy would result in consolidating the power of Najibullah and the Parcham faction. 
Sayed Mohammad Golabzoy one of the leaders of the Khalq faction told, “It should be 
utilized the language of force with the miscreants, they (Mujahidin) have no 
comprehension of national reconciliation except for our weakness and inability” (Azimi 
1998, 389). Even in the Parcham faction, there was not a consensus to support this policy. 
Regardless of the fact that the real reason for these oppositions to Najibullah within the 
party was the national reconciliation policy or something else, it should be highlighted that 
these oppositions were very serious obstacles to the success of this policy and put him into 
trouble in implementing it. Alexander Lyakhovsky according to Soviet intelligence source 
wrote, “After Najibullah’s assumption of power, the internal conflicts did not decrease in 
the party, on the contrary, they became severer and factionalism in the party depending on 
the rivalry between “Khalq” and “Parcham” was more critical. Besides, the traditional 
factions that emerged some new groupings in the party practically gathered around each 
member of the Political Bureau of the Party and pursued their greedy goals (See 
Figure  4-4). Tribal and national factors performed a significant function to make further 
escalation of the conflict not only within the party, but also in anywhere else, which led the 
party to be in further chaos. The Party organizations, provincial and district committees, 
the Central Committee and its apparatus, and in the Politburo and Secretariat of the Party 
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Central Committee openly initiated to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with Najibullah’s 
policy” (Lyakhovsky 1995, 25). 
It is remarkable that Islamic and Jihadist organisations and many Mujahidin commanders 
stood opposed to the policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan. The disagreement 
stems from ideological hostility and animosity of the Cold War between two superpowers, 
the Soviet Union, and the United States of America, which continued at the time of 
National reconciliation. Although Mujahidin’s doubt about the national reconciliation 
policy and Islamic parties was attributed to religious and theological dimensions, peace 
with the PDPA was seen as a betrayal of Islam and Jihad. However, this claim and 
treatment was a deception and pretence in order to use religion as a means of realizing 
their goals. Despite the negotiation between the government and commanders and leaders 
of opponents, Mujahidin, Islamic parties and their external supporters were determined to 
continue of Jihad to overthrow the government.  
The United States of America and their allies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, in the Islamic 
world opposed the policy of national reconciliation Najibullah. Notwithstanding the Soviet 
forces withdrew from Afghanistan and Najibullah enthusiastically attempted to establish 
relations with the Western countries especially the United States of America, it was non-
functional and he was not successful in this regard. “Since the Soviet military intervention 
in Afghanistan was an act of aggression violating basic principles of international law, 
including respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention in internal 
affairs, the Western nations, and other members of the international community strongly 
denounced the action by the Soviet Union. Thus, the Afghan problem has become a 
“symbol” of East-West confrontation” (See Figure  4-5), (Major Issues in the International 
Community and Roles of Japan n.d.). 
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Figure ‎4-5: Symbol” of East-West Confrontation 
(Major Issues in the International Community and Roles of Japan n.d.) 
 
Americans were not very interested in Najibullah’s policy, and owing to over half a 
century of the PDPA’s dependency and relationship with the Soviet Union, they could not 
trust him to be their alliance. Even Americans were not concerned about Moscow’s policy 
leading by Gorbachev that led to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. He 
removed the Soviet forces from Afghanistan to gain Americans’ trust, which in their view 
was a sign of weakness and defeat of the Soviet. 
There was a direct relationship between Najibullah’s national reconciliation policy in 
Kabul and Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika policies in Moscow. The success of 
Glasnost depended on the success of the national reconciliation and Glasnost and 
Perestroika policies were effective strategies to release the CPSU from crisis, 
strengthening the Soviet Union and the rule of the Communist Party. In fact, the national 
reconciliation policy was a reflection of Glasnost and it was regarded as a strategy for 
strengthening the rule of the PDPA and weakening the belligerent or Mujahidin. 
Additionally, as there was not a consistent view regarding Glasnost and Perestroika 
policies within the CPSU, in Kabul the Soviets did not have an integrated view regarding 
the national reconciliation policy too. The Soviets was aware of the opposition of the 
elements and factions of the PDPA to the government policy, but nevertheless they 
adopted a policy of silence and put no pressure on them. 
Indeed, the duality of Soviet policy was by virtue of hypocrisy of the Soviet authorities. 
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Perestroika policies supported the national reconciliation policy as adherence to their 
policies, on the other side Red Army and the KGB strongly supported strengthening and 
surviving the PDPA. Additionally, Najibullah had close ties with both groups; in fact, he 
had a long history of interaction and in the war against Mujahidin and established a close 
working relationship with the militaries in the Soviet army. Withdrawal of Soviet forces 
undermined national reconciliation policy contrary to the impression that it would 
strengthen the reconciliation process in Afghanistan. Najibullah thought Moscow would 
connect withdrawal of its forces to develop the national reconciliation policy, whereas in 
fact Moscow withdrew its troops from Afghanistan regardless of success and failure of this 
policy. 
With the notion that the national reconciliation policy - as reflecting the Glasnost policy - 
was a strategy to withdraw the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, two years after launching 
the mentioned policy in Kabul, the Soviet forces retreated from Afghanistan. During the 
negotiation of the Geneva Agreement, in the first meeting with Gorbachev, Najibullah 
declared that without an acceptable guarantee of cessation of Pakistan’s involvement 
would not sign any agreement. Nevertheless, he adjusted his demands with Gorbachev’s 
desires and paved the way for the signing of the Geneva Agreements.  
Many individuals and leaders of Mujahidin believed that the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
that was based in Geneva Agreement was a sign of victory of Jihad in Afghanistan. After 
the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan, this country became the field of competition 
between the Soviet Union and western countries. In addition, the Soviets after nine years 
of war and spread of instability left Afghanistan without gaining any practical agreements 
with other countries and their rivals to restore peace and stability. 
4.5.2. The Social and Economic Conditions  
On the verge of withdrawing the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the general opinion was 
that the Kabul government would soon collapse, but nevertheless owing to the lack of 
unity and coordination of different groups and existence of the various disorders in the 
resistance movement it did not realize. Najibullah’s government was able to continue his 
political life and accelerate the reform process in Afghanistan. At this time, the main goal 
of the economic policy of the government was to prepare favourable conditions for 
suitable economic growth, which accelerated from 1989 to 1990. The government in the 
process of the economic reform focused on the private sector, and thus development of a 
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free market economy was introduced. The government in order to reconcile the policy of 
national reconciliation with economic and social realities of Afghan society conducted 
some policies. On the one hand, the president endeavoured to attract the attention of the 
international community; on the other hand, he accelerated implementation of new 
reforms. He endeavoured to encourage European countries and capitalist world to re-
establish economy and trade relations. In fact, this policy was the best tactic for him to 
gain political acceptance and economic support. 
Furthermore, he implemented some measures to attract the national capitals and foreign 
investments. The government’s goal of this economic policy was to rebuild economic and 
social future of the country based on its long-term goals and coordinate it with the new 
policies of the Soviet Union. In fact, this policy was a critical goal and difficult to achieve 
for the government. Conditions for normalizing relations with the western world and the 
United States were not still favourable. Accordingly, the policymakers of Kabul 
endeavoured to be forefront of the new social and economic movement and continue their 
political life in the secure, democratic, and political space of the future and they wanted to 
rescue themselves from bloody revenge of Mujahidin. Development and strengthening of 
the governmental sector and old type of economic policy lost their importance. It should 
also be stated that as mentioned earlier, commands of the Revolutionary Council during 
Taraki such as land reforms and private property were abolished, and state law recognized 
the right to private property. Besides, the government made some efforts to promote privet 
sector and launch the mechanism of the free market.
1
  
Najibullah’s government’s economic plan not only was different from the state-building 
process in early Saur coup, but also theoretically, during the reign of Mohammed Zahir 
and Daoud Khan’s Republic, the free market economy was not proposed to this extent. 
Additionally, Kabul government in order to implement the above plans required to expand 
the cities and strengthen their bureaucratic organisations. From the beginning, Najibullah’s 
government demonstrated interest in the growth of cities and industrialisation of the 
country and regarded it as the best manner of developing its political and strategic 
interests. It was obvious that throughout the years of war, the structure of economic, social, 
and traditional life of the Afghan society was affected and millions of immigrants, who 
were accustomed to the phenomenon of urban life, were unwilling to return to rural life. It 
should also be stated that resistance movements and Mujahidin were still connected to the 
                                                          
1
 For further information see: Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper, 6 October 1990/ 14, 7, 1369, p.2. 
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previous social and economic structure and supported local, traditional, and spiritual 
culture of the society and could not coordinate themselves with the new flow in the society 
and take the leadership of the new flow. 
It is noteworthy that the government made some efforts to flourish private sector and 
accelerate the process of industrialization of the country based on the development of 
urban centres. Nonetheless, it was not appeared practical and efficacious realization of this 
strategic plan without growth and development of agriculture, reconstruction, and renewal 
of the previous economic and social structure. In fact, the plan of industrialization of 
underdeveloped society of Afghanistan before providing the necessary and actual 
conditions in addition to getting negative results would exacerbate the country's economic 
and social dependence. Although strengthening and expansion of urban areas in short-term 
was consequential for the Kabul government, in long-term could effectuate acute 
economic and social problems, such as increasing consumerism, creating false occupations 
and unemployment. The government from the early years attempted to dominate rural 
areas through the cities, conversely armed Mujahidin from rural sites and surrounding 
areas put pressure on cities to collapse government’s resistance. It is noteworthy that the 
main issue was not just hostility between Mujahidin and the government; in fact, it was a 
conflict between two movements and two social and economic strategies. 
As historical experiences have shown, a plan based on thoughtful actions and experience 
leads to success. In other words, the government’s policies should have been proportional 
to the time in order to provide coordination between social, economic, and cultural realities 
of the Afghan society and regional and global situation. Although Kabul government 
regarded the realities of Afghan society to some extent and demonstrated interest in the 
growth of cities and industrialisation of the country, from various views the conditions for 
national reconciliation, regional and international coordination and cooperation, and the 
background for social and economic trends in Afghanistan were still unprepared. 
 Resistance to the Afghan Puppet Government and the Soviet 4.6.
Occupation 
In the mid-1980s, United States and Great Britain and some other country supported the 
Afghan resistance movement and provoked national and international movement against 
Soviet troops. Americans knew that the war in Afghanistan became full-fledged battle of 
the Cold War; they, therefore, initiated sending military and financial assistance to 
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opponent forces through Pakistan’s intelligent service. Furthermore, in consequence of 
activities of Afghan fighters militant supporters emerged in Islamic and Arabic countries 
with the intention of supporting doctrinal matters or even earning money. The most 
important among them was a young Saudi named Osama bin Laden and his Arab group 
called al-Qaeda. In fact, the war led to raising some important international political 
groups, which later played an important role to create the political events. 
In the early years of the war, many military bases affiliated to Mujahidin were formed, 
which were connected to the main parties in Pakistan and received financial and strategic 
assistance from them (See Figure  4-5). In the helm of Mujahidin, spiritual leaders had a 
significant role and position. Regional, ethnic, and sectarian divisions of Mujahidin in 
Pashtun regions in the East, South, and South East with multiple and competing tribal 
structure and sub-sectors established basis of several military organisations and leadership 
system. Generally, movements and mobilizing of the forces of campaigns were 
implemented due to public and traditional desire to fight and loyalty to tribal armed forces. 
Considering this issue, it could be argued that the organisations could rapidly reach several 
thousand people in case of favourable conditions. For instance, in the battle of eastern 
provinces and the siege of Khost city in the 1980s these forces performed a significant 
function. The strength of the local forces led to a number of limited defeats for the Soviet 
forces and they surrounded them many times.  
Equipping Mujahidin against the non-Pashtun areas created a very critical problem. Before 
the Soviet invasion, a few non-Pashtun areas had some firearms. Furthermore, after 
beginning the war, they had the readiest forces compared to military or police departments, 
who were weak or were sitting in ambush. International sales of weapons and foreign 
military support caused the local forces tended to achieve of the occupied territories. It is 
worth pointing out that Mujahidin likewise benefited from sabotage operations. In most 
cases of these operations, they pursued goals such as disturbing and explosion in electrical 
transmission lines and pipelines carrying the explosive materials, radio stations, 
government offices, airports, hotels, cinemas. They attempted to perform rocket and 
missile operations within and adjacent to villages in the field of Soviet artillery, which put 
the villagers in danger. They likewise widely put land mine in different areas and 
constantly recruited from the local inhabitants and children. 
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Mujahidin attacks on military and civilian focused on many targets such as destruction of 
bridges, undermining main roads, attacks on convoys crossing, disconnecting electrical 
transmission systems and industrial products, attacks on police and military headquarters 
of Afghanistan and the Soviet and air bases. They likewise attempted to assassinate 
government officials and the PDPA members and occupied remote and frontier posts. In 
March 1982, the Ministry of Education's bomb blast caused damage to several buildings; 
some days after this event, explosion of power transmission tower caused widespread 
power outages in Kabul. In June of this year, a group of the young members of the 
Communist Party, those who were dispatch to work in the Panjshir valleywere attacked 
and suffered heavy casualties.  
As it was mentioned earlier, the basis of withdrawal of Soviet forces apparently was the 
Geneva Agreement. Although these negotiations initiated during the rule of Karmal, 
Najibullah adapted his ideas with Gorbachev’s and convinced him to sign the agreement. 
Mujahidin regarded withdrawal of Soviet forces as their desirable success. It should be 
noted, withdrawal of Soviet forces at that time was a substantial mistake as much as Soviet 
military invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. In fact, it was an unfair and irresponsible 
decision as they left Afghanistan without doing their practical agreements in order to 
restore peace and stability in the country. Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
General declared that during the Geneva Agreement there was not assigned any task to 
decide on Afghanistan’s future and the two superpowers did not support the negotiation 
board to have discussion about Afghanistan’s future (Farhang 1995, 335). 
The first step in withdrawing of Soviet troops was transfer of responsibility for fighting 
Mujahidin to Afghan military forces, with the aim of preparing them to continue to operate 
without Soviet support. In this period, the Soviet military activities confined to support the 
Afghan Armed Forces artillery, air supply, and technical assistance. Nonetheless, the 
Soviet military bands were still conducting some operations. Antonio Giustozzi is of the 
opinion that Soviet sources claim that Afghanistan’s government did not definitely believe 
that the Red Army would leave the country and actions that were recommend to handle 
Mujahidin was not implemented until the last days. Party and government officials never 
wanted Soviet to leave. Even Najibullah did not believe the withdrawal of Soviet forces 
from Afghanistan in the beginning. First he endeavoured to postpone Soviets plan to 
initiate withdrawing their troops in April 1987, whereas in fact when the Soviet army 
initiated withdrawing, he sought to convince the Soviet government to send back to 
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Kandahar 3000 of 5000 of their force to protect the city from the siege. Two months later, 
he requested the intervention of the Soviet Air Force in Jalalabad, where took place a 
momentous battle (Giustozzi 2000, 187).  
In addition to Najibullah, opponents of revisionism in the CPSU leadership, army and the 
Cuban and Angolan allies arose to oppose unconditionally withdrawing of Soviet troops 
from Afghanistan (Roger Keeran; Thomas Kenny 2004, 303). Mikhail Gorbachev’s new 
idea in foreign and domestic policy was the most important factor in the Soviet decision to 
withdraw from Afghanistan. As mentioned before, Gorbachev endeavoured to change the 
recession and conducted two glasnost and perestroika programmes to make political-
economic reforms. He likewise signed intermediate-range nuclear weapons reduction 
treaty to reduce the Cold War tensions and ordered withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan, whose presence in Afghanistan had been increased international 
condemnation. 
Soviet troops initiated to withdraw in May 1988, and 15 February 1989 the last Soviet 
troops behind their commander Boris Gromov, by crossing over the Oxus had left Afghan 
soil. Gromov regarded the Soviet war in Afghanistan without victory and defeat and 
believed that there was no basis for the verification of defeat and the pretence of winning 
the war in Afghanistan was baseless (Gromov 1996, 222). Despite his doubts about 
existing the basis for verification of defeat and victory in the war, the Soviet defeat in the 
war and the basis of their defeat are obvious. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that 
withdrawing of the Soviet force from Afghanistan was not a military defeat with classical 
failure criteria. In fact, Soviet war in Afghanistan was not against a regular army, 
therefore, victory and defeat in it could be calculated with classical criteria. Soviet war in 
Afghanistan was to impose an ideological political system of the PDPA. In fact, they rush 
to save the sovereignty of the PDPA in Afghanistan. Victory and defeat of the Soviet in 
Afghanistan should be evaluated based on the motives and goals of their invasion, which at 
the time of their withdrawal were not achieved.  
Simultaneous with withdrawal of Soviet troops, a group of Mujahidin stationed in 
Peshawar conducted a plan for attacking to Jalalabad in February 1989. Pakistan’s military 
intelligence (ISI) intelligence agency, in consultation and cooperation with Intelligence 
agency United States of America (CIA) played a major role in organizing and stimulating 
of Mujahidin (See Figure  4-5). They organized many meetings with Mujahidin to 
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implement the programme (Coll 2004, 190). Due to the fact that this attack against the 
government implemented just by one ethnic group in Afghanistan, it was doomed to 
failure from the beginning. In fact, the country consisted of several ethnic groups with 
diverse political interests, therefore, if one of them wanted to take control of all the affairs 
of the country, it would face strict opposition from other ethnic groups and bothered it to 
govern effectively. When Mujahidin in Peshawar conducted a plan for attacking to 
Jalalabad, Ahmad Shah Massoud Commander of board of supervisors had military power 
and influence among some part of Afghans. Furthermore, Islamic Unity Party was formed 
in Bamyan and the people of central areas supported its power and influence. Accordingly, 
the rule of Peshawar headed by Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai, failed to topple the Kabul 
government. Although the victory in the Jalalabad war called an independent defence in 
the absence of the Soviet forces, Najibullah’s regime with a huge financial and military aid 
from the Soviet Union was able to achieve this victory.  
After Mujahidin’s failure to topple the Kabul government, in March 1990 occurred a 
Khalqis coup, headed by Defence Minister Shahnawaz Tanai. As was mentioned 
previously, one of the motivations for choosing Najibullah for the leadership of the party 
and the government with the approval and support of Soviet was gaining satisfaction and 
creating balance and trust between the Parcham and Khalq factions, which was not 
successful. The coup plotters believed that Najibullah’s regime relied on foreigners, which 
could not be accepted by the PDPA, army and Afghanistan’s people. They objected to the 
military restructuring of the army, developing it to ethnic, militia, and personal bodyguard 
structures and giving all material and spiritual privileges to the army structure (Tanin 
2005, 342). 
Mohammad Hassan Sharq, believed that after withdrawing Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy 
from the political scene, the Khalqis under the leadership of Shahnawaz Tanai 
endeavoured to force Najibullah and a few of his close associates to resign in order to have 
favourable grounds for negotiations with Mujahidin. However, if they were successful, 
they could attract the majority of the Parchamis, who have similar ideas (Sharq 1994, 
300). After the collapse of his government, some authors - including some of the 
supporters of Najibullah - argued the Soviet intervention in the Tanai coup. Najibullah and 
coup opponents within the party and government continuously exchanged their ideas with 
the KGB regarding ways to handle the coup (Gharif 1998, 179). Tanai ordered army and 
air force to attack major centres, including the Presidential and Darul Aman palaces. It is 
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noteworthy that it was the first time that the heavy weapons and bombers were utilized to 
pummel targets in Kabul. In addition, the resistance of Najibullah’s loyal forces, 
particularly the Presidential Guard defeated the plan of Shahnawaz Tanai coup. 
Failure of the coup weakened the position of the Khalq faction in the army and increased 
power and authority of the Parchamis in the party, army, and government. In addition, the 
remarkable issue was that these officers were mostly supporters of Karmal and their 
increasing power after the failure of the coup led to overthrow Najibullah’s government. 
They expelled him from his seat of government, the party leadership, and the General 
Command of the armed forces, as well as, he was forced to depart to the United Nations as 
refugees, fugitive and failed leader. 
After the failure of the Tanai coup, the Parcham faction was divided into many categories 
and was involved in internal disagreements. In addition to Karmal’s supporters, many the 
Parchamis in the party and government expressed strong opposition to Najibullah’s 
government. Alexander Lyakhovsky believed that the main cause of internal conflict was 
hegemony of the Pashtun. As was mentioned earlier, during the rule of Taraki and 
especially Amin the Khalq faction conducted the Pashtunization policy adopted by the 
government. During Najibullah’s government, the tendency toward the Pashtunization 
policy was engulfed the government, army, and the Parcham faction. For instance, the 
overwhelming majority of master and associate members of the Political Bureau of the 
Party Central Committee, administrators and the Council of Ministers, senior officers and 
generals were Pashtun. This policy provoked aggression and reactivity of representatives 
of tribal communities, who the majority of them constituted the lower and middle ranks of 
the armed forces. The battle over the leadership of the party along with ethnic and 
factional fighting has intensified, which led the government to a complete collapse 
(Lyakhovsky 1995, 51). In fact, dissenting factions within the PDPA especially in the 
Parcham faction increasingly surrounded Najibullah, moreover, his government was 
always in challenge as a result of the conspiracy and sabotage. It is remarkable that 
Najibullah was unable to rule regardless of the factional orientation and ethnic and 
linguistic tendencies.  
It could be argued that after withdrawing Karmal from leadership of the party and 
government, and also handling his supporters within the Parcham faction, Najibullah's 
policy and function were not very balanced and consistent. Sometimes he imprisoned 
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them, and sometimes gave them the Ministry and the presidency. In the shadow of such 
policy, he concurred in Karmal’s return from Moscow to Kabul, which led to the 
escalation of hostilities within the Parcham faction and weakening of his position in the 
party leadership and government. Karmal’s supporters that hated Najibullah and a number 
of them were held in contempt and jail by the government, considered Karmal’s presence 
in Kabul as an opportunity to handle Najibullah. Thus, once again within the Parcham 
faction there was confusion and the government encountered with crisis in dealing with 
Karmal and his adherents.  
Najibullah was determined to continue his leadership in the party and government. He 
consolidated foundations of his authority by dismissing and rejecting of his opponents in 
the military and security forces, and appointing some trusted person in the structure of 
government. Nevertheless, the failed coup of August 1991 in the Soviet Union and its 
consequences made non-functional all of these efforts. It is noteworthy to mention that 
failure of the Soviet extremists’ coup also deprived Karmal of returning to the seat in the 
party leadership and governance. Overall, the failed coup of August 1991 for Karmal and 
Najibullah had the same and similar results. The Soviet Union and the Russian Federation 
on separate boards made several direct negotiations with Mujahidin, which severely 
weakened Najibullah’s position and his government. Tension and division between 
representatives of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation were evident in the 
negotiation process. The Soviet government delegation has little influence in the 
negotiation process. Finally, their negotiations led to the adoption of a joint declaration in 
which was approved the transfer of power to the transitional Islamic Government. 
Furthermore, for new Russian rulers led by Boris Yeltsin was very important to release 
from responsibility of supporting Najibullah’s government in Kabul. 
Najibullah was very concerned regarding declaration of ceasing the Soviet civilian and 
military aid, and even he was of the opinion that the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
equal to the collapse of the PDPA. Furthermore, factions and different sects of the PDPA 
had no desire to achieve the power and preserve the achievements of the Saur revolution 
since the party’s ideology and values that motivated them to attend and compete in the 
field of social and political struggles were faded. Accordingly, for leaders of party factions 
was very obvious that the Soviet collapse would lead to the PDPA collapse. 
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As was mentioned earlier, there is not a shadow of doubt that division and discord within 
the ruling PDPA were one of the main factors of its collapse. Additionally, this disunity 
was rooted in different factors and elements within the factions of the PDPA. Najibullah’s 
failed leadership was one of the main factors of escalation of conflict and hostility within 
the party. Furthermore, regardless of the reasons that provided causes of the failure of his 
leadership, he was incapable of providing the integration in the PDPA. In addition to the 
Khalqis’ hostility and conflict with him, he never could obtain the Parchamis’ trust and 
lost both factions of the party, and was involved in deep and widespread opposition within 
the party. It is worth pointing out that even National Guard, whose members mostly were 
from the government intelligence service, was not loyal to him. 
While the division and hostility within the PDPA and pressure from external enemies 
made extremely shaky and vulnerable the basic rule of the PDPA, being deprived of aid of 
the Soviet Union led to the collapse of its shaky foundations. In fact, the PDPA regime’s 
survival was dependent on the continuation of Soviet aid in all aspects of life of the 
regime. The party's survival in the seat of power after the collapse of Soviet Union and 
without the previous the Soviet military and economic aid was completely impossible. 
Signs of the collapse of the PDPA’s rule after the failed coup of August 1991 in Moscow 
were revealed. Besides, before the coup of August 1991 Soviet forces left Afghanistan and 
ceased their generosity to the PDPA. After the coup and especially after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin ceased completely the Soviet aids, which led the PDPA to 
collapse. In April 1992, the Mujahidin forces entered in capital and establishing an Islamic 
Council took control the situations in the country.  
 Analytic Summary  4.7.
The PDPA’s reform programme led to the failure due to various reasons, which are as 
follows: 
I. Intellectuals, highly educated people, and senior officers of the army founded 
the PDPA, whose policy was based on Stalinism. The Saur coup, which led to 
taking the control of the country by the party, was a Soviet plot. The Soviet 
Union was very content of running a communist party in Afghanistan; 
moreover, it sent plenty of aids, whereas in fact the military corps and state 
bureaucracy were benefited from the Soviet aids. The urban Society unlike the 
rural and tribal population supported the government. The internal rivalries and 
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conflicts in the Party, which caused the split in the party, and ethnic and 
religious contention in the Afghan society were very problematic issues for the 
government to rule efficiently over the people and directed the society towards 
a communist society.  
II. The PDPA’s reform attempts composed of a package of democratic reforms 
that emphasized on continuing the cooperation with the Soviet Union. In fact, 
the PDPA in cooperation with the Soviet Union conducted a series of radical 
reforms in order to help lower classes of society and move the country toward 
socialism. However, the reforms were against Afghan culture and many 
fundamental Islamic traditions. In fact, the PDPA’s government was a non-
Islamic system with non-Islamic reform programme, which could not be 
implemented in an Islamic and traditional society like Afghanistan. They 
interfered in local affairs of the people and endeavoured to modify or change 
them, which in a tribal society needs a long-term and fundamental planning. 
Furthermore, the PDPA as a Soviet puppet government brought the Soviet 
domination in the country (See Figure  5-2) and its reforms threatened interests 
of feudal lords and religious leaders. Disunity within the PDPA, ungodly and 
bureaucratic structure of the reforms, along with an imperialist subversion 
undermined the foundations of the PDPA. It demonstrates obviously that 
Stalinism policy was not able to unify all the strata of the society to handle 
entrenched reactionary matters. Furthermore, lack of an organized and powerful 
army weakened them in handling those whose interests were threatened by the 
PDPA’s reforms. Increasing civil war and having just one popular basis 
concentrated in Kabul deprived the government of having an independent 
organisation of the ordinary people. 
III. The PDPA’s policies not only made no specific development in the Afghan 
society, but also it even destroyed the government organizations founded by 
former states. The PDPA utilized coercive manners to implement its policies 
and did not consider approval or disapproval of the people. The PDPA’s 
government, like former Afghan governments, was not a popular and legitimate 
government and had no support from the local solidarity groups. Arresting, 
torturing and executing, which forced the people to leave the country, 
launching aggressive and repressive policies, and making decisions by a 
communist revolutionary programme regardless of the public sentiment 
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resulted in many popular uprising led by local leaders. Widespread resistance to 
the government plans in many provinces ceased implementing the 
government’s policies. Notwithstanding the modest modern programmes that 
were fundamentally urban, disintegration of the society and economy was more 
obvious and critical. This disintegration was in consequence of implementing 
Stalinist programme and convinced by the reasoning that the theory of 
independent bourgeois democratic development is not functional. In fact, in 
order to develop the society and improve people’s lives is necessary a 
significant increase in the productive forces, which did not happen during 
ruling the PDPA. 
IV. The PDPA’s government was incapable of containing the popular uprisings, 
which provide an opportunity to the Soviet to invade Afghanistan to preserve a 
friendly regime and frustrate imperialism’s plot. In fact, when the Afghan 
government’s interests were at stake, the government encouraged the Soviet to 
attack on Afghanistan in order to preserve its interests. Besides, the Soviet 
policy was based on intervention on the progressive matter of the Afghan civil 
war and there was no motivation and benefit for them to support and develop 
the PDPA reforms. Their invasion caused further controversy in the Afghan 
society; in fact, the Soviet in order to make further disagreement and disunity in 
the Afghan society imposed some social and military policies, which provoked 
the xenophobic sentiments of tribes and ethnic groups. Launching some 
economic policies by the Soviet resulted in deteriorating the life of poor people. 
These measures resulted in the public backlash, which confronted with 
arresting, torturing, hanging of dissidents, and bombarding.  
Subsequent chapter provides comparison of two epochs, analysis of facts in order to obtain 
findings of the study.  
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5. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
 
Figure ‎5-1: Structure of Chapter Five  
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 Introduction 5.1.
Having presented and discussed two cases of reform and resistance to the government in 
Afghanistan’s modern history in Chapters three and four, this Chapter intends to provide a 
comparative analysis of the mentioned cases, and also scrutinizes the foundations of 
reforms and causes of resistance to the government. 
 
The analysis is conducted according two stages. First, the PDPA’s and King Amanullah’s 
regimes are compared according to the governments’ structure, their reform projects, and 
roots of reaction to them. The model of the analysis is Macro-Level, which pursues 
comparative historical methodology and is destined to offer general classifications and 
characteristics that are typical of Afghan Society. The second stage of analysis is destined 
to set more meticulous comprehending of each regime’s function in conducting the reform 
programme, and also scrutinize causes and sorts of resistance that occurred during each 
regime. It is worth pointing out that a significant advantage of Macro-Level is assessment 
of the government function in handling internal and external resistance to the reforms and 
each government’s policies in this regard. 
This comparative analysis is destined to determine the main differences between a 
monarchical and a democratic system in implementing the reforms, and also inspect the 
external elements in the failure of the regimes’ reform projects. It is worth pointing out 
that the analysis is arranged to provide a wider perspective regarding the Afghan society, 
to demonstrate government’s function in increasing unity and consolidating its power to 
handle popular backlash against its policies. Finally, this chapter provides the meticulous 
result based on the analysis. 
 Comparative Analysis of Cases 5.2.
The cases discussed in second and third Chapters embraced two decades of Afghanistan 
modern history, during which the country saw a decade of Monarchy system of King 
Amanullah and another decade of the communist regime of the PDPA under the Soviet 
hegemony. 
These two regimes demonstrate a complete dissimilar basis for comparison that requires 
more meticulous scrutinising. Although each of them spans different political background, 
they had some substantial parallels. In both epochs, the authorities enforced their reform 
projects. Their ideological adherents were limited to the urban community, who were in 
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the minority and whose ideas were not compatible with the feelings and beliefs of the 
majority of the people.  
Both regimes implemented the reform programme by the top-down method, regardless of 
making adequate arrangements and conditions, and with no attention to comprehension 
and approval of those who could be affected by their reform policies. They had no 
regulated and institutional ties with the ordinary people in the rural and peripheral area and 
also were incapable of establishing a permanent agreement with the Afghan local 
solidarity groups.  
It goes without saying that both of the reform projects proposed to decrease the power of 
people in the rural and peripheral area. Consequently, aside from the military forces, both 
of regimes were supposed to establish their control of the local and tribal area in order to 
settle the disagreements and increase unity by making mutual concessions. Furthermore, in 
both cases, the primary causes of the public resistances to the governments was their 
intervention in the privet and local affairs of the people, moreover, the ideological 
motivations could be regarded as the secondary reasons.  
It is particularly significant that although the PDPA regime regarded King Amanullah as a 
pioneer, innovative, and modernist King, it did not consider his failure as a political 
experience in order to implement successfully their policies. As was mentioned earlier the 
PDPA regime’s main characteristic was its brutal crimes and inhuman policies, which 
distinguished it from Amanullah’s government.  
It is particularly remarkable that getting huge amount of financial aids and also political 
support from the Soviet Union, which assisted the PDPA to be on the political scene 
following the Soviet collapse, could be regarded as another sign of differences between the 
PDPA’s and Amanullah’s regimes. An overall analysis of both cases illustrates some 
substantial points regarding two regimes (See Table  5-1).  
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 Form of 
regime 
Nature of 
Regime 
Religion Regime 
Transition 
Foreign 
factor 
Dependency Public trust 
in the 
government 
Status 
of 
reforms 
Basis of 
Resistance 
Amanullah’s 
regime 
indigenous monarchy Islam Struggling Great 
Britain 
Independent Semi-
popular 
Failed Tribal 
PDPA’s 
regime 
Foreign Democracy Secular Coup The 
Soviet 
Union 
Dependent unpopular Failed Ethnic 
 
Table ‎5-1: Comparative Analysis of two cases 
As was mentioned previously the outstanding point regarding comparison of the two 
regimes is that the policy of both of them was very influenced by foreign policy. It is quite 
clear that the Great Game during the Amani era and the Cold War during the PDPA 
fulfilled functional role in the Afghan government policy and in conducting its reform 
projects. As the table number 1 shows the king’s regime was a monarchy system while the 
PDPA authorities claimed that their rule was on the foundation of democracy, which 
deserves deliberation and discussion. It goes without saying that the king’s policies were 
based on Islamic Issues, nonetheless the PDPA regime was secular and endeavoured to 
replace religious and traditional laws with secular and Marxist-Leninist ideas (Tabarani 
2011, 88).  
In both cases, the processes of coming to power were associated with struggle and 
challenge caused by internal and external factors, and it severely affected the process of 
the state-making. During the rule of King Amanullah, the internal factors were tribal, 
religious, and intellectual elites while for the PDPA’s era, in addition to these factors, 
communists and Mujahidin could be regarded as the further obstacle factors. It could be 
argued that regarding handling the external factors King’s policies comparing the PDPA’s 
ones were independent. In fact, the king always endeavoured to decrease the British 
involvement and domination, nonetheless the PDPA regime was, in fact, a Soviet puppet.  
It is worth pointing out that the adopted policies by both regimes were regardless of public 
desires, which could be regarded as one of the chief causes of the failure of their policies 
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and collapse of their governments. Furthermore, Amanullah’s regime was an indigenous 
regime while the PDPA had foreign roots and the majority of its authority members had 
been trained in the Soviet Union. It is noteworthy that both regimes took advantage of 
Islam to obtain legitimacy and also implement their policies in the country. It is quite clear 
that Amanullah’s Pan-Islamist movement was to unify Muslims against colonial powers 
and achieve full political independence for Afghanistan. Additionally, he wanted to use 
pan-Islamism in order to modernize Afghanistan and implement his reforms.  
In addition, the regimes endeavoured to win people’s trust; nonetheless, they were 
unsuccessful in this matter. Even though for the Afghan authority was essential to receive 
the support of the tribal, religious and intellectual elites, they aggressively and 
oppressively forced the people to follow their policies. It could be argued that the 
governments in order to fulfil their own goals changed Afghan traditional structure and 
thus made deep gaps in the society. It is quite clear that those who were in ruling system 
substantially benefited from their position while the other people did not have even right to 
express their opinion. 
In summary, this introductory analysis of the two cases demonstrates subtle distinctions 
between the two cases in implementing their policies and governments’ function in 
handling religious forces. (See Table  5-1) Repeating Amanullah’s political blunder by the 
PDPA and disregarding of experience of 50 years earlier is recognizable. Furthermore, 
Islam was a permanent motive of political movements, opposition to the external 
intervention, and reaction against antireligious policies that were imposed by the king’s 
and the PDPA’s regimes. 
 Analysing Government Functions 5.3.
The monarchical of King Amanullah and the democratic regime of the PDPA had different 
function in conducting reform programmes and handling solidarity groups and irregular 
forces that steadfastly resisted the governments’ modernizing policies. It is quite clear that 
King Amanullah was based on the Rationalism and Westernization, however, the PDPA 
was a Marxist state. Although the PDPA ideologically was democratic and nationalist in 
the beginning, in 1978 it got Marxist-Leninist orientation. 
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5.3.1. Monarchical regime 
The characteristics of the international situation of Afghanistan after the First World War 
forced King Amanullah to provide a specific consideration to the foreign policy. 
Accordingly, he attained full independence in the country as a first substantial step. It is 
worth pointing out that releasing Afghanistan from the British hegemony appeared to be 
very critical due to changing international situation, which was in consequence of social 
and political instability in all British India and also Great Britain. However, in order to 
implement this issue a series of policies such as sending political envoys to other nation 
and establishment political and trade relations with other countries. It is quite clear that 
public support encouraged him to take decisive action and gave him confidence to declare 
war to gain Afghanistan’s independence. Thus, he equipped the army and sent military 
troops to East and South side (Ghobar 1981, 753). The remarkable point in this regard is 
that he requested Ulema to assist him in the war; simultaneously he armed ethnic and 
national forces. Indeed, he comprehended that without getting support from religious 
forces and local solidarity groups withdrawing foreign forces would be very impossible.  
King Amanullah, at the beginning of his rule, conducted a pan-Islamic military policy. 
Soon after his accession, an attempt was made to improve relations between Afghanistan 
and its neighbour Bukhara. In this regard, Afghanistan suggested Bukhara that alliance of 
the Muslim community was essential for the people of Bukhara, Afghanistan, and for the 
rest of the Muslim world. In order to encouraged Bukhara, Afghanistan emphasized that in 
its contract with Russia would be provided to recognize the independence of Bukhara. 
Thus, King tried to prepare a coalition with the neighbouring countries to handle the 
British colonialism. 
It is worth pointing out that Egyptians regarded Amanullah as a democratic and nationalist 
King. They believed that his policies would be the best solution to obtain freedom and 
stand against British colonialism for them and the Eastern people. It is quite clear that 
Egyptians admiring the king wanted him to express his abhorrence for the Egyptian King 
and British colonialism.
1
 
It is particularly significant that along with the raising the independence campaign, King 
Amanullah formed his positions as an anti-imperialist figure in the Muslim world and at 
                                                          
1
 For further information see: Fazl Ghani Mojaddedi, Afghanistan during the Kingdom of Amanullah Khan, 
p.330. 
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the beginning of his rule he followed the militant pan-Islamic policies. Furthermore, he 
supported the caliphate against threat from the British and the Bolsheviks, and he assisted 
Amir of Bokhara and Turkestan Basmachis in handling the Bolsheviks. 
The Bolsheviks seized Bukhara and Khiva in September 1920; however, King Amanullah 
did not allow them to establish the centre of their campaign against the British in Kabul. 
Notwithstanding the first Afghan-Soviet friendship treaty signed on November 28, 1921, 
following concluding the treaty, the Bolsheviks did not implement the obligations, and in 
this regard, the king believed that they certainly were not trustworthy (Stewart, Fire in 
Afghanistan 2005, 32). Indeed, Amanullah comprehended that neither the Bolsheviks nor 
the British had good intention to Afghanistan; however, he was forced to deal with the 
Bolsheviks in order to attain their support to affirm Afghanistan’s international situation. It 
goes without saying that the king’s efforts to make an alliance with the Bolsheviks in order 
to put pressure on Britain increased the British hostility to him. Nonetheless, the essential 
reason for Britain’s detestation of the king was the third Anglo-Afghan war, which 
effectuated the independence of Afghanistan. Further, the king believed that Afghanistan 
as a free country had the right to have a close relationship with neighbouring countries. 
Accordingly, he encouraged Indian Muslims to refuse to Britain rule that led to Britain’s 
grave dissatisfaction with him. In fact, such policies resulted the Britain commenced 
taking decisive steps to eliminate the Afghan king from the political scene. 
It is likely that Amanullah’s Pan-Islamist movement was in order to unify the Muslim 
world against colonial rule and gain full political independence for Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, he sought to take advantage of pan-Islamism in order to modernize 
Afghanistan and execute his reforms. In fact, the roots of his Pan-Islamism policy were 
essentially connected to Mahmud Tarzi’s thoughts that encouraged Muslims to be united to 
withdraw the British colonization from Muslim territories.  
It could be argued that independence and the rule of law in the country were of the highest 
importance and priority among the goals of the constitution movement, based on which the 
constitutionalists had to remove internal barriers to achievement these goals (Ghobar 1981, 
726). 
It goes without saying that King Amanullah comprehended a grave menace to the 
Caliphate and the Islamic world from the western world, thus he made some efforts to 
unite all Muslims especially in Afghanistan. He opposed racial and ethnic prejudice and 
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believed that all people had the same right and nobody had superiority over another one 
(Pamir 2002, 107).  
At the end of the third decade of the twentieth century, Afghanistan was one of the most 
backward countries in the Middle East. Although Abdul Rahman Khan could establish the 
substructure of the modern state of Afghanistan within its boundaries, he made it by the 
feudal and autocratic methods, which often disregarded tribal-cultural principles and the 
most common human values. His successor, Habibullah, was interested in public affairs 
and in a series of political and educational innovation, especially regarding the 
development of the modern educational institutions, made some efforts. However, at the 
end of his reign the development process was halted in Afghanistan. It is likely that the 
main elements that the government was supposed to handle them were included the 
remnants of feudalism, the commanders, nobles and property owners, the religious 
scholars and foreign policy makers that were leading from London. Nonetheless, in 1919, 
Amanullah and Afghan constitutionalists were compelled to modify and change everything 
immediately, and modification of all social mechanisms and the governance structure 
required a large arrangement. 
It is worth pointing out that the political system in Afghanistan since the configuration of 
an independent state in 1747 had been based on monarchy. The main factors that had led 
the country to disorder and instability were monopoly power and inter-tribal rivalry 
between Pashtuns. Furthermore, discrimination and injustice hindered the Afghan society 
from getting any kind of freedom. The existence of the colonial phenomenon in 
Afghanistan impeded setting relations with any other country, except Britain. It could be 
argued that the old colonial political dominance in Afghanistan, internal despotism of 
rulers, lack of communication with the outside world, and finally political, cultural, and 
intellectual isolation of Afghan community resulted in backwardness of different parts of 
the country and led to undesirable consequences. King Amanullah, in order to develop and 
modernize Afghanistan, changed the political and social structure. There is not a shadow 
of doubt that the political reforms of the king could be regarded as the most critical step in 
changing the governance structure with the purpose of releasing the country from its 
dramatic situation. Indeed, Afghanistan’s political and social structure due to having tribal 
and ethnic character was very complicated, and the King comprehended in the process of 
modification the local solidarity groups could fulfil a consequential function in this regard.  
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King Amanullah followed the principle of constitutionalism that assisted him to reach the 
position of authority and foundation a new political system was the king’s primary goal. 
Afghan young movement’s objectives besides gaining full political independence, was 
reform in administration and the formation of a constitutional government, based on which 
the king was not absolute and people had role in policy-making for the country. It is 
sometimes suggested that the constitutionalists substantially established the background of 
free criticism and judgment against the government at least in the first stage of the reform 
programme. 
Amanullah comprehending the significance of the national unity considered a special 
proposal to realize it in the first stage of his reform programme. Establishing an 
independent state and avoiding from tribalism and issues related to the legitimacy were 
under the king’s careful consideration. It is worth pointing out that King Amanullah was 
beholden to his liberation comrades for accompaniment of national unity; moreover, the 
attainment of political independence demonstrated a preferable tendency toward the 
objects of intellectuals and reformists.  
Before the reign of Amanullah, the absolute sovereignty of Kings had resulted in 
establishing the totalitarian regimes and arising autocratic rulers that disregarded the 
subjection to any law and regulation. During the Amani era the reformers attempted to 
establish the rule of law, thus the ordinary citizens and governors were under the rule of 
law and based on the national passion the principles of freedom, democracy, and equality 
of citizens were stabilized. With the purpose of realizing such objects, intellectuals and 
reformers endeavoured to prepare Afghanistan’s first constitution. It could be argued that 
in planning such policy the tribal and ethnic background of the Afghan society was 
completely disregarded, due to which in the process of implementing the Afghan new 
constitution the society did not have adequate background to comprehend it. 
In 1922, it was formed a Loya Jirga in Jalalabad, headed by King Amanullah, in order to 
ratify the primary constitution. Furthermore, in 1923, Afghanistan’s first constitution was 
ratified in 73 articles, it was titled “Afghan state constitution”, and later in Paghman Loya 
Jirga it was approved (See Appendix A). It is particularly significant that in the new 
constitution for the first time, state power were defined based on separation of legislative, 
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executive and judiciary powers (Habibi 1984, 222).
1
 It goes without saying that approval 
of the constitution was the initial stage in the termination of the rule of personal interests in 
the society. (Danesh 2004, 54-58) 
It is quite clear that when King Amanullah regarded western models of considering 
honesty and integrity in performing duties, opposition to his theory was emerged in 
consequence of incompatibility of such theory with individual interests. Elimination of the 
bias and anti-bias system and the phenomenon of favouritism were under his special 
consideration. In this regard, he interrupted pension of some member of Mohammadzai 
and other influential Ulema. Furthermore, he imprisoned one of his relatives with the 
purpose of demonstrating the people that all were equal before the law and nobody was 
superior to another, and any action against the law would be punished according to law. It 
is worth pointing out that local solidarity groups not only did not support the king, but also 
he was criticized by virtue of deviating from ethnic and tribal obligations. It could be 
argued that launching these policies by King Amanullah severely threatened the position 
and interest of the influential persons in tribal communities, which provided the 
background of their reaction. 
The king, collaborating with the young reformist Afghans and some Turkish and Indian 
experts, conducted some policies to regulate and adjust the state in order to release from 
the old tribal and ethnic system (See Figure  3-3) and establish a modern administrative 
state. Accordingly, he established the state structure based on the three branches, including 
legislative, judicial, and executive. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the 
modern administrative from the beginning was doomed to failure in consequence of 
disregarding the principles of the local and solidarity groups. For instance, the judiciary 
system of the King was based on a modern system, which was in striking contrast with the 
local judiciary system. In this regard, Tapper believed that the King wanted to establish a 
new state with no consideration to tribal and local rule (Tapper 1983, 37). 
It is worth pointing out that this combination had its own characteristics. Indeed, with the 
exception of the judiciary sector there was no considerable difference in comparison with 
the substructures of the previous systems. Thus, in the legislative sector, “Dar al Shora”, 
by adjusting changed into “Shora e Khas” (the special council) and later called “Shora e 
Dowlat” (the council). The council was comprised of members appointed by the king and 
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 For further information see: Sarvar, Danesh, An introduction to adoption of the new constitution of 
Afghanistan, p. 54-58. 
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elected members. It had responsibility for examining the legal projects and sending them 
to the king through the council of ministers for validation and confirmation (Ghobar 1981, 
1248-49). Indeed, the King established a new administration in which the function of the 
King was as the previous administration systems, but the previous influence of the 
religious and tribal leaders was eliminated. 
Before this era, the judiciary was apparently autonomous, but practically it could be 
regarded as parts of the servant of King, moreover, the judges were under subjugation of 
King. In the new constitutional law, judicial independence was still held in esteem, but 
nevertheless the wide discretion of the judges was limited. King Amanullah compiled two 
volume books, which called “Tamasok al Ghozat Amanieh” and codified criminal codes.1 
Such influence of Amanullah in the Judiciary system especially after 1923 demonstrates 
that a totalitarian authority was ruling in Afghanistan. He claimed to respect principles of 
freedom, however, practically he disregarded the tribal and religious principles in ratifying 
the new justice rules.  
It is worth pointing out that the reforms in the field of educational and cultural system of 
the country could be regarded as the most outstanding part of Amanullah’s reforms. 
Opening schools and the training of technical people were very significant steps to extend 
the public education system and thus he endeavoured to establish the foundation of a 
modern and civil society. It is particularly significant that the educational reforms were 
conducted with the intention of development of young intellectuals in the country, training 
the technical staff in different fields of science and technology, and finally training 
efficient and skilled labour (Fayyaz 2010, 101). 
One of the obvious characteristics of this era was spreading the idea of freedom, 
liberalism, and modernity. Due to attract foreign experts and scholars in Afghanistan and 
creating cultural connection with the other countries the government made the people 
familiar with the lifestyle in the developing countries. Furthermore, owing to the king’s 
support and consideration to writers and reformists, who made several efforts for the 
development and progress of the country, the previous oppressive political and social 
atmosphere was removed, and the reformists prepared the conditions for establishing an 
open and obvious society. 
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 For further information see: Mir Gholam Mohammad Ghobar, Afghanistan dar masire tarikh, [Afghanistan 
in the Course of History], vol. 1, pp.1248-1249. 
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Language titivation, diversity in literary genres and the press comparing previous epochs 
were widespread, which increased the impact of the press on human growth. Furthermore, 
personal publication resulted in increasing the number of journalists in Kabul, and the 
press provided further information to the people on the different field (Naderi 2007). In 
fact, in this period publishing the press was based on social, economic, and political 
requirements. The king was decisive to modernize Afghanistan in all fields, which 
required the responsible press for elucidating for the people the necessity of launching 
such policies (Naderi 2007). 
As it was mentioned earlier, King Amanullah with the purpose of adjusting Afghanistan’s 
domestic policies conceived the national unity and endeavoured to assist the Afghan 
society to release from fundamentalism. In this regard, his government granted religious 
and intellectual freedom to all Afghan people regardless ethnic and racial variety. 
Furthermore, he drew his attention to social equality and emphasized on the equal right for 
all citizens. In the new constitution, it was stated in eight articles that all Afghans without 
religious supremacy were regarded Afghan citizens with equal rights. It was mentioned in 
the ninth article that the Afghan people are allowed to commit their religious affairs and 
had their personal rights and freedoms.
1
 (See Appendix A) Afterwards, Shiite religious 
ceremonies and their religious places were allowed and Hazara slaves were released from 
slavery (Ghobar 1981, 1274). 
The king without indicating to any sect of Islam declared Islam as the official religion of 
Afghanistan. Nonetheless, in the second Loya Jirga, the king was forced to recognize the 
Hanafi sect in the new constitution as a result of the pressure from some Sunnite scholars. 
Notwithstanding the king revealed intention to recognize Shia, in consequence of extreme 
Sunnite scholars’ opposition he was discouraged to recognize it (Davoudi, Zamine va 
pishinehe eslah talabi dar Afghanistan, [Background and History of the Reform Movement 
of Afghanistan] 2000, 181-182). 
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the first stage of the reforms was prosperous 
and all reformists were concurred with the manner of implementing the reforms. It is worth 
pointing out that modification of the tax system and subsequently releasing the majority of 
the people such as farmers, livestock and artisan from paying heavy taxes, was the most 
critical reform for the reformists. This reform enraged the khans and landowners because 
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 For further information see: Mir Gholam Mohammad Ghobar, Afghanistan dar masire tarikh, [Afghanistan 
in the Course of History], vol. 1, p. 1274. 
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monetary tax was imposed on lands and all people could directly pay the tax. Accordingly, 
the people were linked to financial offices of the government without interference of 
Khans. It could be argued that this matter forced the Khans and chieftains to oppose land 
reform programme that threatened their influential positions among people.  
It is worth pointing out that many factors, such as increasing tax, changing in penal codes 
and family law motivated the Khost people. Subsequent to third Afghan war, Britain cut 
the financial aid to Afghanistan. Furthermore, in consequence of the mentioned war the 
government had to deal with very high costs. Accordingly, the government increased taxes 
as well as in the new constitution changed the tax law. Thus, the government imposed 
taxes on the landowners. 
It is noteworthy that the new system of collecting tax created a further opportunity for 
corruption among the government officials despite being modelled on the western taxation 
system and being annihilated any possibility for corruption. According to Ghobar, the king 
organized an inspection team to examine the new system of collecting, as well as the 
mentioned team was successful in handling tax-collecting process (Ghobar 1981, 691). 
It is particularly significant that ordinary people regarded Amanullah’s social reforms as a 
direct intervention in the most privet aspects of their life such as marriage, funeral, and 
prohibiting wearing some costumes. Besides, people were very resentful of the reform 
programs as a result of the government policy on compulsory military service and its 
policy regarding identity card. Indeed, the military authority of the Afghan tribes was 
weakened by the policy of obligatory military service, as well as the policy of issuing 
identity card for all Afghans controlled child marriage and polygamy. In consequence of 
the mentioned policies, many people expressed their dissatisfaction and reacted to the 
reform program.  
Conspiracy and adverse publicity against the government during the king’s trip to Europe 
was one of the critical issues that his government was supposed to handle it. It goes 
without saying that British elements played a significant function in running the 
propaganda and provoking the people against the government. As it was mentioned 
previously, the British lost their influence in Afghanistan after third Afghan war. They, 
therefore, always endeavoured to find an opportunity to weaken the foundations of the 
government, which had a very destructive consequence in the government’s reform 
programme. There is a school of thoughts that beyond all acts the British secret police 
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organization Britain focused on weakening Amanullah’s position in Afghanistan. Despite 
all of these obstacles and complications made by internal and external factors, the king 
with the new ideas, taken in the meeting with Kemal Pasha in Ankara, initiated a new 
stage of reform programs (Nehru 2007, 1665-66). 
The king’s reforms before his trip were relatively basic and fundamental and they were 
successful and pretty well received by the people. All the reforms of the first and second 
stages such as approving a new constitution, organizing the education system, changing 
the structure of the government were implemented in cooperation with intellectual and 
knowledgeable people. In addition, the last stage of the reforms was imitation of western 
culture and it was completely perfunctory, as well as some reformers opposed some of 
them. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the king’s haste in the implementation 
of the reforms led to performing cursory actions in the country, which soon became 
susceptible to a negative consequence.
1
 
It is remarkable that approving of some new legislation in Loya Jirga that happened in 
Paghman in 1928, irritated Mullahs and provoked their discontent and changed them to be 
upset and confused (Ghobar 1981, 1276). Likewise, intellectuals were angry with King 
Amanullah by virtue of his stubborn refusal in handling some matters such as having 
Chancellery Ministers and missing responsibility for government ministers in the national 
assembly.  
It could be argued that King Amanullah accurately recognized the problem and suggested 
the accurate solution, which was improving the educational system and preparing the 
qualified forces as the political, economic, and cultural substructures of the country. 
Accordingly, he founded and developed the new style schools and conducted some 
educational planning with the purpose of training the skilled forces. Nonetheless, in the 
manner of conducting of these policies he was not proficient to find a suitable model for 
Afghan society, moreover, he was not able to make plans for conducting such model. He 
strongly believed that all the western developed countries at that time might be a proper 
model for progress in the country. 
It is worth mentioning that Amanullah’s critical position against a number of influential 
people in the Afghan society like Mullahs and tribal leaders could be regarded as the most 
                                                          
1
 For further information see: Mir Gholam Mohammad Ghobar, Afghanistan dar masire tarikh, [Afghanistan 
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noteworthy indication that demonstrated his failure to deal with the local solidarity groups, 
especially after European trip. The British colonialism with the purpose of profiting from 
such elements directed the general tendency towards Mullahs and Molavis in the closed 
and tribal society of Afghanistan. As a case in point, they excommunicated the believers of 
the other religions, which were apparently for protecting Islam, whereas in fact it was for 
provoking the people to arise against the king’s policies, impeding the reform process and 
regaining their lost privileges. It should be indicated that one of the stipulations of the 
cease-fire on December 29
th
, 1928, that was underlined by the insurgents was that in 
exception for Britain diplomatic representation, all the rest diplomatic representation had 
to be closed
 
(Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 2005, 84-216), which demonstrates the British 
exerted a strong influence on the opposition. 
The disapproval of the influential and spiritual family of Shor Bazaar and their coalition 
with the other tribes in opposite to the government’s policies and reforms performed a 
significant function in overthrowing Amanullah’s government. In fact, the mentioned 
coalition and subsequent uprisings in the country kept the king and the other Afghan 
constitutionalists and reformists inactivated for five decades. 
Investigation into the reasons for rebellions and failure of Amanullah’s policies is subject 
to analysis of its complicated and abstruse factors. It is a fact that the rebellions interrupted 
and slowed down the reform processes, and eventually overthrew the king’s government. 
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the failure of reform should be regarded apart from the 
collapse of his government. In order to discover whether the reforms resulted in rebellions 
or they were failed by rebellions, several causes of rebellions and their contrasts to what 
was stated by religious opponents of King Amanullah should be regarded. 
There are those who maintain that the king’s reforms could not be considered as the actual 
cause of uprisings. Even the people cooperated with the king on conducting the process of 
the reforms, but nevertheless the issue that provoked their resistance to reforms were the 
troubles in conducting the reforms and existence of some dishonest individuals within the 
government. In addition, the state apparatus and local rulers were involved in the fire of 
rebellions.
1
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 For further information see: Fazl Ghani Mojaddedi, Afghanistan during the kingdom of Amanullah Khan, 
p.221. 
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It is likely that one of the effective propaganda tools for the government’s dissidents was 
some parts of reform programme. Some social and cultural reforms, especially those that 
were related to customs and traditions, were the reasonable excuse for the government’s 
dissidents to react against its policies. They regarded these reforms as the principal 
motivation for emerging public backlash against the government’s policies and toppling 
the regime. 
As it was mentioned earlier the Social reforms were the effective tools of propaganda, 
however the ordinary people that were not influenced by the reforms and had no 
knowledge and experience regarding them were deluded by many misleading policies. 
Further, the reforms intervened in the sensitive issues such as intellectual and doctrinal 
issues and family affairs, which in the tribal society due to traditional values were very 
significant and sensitive. In consequence of such issues, Amanullah’s dissidents 
condemned him account of ignoring Afghans’ beliefs. 
In addition, there are those who maintain that the main parts of the problems were 
connected to the social reforms, which was confirmed by many researchers regardless of 
any consideration of the most significant reasons for rebellions (Poullada 1973, 146-147). 
One of the most significant criticisms of the reforms of King Amanullah is regarding the 
changes that happened in the military system. The king believed that the era of military 
war had been terminated already and the scientific war had been initiated, which allowed 
some people to find fault with him. The king reduced the military expenditure and the 
number of military forces. In this regard, his dissidents believed that in order to implement 
successful reforms a strong military system were essential. They likewise argued that lack 
of a strong military system was one of the main reasons for failure of the reform attempts 
and collapse of the government.  
Furthermore, the king was of the opinion that by justifying and arguing would attract 
people’s support and contribution to steer the country towards development. At least in the 
first stage of his reform programme, he was against using violence and force to implement 
his policies, thus he made many attempts to attain the general approval for his progressive 
plans. Additionally, he severely opposed developing the military system and excessive 
spending in this section. It is likely that he did not want to weaken the military system 
while he was decisive to adjust the military system to the requirements of a developed 
government and adapt it to his ideals. The methods that were utilized by the Afghan king 
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to conduct the reform policies could be examined, whereas in fact there is no uncertainty 
regarding the adequacy of his reform programme (Poullada 1973, 112). 
It could be argued that the guidelines of the government for political interactions with 
other countries slightly achieved the favourable outcomes and thus it was provided the 
conditions of gaining foreign assistance for conducting the reform programme and 
modernizing the economic, social, political status of the country. King Amanullah roughly 
estimated the true cost to implement the reform process, and some critical issues forced 
him to seek for foreign aids. Based on a document dated 26
th
 December 1923 from the 
U.S. National Archives, the king had sufficient financial resources to implement his reform 
programme, but nevertheless some parts of the mentioned resources were spent in the 
Khost rebellion (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan1914-1929: The First Opening to the West 
Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000, 337).
 
 
It is obvious that making fundamental changes in the economic and social aspects in 
Afghanistan required that the king in addition to consolidating his political power 
endeavoured to obtain the essential supports. Accordingly, the king’s trip could provide 
the conditions for development of welfare and increasing the effective speed at which the 
reform programme might be implemented (Aman-e-Afghan 1927). Additionally, attraction 
of the industrial circles of some European countries and some contracts with the western 
companies to found railways and mine the mineral resources, could be regarded in 
consequence of the mentioned trip. Furthermore, in the process of attraction foreign aids 
and assistances in the country there was strict observance of the principles of national 
independence, however, the extent of its achievement is debatable.  
The king’s dissident, therefore, criticized him for enforcing the new laws, which as it were 
indicated previously, was in striking contrast with Shariah. New constitution, marriage 
law, criminal and commercial codes, women’s education, tax law were the critical issues, 
discussed in detail in the Loya Jirga, in 1924. As it was previously indicated, the 
mentioned Loya Jirga , which was established as a result of Khost uprising, was strongly 
penetrated by religious scholars. They took advantage of the problems of the government 
as an opportunity to argue that the government’s policies were to blame. It is worth 
pointing out that the dissidents opposed government’s interference in religious matters, 
and therefore requested repeal of all laws that in their idea were contradicted Hanafi 
jurisprudence. Furthermore, some of them suggested preparing new criminal codes 
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according to Islamic Fatwa in order to implement it instead of Tamasok al Ghozat. It is 
likely that Ulema’s aggressive position and serious requests demonstrated their remarkable 
concerns about the modifications of the legal system. They likewise demanded restoration 
of judges’ rights regarding determining the punishment arguing that determining the 
punishment before committing the crime was contrary to Shariah and the Qur’an. Indeed, 
based on principles of Shariah, kind and quantity of punishment were contingent upon 
different issues. They proposed that the judges based on reasonable evidence and well-
documented reasons and their own knowledge issued sentences (Kateb 1923, 318). They 
likewise had the same idea regarding determining duration of imprisonment before the 
crime, which was contrasted with Hanafi jurisprudence (Kateb 1923, 314).  
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the king was not against religion; however, 
he was of the opinion that some people utilized the religion as a means of achieving their 
own political and economic goals. One of the king’s momentous religious policies was 
educating Mullahs, regardless of considering the religious sensitivity in the Afghan 
society. Furthermore, he wanted to reduce Mullahs’ power in educational and judicial 
system and endeavoured to control the army, which was under the influence of Mullahs, 
and its strategies were conducted based on their interests. It goes without saying that 
launching these policies was very essential to handle the Afghan society with the modern 
world (Poullada 1973, 154-147). However, in consequence of implementing such policies 
not only the government lost the support from local solidarity groups, but also they became 
the opponent of the government and the main obstacle to its reform programme. 
Olivier Roy is of the opinion that launching the policy of modernizing the Afghan society 
by King Amanullah confused his relationships with influential Muslim religious scholars. 
It is particularly significant that this point could be regarded as the termination of the Pan-
Islamism alliance by virtue of differences of opinion among them regarding balancing the 
religion with modernisation. From the point of view of fundamentalist religious scholars, 
defending of Islam was leading the society to attain Islamic values; however, the king 
regarded the issue of defending of Islam as a political issue of anti-imperialism and argued 
that the consequential policy to develop the Afghan society could be tendency towards the 
western values (Roy 1992, 100-101). Afghan people, in consequence of their xenophobic 
sentiments, opposed such ideas and they, therefore, endeavoured to impede the process of 
anti-religion and anti-tradition reforms. 
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It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Amanullah’s policies in the independence 
war resulted in increasing his popularity and attaining the legitimacy. His primary policy 
opposed foreign hegemony, especially British colonialism, and supported Pan-Islamism 
and nationalism. Subsequent to achieving independence, he continued supporting the 
Caliphate and the Indian liberation movements. In addition, the king, following making the 
peace agreement with Britain and consolidating his political position, initiated improving 
Afghanistan’s friendship with its powerful neighbours. It is worth pointing out that 
transformations in central Asia, failure of Amir of Bukhara, killing Anwar Pasha, and 
abolition of the Caliphate that occurred outside the country strongly influenced the 
developments in Afghanistan. 
It is likely that groupings within the government conducted by foreign powers, sabotage of 
court members, and the exploitation of the beliefs of the people resulted in declining the 
foundation of the government. Difference of opinion, political groupings within the court 
regarding the government’s internal and external policies and rivalry among them could be 
regarded as the considerable factors that caused the collapse of the government from 
inside. 
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the British conspiracy should be regarded as 
the significant foreign factors in the collapse of Amanullah’s government. From the 
beginning, Great Britain’s agents planned many difficulties for him and they believed that 
his rise to power could be a grave threat to their interests. British spies in the early 1917 
reported growing nationalist struggles, liberal and anti-colonial ideas, increasing prince 
Amanullah Khan’s popularity and the probability of his rising to power (Adamec, 
Afghanistan, 1900-1923; a diplomatic history 1967, 108).
 
 
The majority of the people in the Foreign Ministry of British India believed that declaring 
independence of Afghanistan resulted in the termination of the previous personal and 
national contracts (British Secret Service Bureau, British Intelligence Agency foreign 
frontier branch, for the week ending October 1920 1920, Paragraph No. 712). The king, 
therefore, became the main obstacle for British agents to obtain their goals in Afghanistan 
and thus they always used to hatch several plots to overthrow him from the political scene. 
Ghobar is of the opinion that the British policy in Afghanistan either during the war or 
contribution policy pursued one strategy. The most ruinous point of the British strategy in 
Afghanistan was keeping the country under its control through the Afghan governments. 
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The British considering the xenophobic feelings in Afghanistan comprehended that in case 
of a direct interference the people could detect enemy’s footsteps and thus British policies 
would be faced with the public backlash. Accordingly, the best option for Britain was 
taking advantages of the internal factors in order to implement British policy under the 
name of an Afghan government (Ghobar 1981, 444-445). 
As it was mentioned earlier, Britain made many attempts to interrupt Afghanistan’s 
political relations with the other governments. The British agents seriously pursued this 
policy, especially after the attainment of independence of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, 
development of Afghanistan’s political relations with the countries was a priority for King 
Amanullah in formulating the foreign policy. Accordingly, with the purpose of introducing 
Afghanistan’s independent ambassador darwazi, the head of a delegation, was sent to 
Europe and America. It is worth pointing out that between 1921 and 1922, the Afghan 
government succeeded in making massive development in the political relations with 
European countries such as France, Italy, and Germany.
1 Abdul Samad Ghaus, believes 
that the king’s hostility to the British while good relationship with Russia and other 
European countries could be regarded as unorthodox foreign policy, which may have 
contributed to the downfall of his government in 1929. (Ghaus 1988, 47) 
There is not a shadow of doubt that the king’s diplomatic policy and developing 
Afghanistan’s relations was another action to undermine the British position in 
Afghanistan. Additionally, Great Britain with the purpose of frustrating ambassador 
darwazi’s activities averted the authorities of the other countries from acceptance the 
Afghan delegation. British ambassador in Paris declared the French that although 
Afghanistan had apparently obtained its independence, it was still under British influence. 
Further, they averted Italian authorities from making any relationship with Afghans, but 
nevertheless their attempts were ineffective.  
Despite the meeting between the Afghan delegation and Harding, which could be regarded 
as recognition of Amanullah’s sovereignty and Afghanistan’s independence, there was no 
relationship between America and Afghanistan, which demonstrated the British attempts to 
prevent the other country from making any relation with Afghanistan. Furthermore, 
ambassador darwazi on 2 July 1921 went to America and in New York, declaring that his 
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 For further information see: Inayatullah Shahrani, Burhanuddin Namagh. Shah Mohammad Wali 
Khandarwazi vakil al saltanehe Alahazrat Amanullah Khan Ghazi [Shah Mohammad Wali Khan Darwazi, 
Amir Amanullah’s representative], p.201. 
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mission to America was with the purpose of making diplomatic relationship between two 
countries, and Amanullah’s government expected America’s investment in Afghanistan 
(Ma’aroof 1987, 22). However, the King’s diplomatic activity could not be considered 
very effective in consequence of the British sabotage and destructive measures against 
Afghanistan.  
5.3.2. Democratic Regime 
Regarding the government’s function during the PDPA rule in Afghanistan, the first 
outstanding point is the Saur coup in Afghanistan that was the starting point of more than 
twenty years of the grave public backlash and internal conflicts that provided an 
opportunity for the Soviet to invade Afghanistan. Subsequent to the mentioned violent 
coup and its critical effects, the people of Afghanistan involved in a situation that required 
an urgent solution and emerged the uncompensated losses in political, cultural, economic, 
humanitarian conditions after the coup in the country. 
Communists with the intention of attracting the public support and obtain the legitimacy 
did not mention the name of the PDPA and its leaders in the first announcement and 
instead selected the title of Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. Even in the army, they 
endeavoured to obtain the support of the Muslim part of the military forces, as well as they 
planned to specify the coup consequences and goals. The revolutionary council on 30 
April exactly one day after the official announcement issued the first decree as The Decree 
Number One. 
“Though the PDPA had been beset by bitter factionalism almost from its inception, and 
had a small membership (less than half of 1 percent of the population), it was able to seize 
political power a scant 13 years after its establishment. The party's remarkable success was 
due to several factors. One was the faltering development of democratic political 
institutions in Afghanistan. Another was suppression, during President Mohammad 
Daoud's strongman rule (1973-78), of moderate and right-wing political parties, while at 
the same time tolerating the existence (in part because of Soviet pressure) of the Marxist 
PDPA as a semilegal [semi-legal] party. Taking advantage of its tolerated status, the PDPA 
grew in importance as the only publicly perceived opposition group. The failure of five 
moderate or rightist coup attempts against Daoud only served to further weakening of the 
non-communist opposition, leaving the field to the Marxists. Where in the 1960s rightist 
Moslem student organizations regularly reacted to leftist demonstrations with counter-
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demonstrations, by 1978 no rightist or centrist party or organization effectively existed in 
the country” (Amstutz 1986, 34). 
USA recognized the Saur coup as a nationalist and internal event and did not consider the 
Soviets’ significant role in it. Even Jimmy Carter discerned the new government in 
Afghanistan as an independent and autonomous government. Based on Americans’ 
impression the DRA was not a Communist government and Soviet Union performed no 
rule in the process of the Saur coup (The New York Times 1987, 18). It is worth pointing 
out that the America’s idea regarding the Soviet non-intervention policy in the Saur coup 
and the character of the coup can only be regarded in term of political justifications. In 
other respects, there are many evidences to demonstrate the Soviet’s intervention in the 
coup. It goes without saying that the communist character of the coup is very obvious that 
there is no need for further discussion.  
The PDPA’s reforms like Amanullah’s second and third stages of reforms were 
implemented hastily and were not concurred with the opinions and aspirations of the 
people. Thus, the new decrees could not provide the suitable conditions for establishing the 
communist rule and making social orders in the country. By issuing the first decrees of the 
new constitution, the people became deeply upset and confused by virtue of the unfamiliar 
terms in the official system, such as "the leader of the Democratic People", "the president 
revolutionary council", "the central committee". In addition, the people comprehended that 
it was not possible to take advantage of such terms to realize their requirements.  
It goes without saying that the PDPA abrogated the constitution of 1977 by issuing the 
third decree, and in fact it accomplished the establishment of new civilian and military 
courts. It could be argued that the initial decrees put at stake the legal immunities of 
citizens, and in addition to threatening the customary and traditional system, deprived the 
people of every aspect of their legal support such as the customary, traditional, formal and 
civil aspects. Further, the legal weakness by the time imperilled broader aspects; therefore, 
the mechanisms of war and armed conflict led to the destruction of law and social orders, 
and subsequently, it threatened personal and social safety. 
The PDPA’s government believed that the decree of prohibition of lien limitation of 
landowners’ profit could release 11 to 12 million peasants from large landowners, 
traditional and feudalism system. It goes without saying that the process of fundamental 
development, without making essential reforms in the social and economic structure of 
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society, would not result in the modification of the controlling traditional system of the 
society.  
It is particularly significant that the PDPA’s government abrogated of the customary and 
traditional connections between the people or different tribal groups, with no regard to 
potential problems and doing the indispensable and comprehensive examination, and also 
regardless of the applicable alternative. Consequently, the economic and financial 
confusions in the rural area ran into a grave crisis. The government’s measures resulted in 
disappointing impressions on interaction between the tribal groups, properties, businesses, 
investments. These disregarded actions effectuated the popular resistances to the 
government reform programme and the internal conflict. 
Establishment of the cooperative funds was one of the innovative measures of the PDPA’s 
government in the rural areas. The government attempted to implement the mentioned plan 
at the initial level in the disorderly and confused circumstances of the rural community; 
however, it did not have prosperous consequences. According to Etefagh-e-Islam “From 
1980 to 1981, 12116 peasant cooperatives were established, which was composed of 200 
thousand farmers” (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper 1982, 3). The People had no confidence in 
the mentioned cooperative funds, as well as the government did not have sufficient 
awareness and familiarity in conducting and handling of such plans. In fact, these 
cooperative funds were not supported by the adequate financial resources, the poor 
families, therefore, were not able to provide their essential needs. It goes without saying 
that the cooperative funds were not established in consequence of the peasants’ appeals 
and requirements, as well as, the government conducted such plans in order to pursue its 
political and ideological aspirations. Accordingly, it was not adaptable to the controlling 
culture and tradition of the society. Along with spreading the public protests and 
increasing the fire of the resistance in the country, all these baseless organizations 
collapsed and the society involved in confusion and grave crisis.  
Indeed, the communist government in the first year of their governing in Afghanistan 
conducted very critical policies. It is noteworthy that from one point of view, they 
seriously endeavoured to enforce the atheistic ideologies on the people regardless of 
preparation the necessary background and careful attention to people’s beliefs. From 
another point of view, they endeavoured to persuade the people to follow their policies, but 
nevertheless the people in the light of many proofs took cognizant of the government’s 
195 
 
anti-Islamic and anti-national character. It is noteworthy that the PDPA’s government at 
the introductory of their communist decrees and also in some of their statement to the 
people took advantage of some Islamic sentence to show themselves as faithful Muslims. 
The Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan stated, “Respect 
and defence of the holy religion of Islam are ensured in the DRA. All Muslims are 
guaranteed complete freedom in the performance of religious rites” (Gupta 1986, 115). 
Likewise, some of the leaders of the PDPA apparently participated in the prayers and 
Islamic ceremonies in the mosque of the presidential palace. It is quite clear that not only 
none of these pretended measures could lead astray the people but also they provoked the 
public’s emotions. 
The first radical steps of the government spread confusion and tension in the political, 
religious, and ethnic figures in rural and urban societies. Additionally, within the party 
happened acute competition between the Khalqis and the Parchamis, and this led to the 
removal of high-ranking people of the Parcham faction from the power structure. One of 
the Parchamis’ fundamental principles was making a rapid progress in the project of 
socialism in the country. This opinion was arranged by the Parchamis owing to the fact 
that they believed that technology was not adequate to go through a real proletarian 
revolution that was requested in the Communist Manifesto. As it was mentioned 
previously, the Parchamis were mainly from the urban area and were a part of 
intermediary social rank between the affluent and the destitute people (Hussain 2003). The 
Persian-speaking of Pashtuns was the dominant group that was moderated and educated. 
Opposed to this group were the Khalqis that were radical and in direct connection to the 
Soviet Union. They were more influential and powerful than the Parchamis and they 
founded a Soviet-style communist government in Afghanistan. They endeavoured to 
transform the Afghan society based on Marxist and Communist ideologies, with the 
purpose of eradicating the traditional and religious beliefs of the Afghan people. However, 
in consequence of the xenophobic feelings of the Afghan society the Soviet-style 
communist government of the PDPA faced with a public backlash. 
According to Anthony Arnold, “as long as Parcham and Khalq had been in quasi-legal 
opposition to the Afghan government, the USSR had had leverage to force them into 
mending their differences. Once the reunited PDPA succeeded in "wresting the political 
power" from Daoud in April 1978, however, it gained a greater measure of independence 
from the USSR, especially in the conduct of its internal affairs. Inasmuch as both the 
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Khalq and Parcham factions were apparently equally pro-Soviet, Moscow initially seems 
to have assumed that it did not matter that very much which faction emerged victorious in 
their own internal struggle. There was probably some hope that the two in fact could reach 
a lasting compromise, and if they could not, Moscow was then prepared to go along with 
whichever faction triumphed. A few leaders might be deposed, jailed, or even executed 
while finally the party would emerge the stronger for having purged itself of leadership 
elements personally unable to accommodate to the winners” (Arnold 1985, 75).  
The both factions Khalq and Parcham after attaining the position of power endeavoured to 
obtain further authority, which led to their rivalry and increased internal dispute in the 
party. It is worth pointing out that before the coup the members of the Khalq and Parcham 
factions were united in spite of having pressure of internal and external factors. Indeed, 
they could not relinquish their disagreements during the coup whose victory was not even 
definite (Mesbahzadeh 1999, 48). 
Subsequent to the Saur coup, the two factions of the PDPA opposed each other. It goes 
without saying that the Khalq faction’s policies were autocratic and they wanted to have 
all the authority. They believed that the leader of Parcham was not loyal to the revolution 
because the Parchamis regarded the Saur coup as a national democratic movement and not 
a revolution. It is sometimes suggested that escalation of these disagreements was a 
outstanding opportunity for the Soviet advisers to send the Parchamis as ambassadors to 
abroad. Thus, soon the leaders of Parcham were sent away from the Afghanistan as 
ambassador or chargé d’affaires in the other countries (Ataee 2004, 404).  
There are those who maintain that differences between two factions were growing 
intensely. Keshtmand regarded the Khalqis’ monopolization as the main reason for 
disagreement within the PDPA. Furthermore, Amin’s rivalry with Karmal and his efforts to 
capture all the power were very substantial factors in this regard.
1
 
Furthermore, Keshtmand is of the opinion that alliance between the Parchamis and 
Khalqis was with the purpose of uniting all dissidents of the society, which could be called 
the United National Front Alliance. It is worth pointing out that regarding the foreign 
policy some strategies were conducted with the intention of emphasising on neutrality and 
                                                          
1
 For further information see: Sultan Ali Keshtmand, Yaddashthaye Siasi va Roydadhaye Tarikhi: Khaterat-e 
Shakhsi ba Borhaee az Tarikhe Siasi Moaser-e Afghanistan, [Political Notes and Historical Events], vol. 1, 
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non-aligned policy in order to obtain the support of all countries (Afghanistan. Viz¯arat-i 
Ittil¯a‘¯at va Kult¯ur 2007, 1283).  
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that extreme commands and programmes of the 
Amin’s government, acute and bloody disputes within the government apparatus, and 
expansion of popular uprisings and armed conflict, could be regarded as the grave menace 
to the survival of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. In this regard, the Soviet 
interests were likewise threatened, which forced them to attack Afghanistan in order to 
control the circumstances in this country and preserve their own intersects. 
Keshtmand is of the opinion that the factors that bothered Karmal to implement his 
policies were the abnormal conditions of continuing war in the country. Arming, financing, 
encouraging and emboldening the armed people on Pakistan’s territory, and intensifying 
their attacks on Afghanistan are other highlighted factors by Keshtmand. Furthermore, he 
also supposed that the Soviet Union military presence in the country, lack of readiness of 
different forces in the country; lack of political willing in the authority for power sharing, 
and finally rejection of political pluralism could be other obstacle to the Karmal’s 
government.
1
  
“Karmal’s loyalty to the Soviet Union was well known. He would say even in the presence 
of non-Parchamis that he wished to make Afghanistan the sixteenth republic of the Soviet 
Union” (Kakar 1995, 64). It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that any reform 
programme and policy implemented by such dependent and puppet system, certainly could 
not achieve the approval of the people and also it could never receive the legitimacy from 
religious elites. 
The Karmal focused on educational and cultural system and obliged them to follow the 
doctrine of the PDPA. According to Karmal’s principles, freedom of scientific, technical, 
cultural, and artistic activities must be in conformity with the objectives of the Saur 
Revolution (Osool-e asasi hezb-e democratic Khalq e Afghanistan, [Fundamental 
principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] 1980, No.29). Accordingly, the 
quality of education especially in rural areas became inferior. Even Mohammad Akram 
Andishmand confirmed the mentioned decline after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
2
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 For further information see: Mohammad Akram Andishmand, Amozesh va parvaresh modern dar 
Afghanistan, [Modern Education in Afghanistan], p. 158. 
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It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the reforms in the Karmal’s era were out of 
the sufficient profundity and the government still was supporting its radical goals. It is 
worth pointing out that Karmal supposed that the land and water reforms were the main 
objective of the Sour coup. 
1
 However, the mentioned reforms did not implement in an 
appropriate manner to bring consequential effects for the Afghan society. Additionally, it 
could be argued that even the reformists of the PDPA did not have an exact realization of 
the shortages in the Afghan Society and as a result, there was no prioritization in the 
process of implementing their reform policies. 
Despite the fact that in the Karmal’s period some effective reforms were implemented, the 
PDPA made no change in its principal doctrine and retained reliance on the Soviet Union. 
It goes without saying that the government made some attempts to improve its methods in 
order to attain the principal objectives of the PDPA and regulated its programme with 
more cautious comprehension of the circumstances. Karmal appreciated the Soviet aids 
and believed that they performed a consequential function in solving the economic 
problems.
2
 
It is worth pointing out that foreign policy during Karmal’s era policy in an accurate 
manner was in line with the interests and policies of the Soviet Union. Moscow’s agents 
even were involved in launching the details of Karmal’s policy. Notwithstanding of the 
shaky foundations of the Soviet Union, its forces still attended in Afghanistan, which 
demonstrated that the Soviet Union did not consider Afghanistan as an independence 
country. It is particularly significant that Karmal believed that Afghanistan was “including 
the Non-Aligned Countries”. 
It is quite clear that numbers of the Soviet advisers had a position in the departments of the 
Army, Interior Ministry, the KGB, party, economic and diplomatic sector, and thus the 
PDPA’s government requested the Soviet Union to dispatch to Kabul some consultants on 
the religion affairs with the purpose of adjusting the relations between the communist 
government and Islam.
3
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 For further information see: Zahir Tanin & Mohammad Kazem Kazemi (Editor), Afghanistan dar gharne 
bistom, [Afghanistan in the Twentieth Century; 1900-1996], pp. 329-330. 
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Figure ‎5-2: Major Soviet Institutions Making Afghan Policy 
 (Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers 
2011, 137). 
 
Figure number 5-2 despites the Soviet involvement in the making Afghanistan’s policies. 
According to Peter Tomsen, “The rapidly deteriorating internal situation in Afghanistan 
inspired the creation of a four-man Special Commission within the Soviet Politburo to 
focus on Afghanistan. Although heavy in seniority, the commission's membership was ill 
suited to understand the Afghan relations. The members, Yuriy Andropov, Dmitry Ustinov, 
Andrey Gromyko, and Boris Ponomarev, were all taken from the Politburo's conservative 
wing. Each had ascended up the CPSU rungs during the doctrinaire Stalinist era; creative, 
flexibility, and dynamism were not their strong suits. In microcosm, the body reflected the 
deep domestic paralysis gripping the Soviet Union during the late 1970s and early 1980s” 
(Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the 
Failures of Great Powers 2011, 137). 
Karmal’s rise to power was simultaneous with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Moscow concluded that Karmal should be dismissed from the seat of power. It does not 
seem unreasonable to suggest that Moscow required an absolute obedient in Afghanistan 
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that would develop Moscow’s interests and provide the condition of withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from the country. Russian advisers believed that appointing one of the Pashtun 
leaders in power could lead to providing this condition (Azimi 1998, 311-312). 
It is remarkable that in addition to the hostility stemmed from traditional confrontation 
among the Parchamis and Khalqis, there was a competition among them regarding 
managing the intelligence agency of the Ministry of Interior. It could be argued that both 
factions with the purpose of strengthening their officials made some attempts to be closer 
to the Soviet. For instance, Najibullah forcefully opposed the appointment Gulabzoy as the 
president of a garrison of Kabul.
1
 
In the framework of intelligence agency and the Ministry of State Security (MSS), 
Najibullah established various military units. There is not a shadow of doubt that he 
increased the forces of the National Guard with the purpose of consolidating the basis of 
his authority. Furthermore, following taking the position of the leadership of the party 
conducted Supreme Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces. He likewise established 
another Supreme Council that called Defae Vatan, which assisted him to control over the 
military forces and their operations all over the country. It is worth pointing out that in the 
meetings of the camp were present the Soviet military advisers, which demonstrates the 
influential function of them in the Najibullah’s system. 
It is particularly significant that considering the special guard by Najibullah led to 
emerging displeasure of the Khalqis, military staffs and the security forces, as well as he 
trusted the Ministry of State Security more than the army and the Interior Ministry. It 
could be argued that he knew without getting support from the army it would be difficult 
to handle the military and political issues, but nevertheless he was always afraid of 
reinforce it (Lyakhovsky 1995, 38). 
The remarkable point of increasing the number of the militia or paramilitary forces was 
that this policy could be regarded as one of the main factors of collapse of the PDPA. It is 
likely that this policy intensified the party’s internal conflict, which finally effectuated the 
collapse of the government, army, and party. It should be highlighted that the Militia 
forces in the beginning were regarded as local forces, supported by the PDPA in the rural 
area. However, increasing weakness of military forces of the government provide the 
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condition for the militia forces to extend their influence in the army and state. In this 
regard, Antonio Giustozzi mentioned that the government did not attract recruits to the 
army anymore and instead, he made some attempts to increase the militia forces.
1
 
The defeat of the national reconciliation policy, which was a reflection of Gorbachev’s 
glasnost and perestroika policy, could be regarded as another factor in the downfall of the 
government. The main goals of the mentioned policy were alliance organizations and 
leftist group with the PDPA, freedom of political parties, creating coalition organisation 
with the armed opposition and employing them at high levels in the ministries, continuing 
unilateral ceasefire, drafting a new constitution, preparations for the election of president, 
and finally organizing the second congress of the PDPA. 
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that dominance of internationalism of Marxist-
Leninist ideas over the PDPA and attendance many Soviet puppets as leaders in the party, 
threatened the spirit of nationalism in the party (See Figure  5-2). Additionally, the PDPA’s 
government due to retaining the monopoly power was formed into a new political 
organization, which called the state party. It is quite clear that the party could not conceive 
to be apart from the state and power, which was proposed by the national reconciliation 
policy. 
Due to existing different point of view regarding the national reconciliation policy within 
the party, not only it could not be functional to decrease the problems, but also it provoked 
the internal fire within the party. Different factions of the party took advantage of it for 
intra-party challenges. In addition, the government conducted some policies with the 
purpose of reconciling the policy of national reconciliation with economic and social 
realities of Afghan society. For one thing, the president attempted to attract the attention of 
the international community. In addition, he accelerated implementing new reforms. He 
endeavoured to encourage European countries and capitalist world to re-establish economy 
and trade relations. He likewise believed that this policy was the most reasonable to gain 
political acceptance and economic support, which finally was not functional and effective 
for the PDPA. 
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 Findings 5.4.
According to the previous analysis of a monarchical and a democratic government’s 
functions and resistance to their policies, several significant findings have been revealed. 
However, the findings are not merely to provide trivial proof as to why the regime of King 
Amanullah was independent and also prosperous in implementing some part of his reform 
programme, and the PDPA regime did not have such prosperity. It is worth pointing out 
that it has been made an attempt to disclose an immense comprehending of Afghan rule 
and challenges to it. Further, the study has meticulously scrutinized the role of internal and 
external factors regarding these challenges and resistance to the government. These 
findings are chiefly divided into two sections, including delineating the characteristics of 
functional Afghan government and also delineating the characteristics of resistance to the 
Afghan government.  
5.4.1. Delineating Characteristics of Functional Afghan Government 
In this section, the substantial factors for a functional Afghan government with successful 
reform policies are examined. These factors are provided based on scrutiny of two phases 
in Afghanistan’s modern history, which are crisis phase (Amanullah’s era) and conflict 
phase (the PDPA’s era).  
5.4.1.1. Foreign Support 
It goes without saying that the examination of both cases has pored over external support 
either to attain the position of authority or in the struggle to retain it. 
King Amanullah’s assumption of power was simultaneous with the termination of the 
tension between Russia and Britain, which was as a result of the Russian revolution of 
1917. Afghanistan, therefore, took advantage of the international conditions to emphasize 
its complete independence and also cease international intervention in its internal affairs. 
The Afghan king’s substantial change regarding external policy immediately initiated 
following his rise to power. In fact, unstable situation of the British encouraged the king to 
overthrow the British forces in collaboration with local solidarity groups resident in the 
Afghan-British borders. Although King Amanullah declared Afghanistan’s independence 
and disallowed the British control of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs, the British authorities 
disregarded his declaration; consequently, King’s forces on some fronts defeated them. 
Nonetheless, owing to the fact that both sides were willing to make peace and settlement a 
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ceasefire concluded among them. It is particularly significant that Afghanistan had already 
embarked on its own foreign policy concluding the new agreement with the Soviet in the 
first year of Amanullah’s rule. Notwithstanding the Afghan side and British side were 
concurred in Afghanistan’s independence in the foreign affairs, the second round of 
Afghan-British negotiations effectuated no definite decision. The Afghans asserted entire 
control over the tribal regions on the British side, which was very rejected by the British. It 
is noteworthy that the assertion of Afghan authority was based on its agreement with 
Russians in 1921, which regarded the Afghan control over tribes on the Russian side 
Bukhara, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and all northern Afghan territory (Alikuzai 2013, 
449). It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that this issue convinced the Afghan 
authority to implement some policies in order to have tribal assistance to handle British 
tenacious hegemony. 
King Amanullah consolidated Afghanistan’s diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union 
in1920, moreover from 1921 to 1923 Afghanistan’s relations with Turkey, Italy, and 
France substantially improved. Although Afghanistan independence was in its infancy, its 
relations with the British and the Soviet could be regarded as the most authoritative stance 
of its foreign policy. It goes without saying that subsequent to Saint Petersburg 
convention, the Great Game tensions over Afghanistan were considerably descended. It is 
quite clear that Moscow in the beginning adopted the policy of appeasement of Muslims 
inside and outside of the Soviet territory, based on which the Soviet leaders were astutely 
wanted to establish amicable relations with abutting Muslim regions in Afghanistan. 
Moscow’s intention of adopting such policy and making close relationship with Kabul was 
menacing Britain that was doing sabotage encouraging counterrevolution activities in the 
Soviet Union. Furthermore, when Afghanistan dispatched an envoy to Moscow in 1919, 
Moscow received it warmly, and Moscow reciprocally sent a delegation to Kabul and 
offered aid to Kabul government. It could be argued that this alliance with Moscow 
provided the opportunity for the Afghan government to take advantage of the British 
faintness in the British India during and even after the third Angolo Afghan war. It is 
remarkable that Afghanistan despite having a feeble military position in the mentioned war 
as a result of having tribal support obtained an outstanding diplomatic conquest.  
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that during the Amani era Soviet-Afghan 
relations in consequence of strategic importance of Afghanistan for Moscow’s authorities 
at any particular time. Indeed, Moscow considered Afghanistan as a mechanism for 
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managing the Soviet’s Muslims minorities and also for gravely menacing the British 
interests. Accordingly, Moscow was very assistive with Kabul government just when they 
needed to manage the Soviet Muslims or during its critical relationship with the British 
relations with the British (Alikuzai 2013, 450). 
Extensive study of the Amani era demonstrates that the Afghan authority always suspected 
the Soviet; however, Kabul retained its connection with Moscow in order to attain 
assistance and support from the Soviet and also taking advantage of relations with the 
Soviets in handling the British grave menace. Thus, the Afghan-Soviet treaty of Friendship 
was the first international agreement after Afghanistan’s independence in 1919. Although 
Moscow provided Kabul with aid as early as 1919 and also throughout the 1920s Moscow 
granted cash subsidies for Kabul, King Amanullah never recognized Russians a trustable 
neighbour and deduced an optimistic view regarding the Soviet authority. It goes without 
saying that the Soviet oppressive policies regarding Muslims across the border, in order to 
manage Central Asia through deportations and oppression resulted more than any other 
time Kabul opposed Moscow’s policies. (Alikuzai 2013, 450). 
It is likely that Soviet interference in Afghanistan, especially subsequent to World War II, 
was intentionally planned to force Kabul authority to accept Soviet hegemony (See 
Figure  4-4). Accordingly, it goes without saying that Moscow took advantage of several 
policies interactivity to fulfil this objective.  
It is worth pointing out that before World War II increasing diplomatic relations and 
economic aid were preferably under the Soviet’s consideration, however subsequent to it 
the Soviet expanded its policy to embrace military assistance and political affairs. The 
accomplishment of these policies was reflected in the influential role of the USSR in 1978. 
Indeed, Moscow was the most momentous trade partner and financial supporter of Kabul, 
and had modernized the Afghan military forces, as well as with its support the PDPA had 
overthrown Daoud’s government from power and was ruling the country. In April 1978, it 
was very fulfilled Moscow’s winning the Great Game that let Moscow’s government take 
another step toward the Arabian Sea. 
It goes without saying that by late 1979, it was apparent that the PDPA’s government 
would topple unless the Soviet Union supported it. It is quite clear that Moscow’s direct 
military intervention resulted in the transformation the Afghan war into a regional and 
geopolitical conflict, which ultimately ruined the country. Furthermore, this military action 
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prompted the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism and instead effectuated 
Islamism in the Sunni area of the Muslim World. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest 
that these events gradually reinvigorated and changed the Great Game for reach and 
control Central Asia while the Great Game’s trait and some of its performers changed 
(Goodson 2001, 53). 
Afghanistan by virtue of its strategic position (being connection point of Middle East, 
South and Central Asia) was the scene of the rivalry between the great powers (Gregorian 
1969, 10). The two colonial powers Russia and Britain from the late nineteenth century 
regarded Afghanistan’s territory to be a buffer state among them. In addition, the colonial 
competition between these colonial powers until the mid-twentieth century, led to foreign 
invasions and interferences and ultimately becoming Afghanistan as a buffer state. King 
Amanullah adopted anti-British and anti-colonialism policies, which weakened the British 
position in Afghanistan. The Soviet, therefore, endeavoured to make a good relationship 
with the king and thus Afghanistan became the scene of rivalry between Britain and the 
Soviet.
1
 It is noteworthy that the king required financial resources to implement his reform 
programme, which forced him to make a good relationship with the Soviet Union. 
Although he concluded a treaty with the Bolsheviks, they fulfilled none of their 
obligations. The king believed that the Bolsheviks could not be trusted and he knew that 
Russians in their promises had never been honest.2 It could be argued that the king 
endeavoured to make an alliance with the Bolsheviks in order to put pressure on Britain, 
which led to the hostility of the British with him. In addition, the fundamental reason for 
Britain’s detestation was the third Anglo-Afghan war that led to the independence of 
Afghanistan. Although during the Great Game tribal and ethnic competition in 
Afghanistan provided opportunity for Britain to launch its strategic policy in Afghanistan, 
the king’s anti-British and anti-colonialism policies placed the Afghan local solidarity 
groups in a united front against the British. Likewise, there is no dispute that his 
government’s pro-Soviet character resulted the British assisted the opposition to collapse 
his government. Notwithstanding the Soviet conducted some plans to return the abdicated 
King to power, they were ineffective as a result of the fact that at that time the British had 
better geopolitical access in Afghanistan. (Saikal n.d., 60-74) 
                                                          
1
 For further information see: Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, (New 
York: I.B. Tauris), pp.60-74. 
2
 For further information see: Rhea Talley Stewart, Mohammad kohsar Kabuli (Trans), Fire in Afghanistan, 
p.32. 
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The Soviet Union took advantage of the same opportunity during the Cold War in order to 
launch the Saur coup and bring to power the PDPA’s regime, which was communist and 
the Soviet’s follower (See Figure  5-2). It goes without saying that the Cold War resulted in 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that a 
communist party’s assumption of power in Afghanistan could be regarded as the starting 
point for serious Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Although the Khalq faction encouraged 
the Soviet to invade Afghanistan, there were many other intentions for the Soviet invasion. 
It is particularly significant that the PDPA was incapable of fulfilling the Soviet interests 
and handling Mujahidin’s opposition. Afghanistan was an important crossroad in the 
region between India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Accordingly, the Soviet Union wanted to 
reach Iran’s oil field and trade way through Indian Ocean. 
Indeed, foreigners’ intervention and subsequently their invasion along with internal 
conflict and completion destabilized the foundations of the state and effectuated instability 
in Afghanistan. Owing to the fact that foreign agents had strong influence on the Afghan 
state that any kind of change and modification should have maintained their interests, each 
policy to handle these internal disorders from the beginning was doomed to failure. 
Furthermore, competition between religious intellectual and tribal chiefs offered an 
opportunity for foreigners to implement their policies in Afghanistan. Each group of elite 
that took the power need foreign support to maintain its power. It should also be remarked 
that state-making process and conducting reform policies were always from top to down, 
and with no attention to the opinion of the society and its significant function in the 
mentioned measures, due to which, the governments faced with many reactions from the 
society to their policies. 
It is particularly significant that incapability of attaining legitimacy and public support 
persuaded the governments to strengthen their military forces in order to preserve their 
authority, and this forced them to provide external support. Additionally, in both cases the 
weakness of the army resulted in inward collapse of civil institutions. For instance, lack of 
organized and powerful military forces in the PDPA’s era -especially after the Soviet 
Union’s collapse- could be regarded one of the main factors of Mujahidin’s victory 
(Englehart 2007, 144). 
A substantial distinction of the external support was provided for each regime, but 
nevertheless is that in cases where the regime was more purposeful and prosperous in 
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instituting rule and improving government function. It goes without saying that 
Amanullah’s regime was capable of protecting its independence without external support 
while the PDPA regime was appeared to be the puppets of its foreign supporters (See 
Figure  5-2), and so that it could not obtain any legitimacy for its rule. 
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Afghanistan required external support and 
not external intervention, which was effectuated by superpowers by virtue of fulfilment 
their interests and developing their domination of the country. 
5.4.1.2. National Identity 
The significant function of the national identity in two studied epochs has been 
demonstrated by several occurrences. Nancy Hatch Dupree is of the opinion that national 
identity had an effective role in the process of state-making during Afghanistan 
contemporary history. She likewise indicates, “A glance at Afghan history affirms an oft-
repeated pattern of altering periods of fissions and fusion. Afghans may quarrel happily 
among themselves, but they stand together and assert their pride in being Afghan when 
outsiders threaten. A sense of national identity does exist, elements of divisiveness and 
notwithstanding” (N. H. Dupree 2002, 977-989). 
It is worth pointing out that tribal identity appears to be one of the most remarkable 
barriers in the process of formation a government and conducting its policies while 
national identity could be regarded as a constructive factor to create a consolidated 
government. In consequence of the fact that government policies could not be aligned with 
the desires and interests of all tribes, there have always been some tribes, whose concerns 
were incompatible with the government’s policies. It is particularly significant that one of 
the fundamental reasons for unprosperous policies of the Afghan regimes negligence for 
considering tribes in the structure of power. 
It could be argued that King Amanullah took advantage of the national identity in order to 
unite different political and social groups in Afghanistan and gain independence of the 
country from Britain. Thus, national identity performed a significant function to remove 
Britain’s domination from the country. Further, the king implemented his reform 
programme with no consideration of tribal and religious identity of Afghans; consequently, 
he confronted public backlash against his reforms, which was organized by the same 
factors that collaborated with him during the war of independence. There is not a shadow 
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of doubt that the paying special consideration to the issue of national identity effectuated 
constructive results for the government and lack of attention to this issue resulted in 
destructive consequences.  
5.4.1.3. Legitimate Government 
One of the most remarkable factors that troubled both regimes in conducting efficaciously 
their policies was inadequacy of their institutional system. It is likely that this issue arose 
from the legitimacy crisis, the incompatibility of the state and society, and incompetency 
of the governmental institutions.  
It is quite clear that legitimacy is essential to any regime in Afghanistan, for without it, 
they would immediately be ousted by the nation those oppose authority system. As it is 
discernible in the first case of this research the Afghan regime historically focused on a 
charismatic leader, whose power was absolute, moreover, who got legitimacy on the 
foundation of charismatic, traditional, and rational authority. 
It goes without saying that both regimes were involved in the legitimacy crisis, but 
nevertheless King Amanullah in consequence of declaration of Jihad against Britain could 
temporarily release from this crisis, whereas in fact the PDPA due to planning the Saur 
coup to attain the power from the beginning was involved in this crisis (Brecher 1997, 
356). In fact, the elites determined the legitimacy of the government based on their own 
interests and objectives. Diversity of intellectual, tribal and religious elites was 
consequence of social, religious and linguistic diversity in the country, which led to the 
variety of the roots of legitimacy to King Amanullah’s and the PDPA’s governments. It is 
particularly significant that tribal and religious elites granted legitimacy to government 
based on Islam and tribal codes, whereas intellectuals followed the foreign ideology, and 
thus were more compatible with the reformist ideology fulfilled by both regimes. It does 
not seem unreasonable to suggest that oppression of tribal and social elites in Amanullah’s 
period could be regarded as one of the foremost causes of the miscarriage of his policies. It 
is worth pointing out that during the PDPA intellectual elites were under the influence of 
communist ideas and they, therefore, upheld the ruling system. In both regimes, they were 
in power and tribal and religious elites were in challenge with them and always stimulated 
the mass to arise against them; nonetheless, neither the king nor the PDPA could 
effectively handle them. There is not a shadow of doubt that the constant internal conflicts 
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troubled the Afghan governments to establish a stable situation in the country and conduct 
functional policies. 
In addition, the presented regimes in this research had at least one, or more, charismatic 
leaders. Amanullah’s rule was based on charismatic, traditional, and rational authority. His 
traditional authority was his antecedent while his charismatic character of his leadership 
was on account of his capabilities. Furthermore, he established his rule based on rational 
regulations. Regarding the PDPA regime, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that 
none of its communist leaders had adequate capability of obtaining the minimum level of 
the legitimacy. 
In addition, one supplementary significant finding stemmed from the comparative analysis 
of two regimes (See Table  5-1) is that an indigenous system is very essential for the 
Afghan regime to attain and retain legitimacy. This concept highlights that if the 
government is a puppet and dependent on a foreign power, it could be deprived of 
legitimacy by the traditional and religious elites; this concept demonstrates the contrast 
between external control and legitimacy.  
5.4.1.4. Indigenous Government 
As it was previously stated, an authority originated from Afghanistan with domestic and 
autonomous administration, whether monarch or democrat, has been more prosperous in 
attaining further legitimacy and improving government’s function as compared to a puppet 
one that has been controlled by a foreign agent. It goes without saying that the PDPA 
established a puppet government based on communist and Marxist doctrine (See 
Figure  5-2), foreign legitimacy and administration, which was controlled by the Soviet 
agents; while Amanullah’s government was an indigenous authority that was founded 
based on Islamic ideology, domestic legitimacy and the system of bureaucracy.  
It is quite clear that the root-and-branch reforms provided by the PDPA were fundamental 
and quick, with the purpose of implementing widespread reform with predominantly 
considering the interests and policies of its external benefactors. Accordingly, the people 
opposed the government’s programme regarding civil rights and the emancipation of 
women, as they were opposite of what they believed. Further, the PDPA’s regime fulfilled 
hasty decrees and conducted radical objectives, which abrogated customary principles of 
the tribal society of Afghanistan and revoked the previous tribal ruling system.  
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It is worth pointing out that Amanullah’s military reforms and conscription policy were 
implemented with the intention of establishing a modern and potent army that could 
provide internal security. Kemalist Turkish officers assisted him regarding organizing the 
army; as a result of these officers’ pretty hasty plans for the army, the inspiration of 
Afghan nationalists, and also arranging well-trained Afghan officers a remarkable 
transformation was accomplished in the structure of the army and thus a national army 
arranged by Amanullah. Nonetheless, disunity among the tribal solidarity groups and also 
the government’s incapability of reaching an agreement with them in 1928, moreover, 
arising a sweeping unrest resulted the Afghan indigenous army rapidly was broken apart. 
Alternatively, the PDPA’s army had always been reliant upon external assistance. Its 
puppet and semi-indigenous army (See Figure  5-2) was unpopular and disloyal to the 
government, moreover, there was a huge gap between high-ranking officers and corps. 
Although the non-indigenous army’s dependency on the Soviet support from one point of 
view increased its power, from another point of view it diminished Army’s legitimacy and 
popularity. 
King Amanullah’s indigenous authority was capable of obtaining public legitimacy in 
consequence of the establishment of effective organizations that ensured the safety of the 
state. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that establishing a legitimated Afghan 
regime and independent of any external support required implementation of consequential 
policies to reach agreement with the opponents and attain public support; thus the regime 
could retain its authority and also abolish previous forms of traditional administration. 
5.4.1.5. Totalitarian Authority 
In Afghanistan, the foundation of the government was autocratic, and tribal-patriarchal 
relationship was established in the society. Relations between nation and state were never 
defined based on equality, justice, and freedom. The rulers introduce themselves as the 
representative of God on earth (Farhang 1995, 425). Their approved law was implemented 
by their power. Resistance to the king meant resistance to the law, and people just had 
right to unconditional submission and obedience (Majmoeye maghalate seminare ayandeh 
Afghanistan va ghanoon asasi, [Proceedings of the seminar on the future of Afghanistan 
and the constitution] 2003, 19).  
Amanullah’s rule had somehow the same definition. Although he endeavoured to consider 
the principle of citizens’ individual rights and freedoms, it was based on his own desire 
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and also was not compatible with the potential of the society. In fact, by virtue of lack of 
education and knowledge, the society was not able to comprehend his reform programme. 
Consequently, the king was forced to adopt oppressive and coercive methods to implement 
his policies. It is worth pointing out that the PDPA regime from the beginning asserted that 
it would respect human right; nonetheless, the assertion was not practically regarded by its 
authorities. For instance, Karmal’s government asserted that offences against human 
dignity and torture were not allowed (Osool-e asasi hezb-e democratic Khalq e 
Afghanistan, [Fundamental principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] 1980, 
No.30). Nevertheless, in his government, as the previous governments, still executed the 
torture, forced confessions along with the various harassment, human rights violations, 
shootings, and hangings of opponents. His government influenced all education and 
cultural institutions and was forced them to promote the ideology of the party, which was 
against the public beliefs. Furthermore, Afghanistan’s multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic 
society troubled both regimes to handle the requests of different groups. The country’s 
mountainous areas and impassable roads led to poor communication made a huge gap 
between the people and the governments. Besides, these factors assisted the tribal and 
ethnic group to be isolated and implement their own tribal rules in the isolated regions. 
It is remarkable that Afghanistan’s history demonstrates that a powerful authority was 
effective and was esteemed by the people. In addition, the semi-prosperous Afghan ruler, 
King Amanullah, ruled by some strict and strategic methods in order to handle the majority 
of unapproachable Afghan territory and combatant people that had shattered numerous of 
the strong armies established during Afghanistan’s history. 
During the Amani era it was installed a secular judicial structure that prevented religious 
leaders from involvement in the judiciary system, consequently it lost popularity with the 
public. Further, the comprehensive regulatory system that was founded in this era was a 
means for keeping the people updated and aware, and performing decrees that strove to 
improve the Afghan lifestyle, which was not considerably prosperous in realizing its 
subjects. In point of fact, Amanullah’s judiciary system identified an illegal act in 
accordance with the constitutional law, which did not have approval of the religious 
scholars. Further, the PDPA’s judiciary principles, which was based on communism and 
Marxism ideas, considered any insubordination to the PDPA’s radical principles as crime. 
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It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Amanullah’s function in handling the 
opponents was more successful than the PDPA’s one in this regard. Accordingly, it could 
be argued that one more significant point of prosperity of government in Afghanistan was 
the method of handling dissidents who seriously threatened ruling government. Although a 
totalitarian authority like Amanullah’s comparing the PDPA’s unstable authority appears 
to be more prosperous in centralizing control, in the process of conducting the reform 
programme king’s totalitarian authority has not been able to attract public support and 
even it has been confronted with backlash in the second and third stages of the reforms. 
In this regard, an egalitarian and popular system that considers equal rights for all the 
Afghan people, respects the ideological beliefs and political interests of different local 
solidarity groups, and esteems the position of the religious scholars could face with less 
trouble in the process of state-making and reform-making.  
5.4.1.6. Handling Dissidents  
One of the most remarkable points of the two regimes presented in this research was the 
entire military defeat of their political rivals, which assisted them to seize powerfully the 
power. In addition, the inefficiency of the Afghan government to handle its dissidents 
finally caused to appear considerable resistance to their policies. In both cases, the 
government’s incapability of overcoming its dissidents offered an opportunity for its 
political opponents to challenge the government and finally overthrew it from the political 
scene and introduced themselves as the foundations of an alternative rule. 
King Amanullah, in order to handle the external opposition (the British) during Angolo 
Afghan, unified the different local solidarity groups within the country; however, the 
PDPA appealed the Soviet assistance to handle internal opposition. It is quite clear that the 
military forces of both regimes were not reliable and strong enough to manage the internal 
conflict. Furthermore, along with emerging public oppositions, which was stimulated by 
different factors in all over the country, the authorities endeavoured to manage it with their 
weak military forces, which was not effective. This is because the character of the Afghan 
army that were principally composed of the people from the rural areas, who demonstrated 
special consideration and concern with the conservative opposition; consequently they 
supported the opposition to the government. Furthermore, along with expanding the fire of 
civil war, the Afghan army were weaker and it was supposed to deal with massive 
desertions. 
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It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that abreast of the importance of military 
capability, a functional Afghan prosperous government should be able to perform an 
exclusive control of society’s confusion by the absolute supervision or undermining of 
traditional rule in the society.  
5.4.1.7. Decentralized Government 
It goes without saying that resistance to the Afghan government throughout both regimes 
was a popular phenomenon that was planned by masses; thus the governments were 
required to establish consolidated rule and decentralize control in order to handle 
effectively the resistance to their policies. It is likely that Amanullah’s supreme authority 
and charismatic autocracy was more functional regarding managing public resistance 
compared to the PDPA’s decentralized rule and control whose structure was based on 
tribalism and factionalism.  
Despite the fact, that the Afghan army assisted Amanullah in coming to power, army’s 
loyalty to his government remarkably diminished as a result of his policies that were 
suggested by his Turkish military advisors. Further, the king’s policies regarding 
recruitment and prevention tribal leaders from running the army’s affair disappointed the 
tribes with his government. Even Minister of War opposed his domestic policies and 
ignoring tribal sensitivities. 
Common sense says that tribal resistance that collapsed King Amanullah’s regime 
occurred apart from the resistance to his reform programme. Notwithstanding the reforms 
were more affected the urban population than tribal and rural population, there was no 
widespread resistance to the reforms in the urban area. Furthermore, tribal leaders and 
Afghan religious scholars found a shared purpose to upraise against government. 
Consequently, the king embarked on crushing tribal and religious leaders and 
systematically undermined their influence by his policies to establish a modern 
administrative and new political system. He replaced the previous traditional and local 
system with a contrived but advanced administration, in which local ruling bodies 
fundamentally substituted for loyal officials and government employees who enforced the 
government’s policies and its authority on the lower classes. The king lost the loyalty of 
the army, which had supported him to attain power, as a result of his reforms within the 
army. It is worth pointing out that his efforts to implement social modernization did not 
threaten his government more than his measures to establish a consolidated government 
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between the two superpowers, Soviet and British. In addition, the phenomenon of tribal 
separatism during the Amani era, which appeared by virtue of lack of a dominant 
government, led to the bloody struggle between centralized power and Afghan tribes. Due 
to lack of a loyal army and also the desertion of the army unravelling this issue was 
unfeasible for the government.  
The PDPA’s ambition of establishing a modern socialist state forced them to embark on 
mass arrests, torture, and executions. Furthermore, owing to lack of popular support to 
perform its policies, the PDPA regime found itself in a critical position and also 
decentralized control. Furthermore, sweeping uprising all over the country and within the 
army became a potential menace to the stability of the government. Additionally, disunity 
within the party and the army offered an appropriate time for the Soviet to invade 
Afghanistan. It is particularly significant that the Soviets conducted systematic policy 
regarding taking advantage of intelligence service. In this regard, the KhAD that was 
instituted based on the Soviet KGB played a substantial function to suppress the 
opposition, as well as the consequential function of the Soviet advisors to direct the 
KhAD’s agent cannot be disregarded (See Figure  4-4). 
Despite the fact that Karmal made some efforts to unite the Parchamis and Khalqis, the 
consequence of none of them was constructive and not only it increased the disunity within 
the party, but also intensified the discontent and fragmentation into the army. It goes 
without saying that disunity within the PDPA and subsequently and lack of direct 
command over the army was so destructive and critical that the policy of recruitment was 
implemented to strengthen the weak position of the military establishment. The 
government embanked on organizing militia forces to handle Afghan rebel forces with the 
intention of establishing decentralized authority over the fractured country. However, it is 
quite clear that the policy in this regard was incapable of assisting the government to 
handle efficaciously the tribal rebel forces.  
It is worth pointing out that even the Soviet authorities made some efforts to unify the 
PDPA. They comprehended that the only solution to stabilize Afghanistan was settlement 
of disunity within the party and developing the government domination throughout the 
country. In 1980, it was conducted a policy to strengthen the PDPA’s domination into the 
rural and tribal regions. Although the PDPA was able to achieve somewhat a unity within 
the party before implementing the mentioned policy, it was not sustainable by some radical 
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elements of the party, and consequently it was undermined. Furthermore, lack of a stable 
and consolidated government in Afghanistan led to Soviet direct involvement in the 
country’s affairs. 
It is remarkable that when the country disposed of the tribal form of government, the 
government was supposed to create a consolidated and dominant administration. It goes 
without saying that along with the political and military weakness of the PDPA regime and 
expanding chaos in the country the sign of local and tribal rule was reappeared. 
5.4.1.8. The importance of Local Control and Administration  
The capability of instituting local administration under the control of a central government 
and implementing reform policies by a combination of local and state authority could be 
regarded one of the essential characteristics of a functional Afghan government. In this 
regard, the PDPA was not able to manage properly this important measure. In fact, it paid 
no heed to the fundamental issue of recognizing local forces and agencies within the 
framework of the central government. Although King Amanullah had performed better 
function, even in the Amani era like the PDPA regime the rivalry between the modern 
central government and traditional and local communities for local control was discernible. 
Consequently, local control and administration were the most momentous issues in the 
process modernizing the traditional ruling system that could be regarded as the actual roots 
of popular resistance to the government in Afghanistan’s modern history.  
King Amanullah, in order to rationalize and consolidate his government apparatus, 
established a national campaign. He founded a system of local control and administration 
through local elites at the local level. This new system of administration was composed of 
Alaqadari (sub-district) and Woluswali (district). In the beginning, he required popular 
support to cut the hand of British colonialism from Afghanistan; in this regard he 
implemented some policies to encourage local communities and gain their support. 
Accordingly, his reign became popular as his government mobilized local Ulema and tribal 
chief to create a strong military establishment to overcome British military. Additionally, 
his centralized government performed some transgressions against local communities’ 
rights, such as the policies of extraction and taxation in the local areas. It does not seem 
unreasonable to suggest that when his government had no longer control over the local 
administration and also it was incapable of handling properly traditional and religious 
forces lost its popular support. 
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As a matter of fact, King Amanullah could not organize a sophisticated local 
administration, in order to implement the consequential policy in the local community. 
Notwithstanding the king enabled local administration system, there was a substantial 
contrast between civilized and educated elites, who managed the local administration and 
the ordinary rural people. It is likely that the elites’ function at the local community was 
not constructive. 
In addition, lack of sufficient trained and skilful administrators in the local communities 
was another considerable point in this regard. The government’s administrators, whose 
concerns were focused on maintaining or improving their own position and increasing 
their influence, did not function properly in the field of Amanullah’s local administrative 
policies. It is worth pointing out that although the government by the policy of frequent 
transfer of its administrators endeavoured to prevent their influence in the local areas, the 
government, therefore, was incapable of establishing a stable relationship with the local 
community, and consequently it did not implement properly its reform at the local level. 
Regarding state administration of the PDPA should be remarked that the Soviets regarded 
the Afghan communist government as party-state system of government, like the Soviet’s 
system of authority. While the PDPA supposed, essentially the Afghan government as a 
result of extreme internal dispute within the party and disunity among the Khalqis and the 
Parchamis could not be matched the Soviet Communist party. It is quite clear that these 
complications disturbed the government administrations to run properly as a result of each 
faction’s endeavour to strengthen its control of the various organization and administrative 
structure within the government. Further, the Soviet government sought to take advantage 
of local Afghan institutions to establish local and regional administration. It is worth 
pointing out that a substantial number of local institutions were largely bribed to achieve 
their collaboration regarding consolidating the government local administration structure.
1
 
(Minkov and Smolynec 2010, 316-320) 
Indeed, in this era lack of an organized and developed local control and administration 
resulted in strengthening self-governing, especially in the local communities. Although in 
many local communities there were Shuras (local councils), they were not organized and 
under the government control, as well as they did not systematically represent a specific 
                                                          
1
 For further information see: Minkov, Anton and Gregory Smolynec, 4-D Soviet Style: Defence, 
Development, Diplomacy and Disengagement in Afghanistan During the Soviet Period Part 1: State 
Building, Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol. 23 No. 2 (2010), P. 316- 320. 
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local community. Furthermore, Shuras were incapable of performing the function of the 
local administration because they did not have the capacity for making a good connection 
between the central government and local areas and putting into effect the government’s 
policies.  
The sphere of influence of PDPA’s government control was only in the urban, moreover, it 
retained full control in some strategic locations. It is particularly significant that in areas 
under resistance groups control and the opposition, and they implemented several 
administrative policies, principally regarding military and civilian matters. These 
administrative policies were assimilated the PDPA’s ones and demonstrated that the 
significance of the local administration was particularly deliberated by resistance groups as 
well.  
5.4.2. Delineating Characteristics of Resistance to the Government 
The substantial various characteristics of the resistance to the government are examined in 
this section. These distinguishing qualities are delineated based on scrutiny of the crisis 
phase of King Amanullah and the conflict phase of the PDPA. 
5.4.2.1. Irregular Forces, Rebels 
One of the momentous elements of the Afghan resistances was irregular and rebel forces. 
Afghan government have historically relied on irregular tribal and local forces such as 
militia and also on the other local and tribal units as a result of permanent lack of a reliable 
army. It goes without saying that the ruling years of both regimes saw many instances of 
the Afghan tribal resistance and their hit-and-run tactics against the central government or 
foreign invaders. The Great British army and Soviet Union’s Red army were the prominent 
instances that faced with the Afghan tribes particularly the Pashtun. It is sometimes 
suggested that in consequence of Pashtun’s habitation in the strategic passages of 
Afghanistan, they inevitably faced with foreign invaders and stubbornly defended their 
fatherland.
1
 (Dallmayr 1999) 
Besides the fact that the Afghan tribes’ doctrine was established upon resistance to foreign 
aggressions, the foreign influence and interference was a favourable opportunity for 
Afghan divided tribes to be united for handling common and grave menace as well. Two 
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 For further information see: Fred Reinhard Dallmayr, Border Crossings: Toward a Comparative Political 
Theory, (Boston: Lexington Books, 1999), p. 113. 
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remarkable points are supposed to be highlighted in this regard; first, there were 
interactions between the irregular forces and the regular armies; second, the irregular 
forces had the popular support. 
Notwithstanding the military operations of the irregular forces occurred at the local and 
regional level, their function caused national effects. The irregular forces assisted the 
government to defend the country, but nevertheless when the government’s reform policies 
were against their beliefs and interests they functioned as anti-government and rebel 
forces. One of the outstanding situations regarding taking advantage of irregular forces 
was during the succession crisis following the assassination of Habibullah Khan, which 
resulted in King Amanullah’s assumption of power. He prospered in managing the army 
and also most of the local tribal forces supported his government. It goes without saying 
that the same forces finally overthrew his regime.  
Despite the fact that the communist government of the PDPA and its Soviet supporters did 
not have complete control of the irregular forces throughout the country, they relied upon 
militias to provide safety and legitimize the government. It goes without saying that 
reliance on militias caused new political equilibrium in Afghanistan. Subsequent to 
General Tanai’s abortive coup, Najibullah could not trust the army anymore. He, 
therefore, increased the militia forces and also adopted some policies to organize them.
1
  
5.4.2.2. Local Population and Ethnic Groups 
Local population and ethnic groups were other elements of the Afghan resistance. In both 
studied regimes the structure of the Afghan resistance to the government’s reform policies 
local, tribal, ethnic. It goes without saying that none of the central governments was 
capable of controlling effectively the local, tribal areas, in consequence of the local 
population and ethnic groups’ opposition to central government’s reform policies. King 
Amanullah like his grandfather endeavoured to retain control over tribal leader while the 
PDPA regime was incapable of preserve its control, which led to strengthening the 
influence of tribal and ethnic groups and emergence of warlords against the central 
government. 
                                                          
1
 For further information see: Antonio Giustozzi, War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan: 1978-1992, p. 
226. 
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It is particularly significant that tribal and ethnic groups like qawm were the main force of 
political mobilization and resistance to the government in two examined regimes. 
Furthermore, it goes without saying that these fundamental basis of Afghan identification 
were throughout both regimes were the dominant component of Afghan unity in handling 
external invasion. 
During the Amani era, tribal and religious groups and the dominant ethnic groups like 
Pashtun were the major forces of opposition to the government. Further, they were the 
obstacle to modernizing the country and to consolidating the government’s control over 
local areas. The conflict between the tribes and the central government principally was in 
consequence of the governments’ efforts to abolish the tribal laws or regulations that were 
in contradiction to the new constitution. Both governments’ desire was to restrict tribes’ 
self-ruling system in order to decentralize their authority. The intellectual elites supposed 
that tribal chiefs to consolidate their self-ruling system took advantage of tribal laws, 
which could harm to centralize the government’s control and implement the constitutional 
rule. 
It is quite clear that throughout both regimes the most outstanding conflict between the 
Afghan government and tribal system was with the Pashtun tribes, which was in 
consequence of discordance of the Pashtunwali codes with the new constitution, approved 
by the Afghan governments. Consequently, along with the Afghan government’s reform 
policies the country encountered opposition from the rural Pashtun tribes.  
It is remarkable that sweeping anti-communist concerns after 1978 effectuated more 
extensive ethnic and tribal solidarity, which was the main root of resistance. 
Notwithstanding Afghan Jihad was against internal political structures that threatened 
directly traditional values, it was a front against an alien political and ideological invasion. 
Critical consequences of Jihad against the Soviets changed political equilibrium. Indeed, 
the Pashtuns were dominated ethnic group and well-armed among Afghan tribal 
community. However, Jihad against the Soviet invaders established some other ethnic 
groups like the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras that developed into being well-equipped and 
also well-trained tribes. Further, the Pashtuns fragmented into several limited Pashtun 
groups, which caused extensive ethnic and local groups became the strong basis to handle 
the Soviet invasion. 
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5.4.2.3. Importance of Islam 
In Afghanistan’s modern history Islam was an importance factor to unify the several 
ethnic, tribal, and linguistic groups and common denominator shared by Afghan solidarity 
groups; moreover, it was a primary source to provide legitimacy to the Afghan 
government. It is particularly significant that Islam had the function of source of 
legitimacy for two inconsistent purposes. From one point of view, as it was mentioned it 
provided political legitimacy to the Afghan governments; from another point of view local 
rebels took advantage of Islam to legitimise their uprising against the governments. Those 
disregarded their beliefs and values. Furthermore, Islam was a means to unite the people 
against foreign intervention like Anglo-Afghan wars, as well as based on Islam several 
tribal and local groups were united in opposition to King Amanullah’s secular reform 
programme. 
As a matter of fact, Islam was a favourable means for religious scholars and traditionalists 
to consolidate their position and handle reformers. It goes without saying that they 
regarded Shariah as the most reasonable interpretation of uprising against Amanullah’s 
reform policies. It is worth pointing out that this consequential role of Islam during the 
Amani era could be comprehended during the PDPA’s era as well. The communist 
government implemented particular aggressive anti-Muslim stance, promulgated Marxism, 
and abolished many Islamic laws and traditional rules that encouraged uprising of 
Islamists and traditionalists in the countryside.  
In both cases, it was obvious that Muslim warriors and Afghan rival tribes unified under 
the flag of Jihad and faced with foreign invaders, the British and the Soviets, with the 
purpose of withdrawing them from their country. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest 
that Islam had a fundamental function in provoking the resistance movements throughout 
Afghanistan’s modern history. 
It could be argued that the Afghan government was supposed to consider Shariah in its 
policies, and also it should consider religious and traditional beliefs of the society in its 
policies. Even though religious scholars did not have political power, their declaration of 
Jihad was the most powerful means of integrating rival forces to handle foreign invaders 
and infidel Afghan rulers.  
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5.4.2.4. Xenophobic Resistance 
The Afghans’ cultural xenophobia mobilised them against any foreign military occupying 
force, which could be regarded as another substantial factor regarding the origin of the 
Afghan resistance. It goes without saying that in both epochs superpowers’ attempts to 
dominate Afghanistan were confronted with Afghan national resistance despite the fact 
that there were rivalry and disagreement among different Afghan groups. Indeed, Afghan 
people, in consequence of their xenophobic sentiments resisted to any invasion of their 
territory, either in the scale of alien invasion or in the scale of competition among Afghan 
tribes. It is particularly significant that in the scale of alien invasion Afghan’s xenophobic 
sentiments were directed against traditional imperialists, Great Britain and USSR. 
Reviewing the resistance movement throughout Afghanistan modern history demonstrates 
that Xenophobia would accomplished in Afghanistan when there were common feelings of 
hostility towards who had aggressive intentions to the country. The Great Game and the 
British and Russians aggressive intentions to Afghanistan provoked the Afghan tradition 
of xenophobic resistance. The British invasions resented the Afghan people and united the 
Afghan solidarity groups provoking the feeling of xenophobia. They, therefore, 
accomplished powerful resistance to Western cultural and political aggressions. 
The British intervention in the Khost rebellion or the Mangal rebellion could be a 
remarkable example to illustrate the xenophobic feelings during the Amani era. Abd al-
Karim from Indian British entered made some intercessions in the Afghan civil war. 
Despite the public inconvenience of the country’s administration, the people maintained 
their neutrality in the Paktia war. Indeed, when they realized involving British spies in the 
Paktia rebellion, in addition to having religious neutrality, they retained their political 
neutrality as well. Thus, all people rose to support the government and were united against 
foreign intrusion (Ghobar 1981, 808). It is noteworthy that the young Afghan movement 
had a significant role in creating the spirit of independence and xenophobia among Afghan 
people. 
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Afghan xenophobia as an aspect of Afghan 
culture could be attributed to the tribal and ethnic basis of the Afghan society. For 
instance, Pashtun’s xenophobic tendencies that emanate from Pashtunwali codes could be 
highlighted as a huge tribal anti-foreign force in this regard.  
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 In addition, the Great Britain in the third Angolo Afghan war and the Soviets following 
their invasion in 1979 confronted with the most common, effective and systemic 
xenophobia. Indeed, the Afghan tribes considered both of the mentioned invaders as a 
grave menace to the Afghan territorial integrity and to Islam. Consequently, they 
demonstrated a strong feeling of xenophobia, which mobilized them against foreign 
invasion. It is worth pointing out that when the government’s policies disregarded Afghan 
tribes’ autonomy, the tribes inevitably resisted to them, which demonstrates internal scale 
of Afghan’s xenophobic resistance.  
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Figure ‎6-1: Structure of Chapter Six 
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 A Summary of the Findings  6.1.
Several efforts to modernize Afghanistan and decentralize Afghan government’s authority 
throughout modern history of Afghanistan led to the failure. This study has scrutinized two 
periods of these efforts to illuminate the character of the resistances that bothered the 
governments to achieve their desired goals. 
The blunder that was outstandingly disastrous to King Amanullah’s and the PDPA’s 
regimes was their negligence in considering appropriately the significant role of the local 
solidarity groups, whose influence were all-pervasive. In addition, the king during the first 
stage of his reforms comprehended that the mentioned groups could be either support or 
potential menace to stability of his government; thus, he made some efforts to attract their 
support, through Jihad proclamation and launching pan-Islamism movement. Nonetheless, 
the PDPA’s government did not consider the mentioned groups neither as a support nor as 
a grave threat to their policies. The study has illustrated how King Amanullah at the outset 
of his reign handled the local solidarity groups and managed to attain the religious 
scholars’ and tribal chiefs’ supports to be united against the British hegemony. In other 
words, the king comprehended the national identity could be regarded as a consequential 
factor to bring together the different social and political forces in the country. It is worth 
pointing out that the king’s regime, due to being an indigenous political system could 
recognize the significance of national identity in Afghanistan. However, the PDPA was a 
non-indigenous and as a consequence the authority could not even comprehend the Afghan 
national identity and made no effort to attain the support from the solidarity groups and 
also be united with against foreign hegemony.  
King Amanullah taking advantage of the national identity was capable of attending the 
support of religious and traditional forces in the third Angolo Afghan war 1919. Indeed, the 
king as a result of the support from the mentioned forces was able to withdraw the British 
troops. It is worth pointing out that Ulema declaring Jihad against the British encouraged 
the popular forces to support the king, which effectuated that the government attained a 
substantial popular backing in the independence war. The king, unlike his predecessors, 
arranged many privileges for religious scholars and offered freedom to them in conducting 
the religious affairs at least in the first years of his reign. Consequently, religious leader 
were very satisfied with the king’s approach and fulfilled a fundamental function in 
conducting the first stage of his reform programme. The PDPA regime initially 
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demonstrated no opposition to religious leaders and both Taraki and Amin endeavoured to 
recognize ostensibly their rights; however, the regime’s policies were grave menace to the 
interests and principles of the religious class. 
Despite the fact that the majority of the local solidarity groups initially supported 
Amanullah’s regime and also demonstrated no opposition to the PDPA’s regime, the clash 
commenced when the central government interfered in traditional rules and Islamic values 
with the intention of modifying them and fulfilling radical modernizations. These 
measures effectuated that Amanullah’s government became deprived of the legitimacy, 
which was granted by religious elites as well as the PDPA never could obtain even a 
minimum level of it from religious elites. 
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that King Amanullah’s initial policies to attain 
the support of the local solidarity groups were unstable owing to his political and social 
modifications. The king secularized and westernized his reform programme particularly 
following his journey to Europe in 1928, which inevitably resulted in failure of his reforms 
and collapse of his government. Furthermore, it goes without saying that when the PDPA’s 
government’s modernization programme trampled the Afghan traditional rules, the society 
demonstrated intense resistance to the state policies, as well as diverse elements of the 
society as a consequence of having a common threat became a united force to preserve 
their values.  
It is particularly significant that both regimes’ reforms as a result of their anti-religious and 
anti-tribal characters accomplished alien social and political rules in the country, and they, 
therefore, challenged with several grave reactions from the public against the alien rules. It 
is likely that Islam could be designated as a common character among all the resistance 
movements. Indeed, it was the connection point for different local solidarity groups and 
the main pillar of Afghan identity and thus every irreconcilable policy in this regard was 
doomed to failure. Additionally, such ideological background along with tribal identity 
empowered the local solidarity groups to be as the most determinative forces in the Afghan 
society. It is likewise worth pointing out that in consequence of intensifying international 
challenges such as the Great Game and the Cold War in twentieth centuries and 
simultaneously fulfilling modernization efforts, the function of Islam to coalesce the 
several Afghan tribal and local groups into a united force and protecting Islamic and tribal 
values became specifically essential. Furthermore, owing to such circumstances both 
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Shariah and Pashtunwali regarded critical menace from the external factors and also from 
the governments’ modernization programmes, and they, therefore, were coerced into 
reacting. 
It goes without saying that both studied regimes adopted some policies to centralized their 
controls and decentralize their authorities. It is quite clear that conducting such policies in 
the Afghan society, whose foundation was based on traditional and tribal factors, were so 
critical to the administrations. Although King Amanullah Kahn sought to arrange an 
organized army, neither his regime nor the PDPA’s one had a reliable army to assist them 
in centralizing their controls and decentralizing their authorities. It is particularly 
significant that the regimes’ policies in this regard were absolutely critical to local 
solidarity groups’ authority and also for their traditional power. Accordingly, they 
challenged authorities to reclaim their traditional function and influence. Furthermore, 
another group that was overwhelmed by the regimes’ mentioned policies was the religious 
one that was deprived of its privileges and also the authorities disregarded its beliefs. Thus, 
they were integrated into the local solidarity groups and supported anti-government revolts 
throughout the country. There can be no doubt that in consequence of lack of an organized 
army none of the regimes were capable of managing effectively the opposition.  
It is worth pointing out that none of the regimes regarded an appropriate proposal to 
implement the reforms. The first case study demonstrates the remarkable function of the 
king’s Turkish advisers in the process of reform-making and the second case highlights the 
Russians’ performance in this regard. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Turks 
and Russians advised the Afghan government according to the western method of change 
and improvement, which was very inappropriate for the Afghan society, was unfamiliar 
with such method of improvement. 
It goes without saying that the authorities enforced the reforms on the society with the 
intention of implementing radical change in the country, regardless paying sufficient 
attention to the social and political background of the country. Although the regimes 
seemed to be very desirous to modernize the country, their aggressive policies to impose 
their hasty reforms on the Afghan people demonstrate that they were substantially far from 
principles of the modernization. 
Amanullah’s regime provided conditions for tribal chiefs and religious elites to attain 
political power more than any other Afghan regimes. It goes without saying that 
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achievement initial legitimacy, attainment tribal support and subsequently accomplishment 
some political success could be regarded as results of adopting such policy. In addition, the 
PDPA’s regime did not consider religious and tribal factors as supportive factors in the 
implementation of its policies. Consequently, the opposition challenged the government’s 
policies from the beginning, and it, therefore, requested the foreign support to implement 
its policies. 
It is worth pointing out that none of the regimes had adequate financial resources to 
implement the reform programme; therefore, conducting fundamental economic reforms 
before social and political ones were very essential. Nonetheless, the authorities 
disregarded the fact that proposing some particular reforms to solve economic problems of 
the people were supposed to be observed as a priority. Despite the fact that both regimes 
implemented the fiscal and tax reforms, their outcomes imposed further tax and economic 
pressure on the people.  
Although Amanullah’s reforms did not attain the desired goals, there is not a shadow of 
doubt that it was the termination of backwardness of the country and also provided the 
background for making further reforms by the subsequent regimes especially the PDPA. 
One could draw the conclusion that both regimes’ administrational efforts were capable of 
conducting the country’s administration system in the course of development. 
Furthermore, their educational and cultural activities significantly raised the general 
knowledge of the Afghan people and largely moderated traditionalism and radicalism in 
the Afghan society. 
It is particularly significant that Afghanistan owing to its strategic position was the scene 
of the rivalry between the great powers. As a result, it became a buffer state between 
Russia and Britain from the late nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century. The 
colonial competition between these colonial powers, known as the Great Game, 
effectuated the phenomenon of foreign intervention and invasions of Afghanistan. 
Amanullah’s policy was initially based on opposition to British colonialism and fulfilling 
nationalism. Although Afghanistan could gain independence from the British in August 
1919, the British retained involvement in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. When, the Soviet 
observed Britain’s position in Afghanistan endeavoured to establish a good relationship 
with the king and due to that the country became the scene of rivalry between Britain and 
the Soviet.  
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It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the Soviet Union assisted the communist 
regime of the PDPA to rise to power with the intention of increasing its domination in 
Afghanistan, as well as the Cold War resulted in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Although it is believed that the Khalq faction encouraged the Soviet to attack Afghanistan, 
there were many other reasons for the Soviet invasion. Indeed, it goes without saying that 
the PDPA was incapable of fulfilling the Soviet interests and handling Mujahidin’s 
opposition. It is worth pointing out that Afghanistan was an important crossroad in the 
region between India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. Accordingly, the Soviet wanted to reach 
closer to Iran’s oil field and trade way through Indian Ocean. 
Indeed, superpowers’ intervention and subsequently their invasion along with internal 
conflict and competition destabilized the foundations of the state and effectuated instability 
in Afghanistan. It is quite clear that owing to superpowers’ substantial influence on the 
Afghan state each policy to handle the internal disorders from the beginning was doomed 
to failure. This is because foreign agents forced the Afghan authorities to regard their 
policies and interests in implementing any kind of change and modification. Furthermore, 
by virtue of competition between religious intellectual and tribal chiefs an opportunity was 
provided for foreigners to implement their policies in Afghanistan, thus each group of 
elites that took the power need foreign support to maintain its power.  
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that resistances of traditional forces such as tribal 
and religious groups to the central government were the primary factors, and rivalries and 
interventions of the superpowers such as Russia and Britain were the secondary factors in 
disrupting the modernizing process and failure of the reformist regimes throughout 
Afghanistan’s modern history. 
 Recommendations 6.2.
Centralizing the power and decentralizing the authority in Afghanistan are particularly in 
need of human and financial resources. The arrangement of these necessities is essentially 
related to fulfilling unity between local solidarity groups and the central government. 
Furthermore, such unity can be only established by a political structure that regarded tribal 
and religious requirements and regarded the local solidarity groups’ rights. It is quite clear 
that an aggressive and oppressive policy like the PDPA’s does not assist the government to 
provide a strong sense of unity in the country. It is worth pointing out that the government 
should be regarded the consequential role of the tribal and religious elites, whose support 
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can provide legitimacy and popularity for it. Besides, the mentioned elites could fill the 
historical gaps the Afghan people and the Afghan government. 
It does not seem unreasonable to recommend that an Afghan government should be 
originated from the heart of society and its policies are supposed to be matched with the 
people’s demands. This importance is an essential strategy to legitimize and nationalize the 
apparatus of the government. Furthermore, the authority is supposed to fulfil the requests 
of the people regardless of their political and social orientations. A functional and 
responsible political system in Afghanistan requires a constitution that considers national 
interests. It is worth pointing out that providing further power for the local and tribal forces 
would increase domestic support for the government and also decentralize the Afghan 
authority.  
The Afghan government is supposed to provide the condition to improve the education 
system. It is particularly significant that the important and essential step in developing 
Afghanistan is conducting reforms in the education system, which could assist the Afghan 
society to release from the superstition and traditional beliefs. Besides, it could likewise 
provide professional and educated staff for the government.  
Foreign support is significant for the Afghan government in implementing its policies. In 
addition, the foreign powers seek for their own interests in Afghanistan, which are 
incompatible with the Afghan people’s interests. Making fundamental and consequential 
reforms and put Afghanistan on the course of development without foreign support are 
problematic; however, foreign powers should endeavour to implement supportive policies 
instead of interventionist policies.  
 Avenues of Future Research 6.3.
Nationalist-reformist movements throughout the twentieth century in the Middle Eastern 
countries such as Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, initiated to examine cautiously the Western 
methods and procedures of political and social reforms in order to provide adaptable 
reforms for the Islamic societies and their administrative system. In some countries, these 
reforms were successful and in others, they were faced with the resistance and failure. This 
thesis has focused on the two epochs of reform and resistance in Afghanistan in the 
twentieth century, and regarded some factors as the roots of the failure of the Afghan 
reformist regimes. The similar factors might be the reasons for the resistance and failure of 
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the reform attempts in the other countries like Iran, which could be suggested as an idea of 
further research in this regard. 
The two most influential groups in Afghanistan that always played remarkable function 
along with the Afghan governments were religious and tribal groups. This thesis focused 
on their resistance to the government’s reform programme, which disturbed the 
government in conducting successfully their policies. Furthermore, there were internal 
challenges among several tribal groups that offered further opportunity for the 
superpowers to seek their interests in Afghanistan that invites further research to scrutinize 
tribal challenges in this regard. 
Finally, the current Afghan government’s policies and resistance to them might be another 
field of the study to discover the reasons for the resistance to the government’s policies 
and also scrutinize that the historical roots of the failure of the government’s policies are 
still functioning or not. 
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